Global connectivity architecture of mobile personal devices by Ford, Bryan, 1973-
UIA: A Global Connectivity Architecture
for Mobile Personal Devices
by
Bryan Alexander Ford
B.Sc. Computer Science
University of Utah, 1998
M.Sc. Computer Science and Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science and Engineering
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2008
c© 2008 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
August 29, 2008
Certified by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M. Frans Kaashoek
Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Terry P. Orlando
Chair, Department Committee on Graduate Students
2
UIA: A Global Connectivity Architecture
for Mobile Personal Devices
by
Bryan Alexander Ford
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
on August 29, 2008, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science and Engineering
Abstract
The Internet’s architecture, designed in the days of large, stationary computers tended by technically
savvy and accountable administrators, fails to meet the demands of the emerging ubiquitous com-
puting era. Nontechnical users now routinely own multiple personal devices, many of them mobile,
and need to share information securely among them using interactive, delay-sensitive applications.
Unmanaged Internet Architecture (UIA) is a novel, incrementally deployable network archi-
tecture for modern personal devices, which reconsiders three architectural cornerstones: naming,
routing, and transport. UIA augments the Internet’s global name system with a personal name sys-
tem, enabling users to build personal administrative groups easily and intuitively, to establish secure
bindings between his devices and with other users’ devices, and to name his devices and his friends
much like using a cell phone’s address book. To connect personal devices reliably, even while mo-
bile, behind NATs or firewalls, or connected via isolated ad hoc networks, UIA gives each device
a persistent, location-independent identity, and builds an overlay routing service atop IP to resolve
and route among these identities. Finally, to support today’s interactive applications built using
concurrent transactions and delay-sensitive media streams, UIA introduces a new structured stream
transport abstraction, which solves the efficiency and responsiveness problems of TCP streams and
the functionality limitations of UDP datagrams.
Preliminary protocol designs and implementations demonstrate UIA’s features and benefits. A
personal naming prototype supports easy and portable group management, allowing use of personal
names alongside global names in unmodified Internet applications. A prototype overlay router
leverages the naming layer’s social network to provide efficient ad hoc connectivity in restricted but
important common-case scenarios. Simulations of more general routing protocols—one inspired
by distributed hash tables, one based on recent compact routing theory—explore promising gener-
alizations to UIA’s overlay routing. A library-based prototype of UIA’s structured stream transport
enables incremental deployment in either OS infrastructure or applications, and demonstrates the
responsiveness benefits of the new transport abstraction via dynamic prioritization of interactive
web downloads. Finally, an exposition and experimental evaluation of NAT traversal techniques
provides insight into routing optimizations useful in UIA and elsewhere.
Thesis Supervisor: M. Frans Kaashoek
Title: Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The original Internet architecture was designed to connect large mainframe computers, which were
tended by trustworthy experts and whose primary communication applications were text-oriented
messaging, remote terminal login, and bulk data transfer. The Internet has fundamentally changed
since then, particularly since its commercialization: not only in scale but in many qualitative re-
spects. Today anyone can own their own computer and connect it to the Internet, so the majority of
Internet devices are now owned and managed by end users with minimal technical knowledge and
limited accountability for their actions. Many devices are portable and move frequently with their
users, such as laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and smart cell phones. The application
profile has changed as well: modern users are just as likely to use the Internet for streaming voice or
video communication, or transaction-oriented web browsing or remote file system access, as for tra-
ditional text-oriented messaging and bulk file transfer. Modern users expect their personal devices
to “just work,” providing reliable and responsive performance across diverse applications, without
their having to understand protocol details such as IP addresses and DNS records, and without nec-
essarily having a clear understanding of how to protect themselves from now-rampant viruses and
other malware. But the protocols underlying the Internet’s original mainframe-oriented design are
not up to this task.
This thesis takes a step toward addressing these problems by rethinking basic elements of the
Internet architecture around the needs of modern users and their ubiquitous personal devices, to
create Unmanaged Internet Architecture (UIA), a novel global connectivity architecture designed
to support these personal devices more effectively. “Unmanaged” refers to the primary goal of
making devices and protocols “just work” reliably and responsively in a wide variety of contexts
and for a wide variety of applications, without requiring configuration or technical knowledge on
behalf of the user. UIA is intended to augment the traditional Internet architecture, not replace
it, thereby providing a practical and incrementally deployable approach to addressing some of the
current architecture’s shortcomings.
While many elements of the Internet’s architecture ultimately need to be reconsidered around
the requirements of personal devices, UIA focuses on three major functional areas: naming, routing,
and transport. UIA introduces new networking abstractions and protocols into each of these major
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Figure 1-1: Architectural diagram of UIA and how it fits into the Internet architecture
function blocks, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. After first introducing the common theme of decen-
tralization upon which many elements of UIA’s design rests, subsequent sections briefly introduce
UIA’s new architectural components in each of these functional areas. Later thesis chapters will
explore these functional areas in detail.
1.1 An Emphasis on Decentralization
A primary objective of UIA and a common theme throughout its design is the goal of building a fully
decentralized architecture, in which personal devices do not inherently have to rely on the existence
or accessibility of centralized services in order to communicate and function properly. This focus
on decentralization has three primary motivations.
• Management Autonomy: First, a centralized connectivity architecture forces the user to reg-
ister with or subscribe to some service (e.g., allocate a domain name and static IP address),
talk to an expert who can set things up for him, or perhaps even deploy such a service himself
(e.g., set up a Mobile IP [185] home server), before his devices will be able to communicate
with each other properly. UIA’s philosophy is that users should not be forced by the architec-
ture to wade through bureaucratic “red tape” of one kind or another before their own devices
will be able to communicate with each other in natural peer-to-peer fashion. A decentralized
architecture can still allow the user to associate with and make use of centralized services—
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indeed, for many high-level services such as airline reservations, a centralized architecture
is indeed most natural—but a decentralized connectivity architecture makes such registration
optional and not assumed, enabling the user to communicate among his personal devices even
without having made some or any of them known to central services.
• Availability: Second, global Internet connectivity is not always available from every location
we may need to use our personal devices, or equally fast or inexpensive even when it is avail-
able. UIA’s philosophy is that two users sitting next to each other on a bus or plane without
Internet access should still be able to communicate and work together via their devices over
an ad hoc wireless LAN, without their connectivity or naming regime breaking or substan-
tially changing just because they temporarily lack access to central Internet services. Even if
“always-available” wireless Internet services eventually reach every corner of the planet, an
ability to communicate and operate within a local area independently of central services may
still be important whenever global communication is substantially slower or more expensive
than local-area communication. Further, during times of crisis or natural disaster, a whole
geographic region might be temporarily disconnected from the rest of the Internet, and it is at
such times that personal device users within such a region are most in need of their devices to
continue to function and communicate, to whatever extent is theoretically possible under the
circumstances.
• Privacy: Third, a communication system that relies on centralized services unavoidably
“leaks” information to the operators of those services, which can create security and privacy
concerns for both individual and corporate users. Even a fully decentralized system cannot
necessarily prevent such information leakage entirely, since global communication traffic still
has to flow through untrusted intermediaries such as network providers and ISPs, and even
encrypted traffic may be susceptible to traffic analysis. A fully decentralized design neverthe-
less minimizes the amount of information that needs to be explicitly exposed to third parties
merely in order for the communication system to function.
Some parts of UIA’s design could be made substantially simpler by giving up this emphasis on
decentralization and making personal devices rely on central “authoritative” servers; these potential
simplifications will be pointed out at the appropriate places.
1.2 Naming
In order to connect to remote devices, services, and users over the Internet, users first need to be
able to name those remote entities in order to identify the desired communication target(s). There
are many possible approaches to naming, many involving tradeoffs between different goals such
as ease of use, name conciseness, portability, and implementation complexity. A crucial issue in
any naming system is how names and namespaces are managed; different approaches to naming
often imply different paradigms for name management. The Internet’s traditional naming paradigm
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Figure 1-2: The Internet’s traditional global naming hierarchy
is built around global names, but UIA enhances the Internet to support a new and complementary
naming paradigm called personal names.
1.2.1 Global Names
The Internet’s existing domain name system (DNS) [258] provides globally unique names based
on a hierarchy of name registration services. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
delegates each top-level domain such as .com and .edu to a specific organization, each of which
manages the allocation of sub-domains such as meraki.com or mit.edu according to various
administrative policies. These authorities in turn delegate registration authority for sub-domains to
the organizations that own them, and so on. Figure 1-2 illustrates this traditional global naming
hierarchy.
To name a particular device in this scheme, so that the device can be accessed remotely from
anywhere on the Internet, the device’s owner must register the device: i.e., find a unique, not-yet-
allocated name in some domain within this administrative hierarchy, and follow appropriate regis-
tration procedures defined by the owner of that domain. For example, to make my work PC globally
reachable via the name xi.csail.mit.edu, I had to register the name xi with my work or-
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ganization, CSAIL, which manages the domain .csail.mit.edu, and derives its authority to
manage that domain from MIT (the authority for .mit.edu), which in turn derives from the top-
level registrar for the .edu domain and ultimately from IANA. This naming architecture implies
that names are globally unique, meaning that they can in theory be used from any device on the
Internet and will always refer or resolve to the same target, but it also means that these names must
be administratively registered in order to enforce this global uniqueness: i.e., CSAIL’s registration
process is responsible for ensuring that only one device can be named xi.csail.mit.edu at
once. Ultimately, what this means to ordinary Internet users is that when naming their devices with
DNS, they can use only names that are not already taken (and in these post-Internet-land-rush days
most of the “good” ones are already taken), and users must obtain (often purchase) the use of those
names from some registration authority in the DNS hierarchy.
Global uniqueness of names is a valuable property for certain types of names to have: par-
ticularly names corresponding to global brands or other trademarks such as amazon.com. As
companies have realized since early in the “.com boom,” having a unique, memorable “online brand
name” such as amazon.com, which people can type into any web browser to reach the company’s
web site, is crucial to E-commerce and to “online presence” in general. And companies are willing
to pay far more than the nominal registration fees to obtain “premium” names corresponding to
recognizable words or phrases [238].
1.2.2 Personal Names
But when a user wishes to connect remotely not to a global online brand, but rather to one of his
own personal devices—or to that of a friend—global uniqueness is less important than simplicity
and convenience. For example, a casual tourist may wish to upload photos from his WiFi-enabled
digital camera directly to his home PC or to a family member’s PDA, and a business traveller may
need remote access from her laptop to files on her work PC or a colleague’s. In this situation, it
is common for the device initiating the communication to be owned by or otherwise administra-
tively associated with the user, which means that the initiating device’s own identity can provide
context for naming the remote device to be accessed. For example, if Alice has only one work
PC, and she wishes to access it from her own account on her own laptop or home PC, it would
be more convenient for her to be able to use a shorter, simpler name like work-pc instead of
work-pc.alice.csail.mit.edu. Even though work-pc is probably not globally unique
(there are many people in the world who have work PCs that they may wish to name work-pc),
that may be fine if Alice has only one device named work-pc and the device initiating the connec-
tion knows that it is Alice who is requesting the connection. We refer to such a non-globally-unique
name as a personal name, since its interpretation context is personal to the user.
A useful analogy is the address book on a modern cell phone, which allows the phone’s owner
to use short, convenient names like Bob and Mom instead of cryptic, globally unique phone num-
bers to call people the phone’s owner dials regularly. Indeed, we might consider such an address
book to be a personal naming system. The personal naming system that traditional address books
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provide are not adequate for personal Internet devices, however. Users increasingly have many
more Internet-connected devices than they have cellular accounts or phone numbers, and separately
managing address books on each of those devices quickly becomes cumbersome and impractical.
Current address book synchronization software typically either operates between only a specific pair
of personal devices—e.g., between one smart phone and one laptop or desktop PC, leaving other
personal devices’ address books unsynchronized—or it operates between one or more personal de-
vices and a central server deployed by a device manufacturer or service provider, in which case this
synchronization and personal naming is unavailable whenever devices are disconnected from the
Internet or from their designated cellular network. To meet the demands of modern Internet users,
personal devices must not only support convenient personal names, but must be able to keep them
synchronized automatically across an arbitrary number of personal devices, and those names must
be usable even in partial connectivity situations: e.g., when Bob and Alice are travelling together
in a bus or plane and need to share information between their devices while they have no Internet
access or cellular coverage.
A basic assumption underlying the idea of personal names is that the devices through which
the user typically works or accesses the network—i.e., the terminals responsible for interpreting
these personal names—are either owned by or somehow affiliated with the user, and thus have some
personal user context in which to interpret these personal names. This assumption fails in the case
of public-access terminals, such as those found in an airport or Internet cafe´: since a public terminal
has no prior affiliation with the user, it typically has no context in which to resolve personal names,
so only global names are directly usable at such terminals. (A user could still use a public terminal
to log into a remote machine or account via a global name, and from there use personal names
to reach his other devices or services.) Given the trends of personal Internet devices becoming
increasing cheap and readily available [152, 204], the ubiquitous availability of WiFi hotspots [1]
and mobile broadband [41] for use with consumer-owned devices, and the well-known security
risks inherent in the use of public-access terminals [218,256], it appears safe to assume that private
devices rather than public terminals will remain the primary means by which most users access the
network, satisfying the main requirement for personal names to be useful.
1.2.3 UIA Personal Names and Personal Groups
The Unmanaged Internet Architecture is not designed to replace DNS, the Internet’s existing global
naming system, but rather to augment it with a personal naming system that can work alongside
DNS. With UIA, the user can still use global names like amazon.com, but can also use personal
names like laptop or pda.alice (meaning “Alice’s PDA”).
A key technical challenge in create such a personal name system is defining the context or scope
in which these personal names are to be resolved: this context should be larger than a single device,
so that the user does not have to administer one address book for each device he owns or operates,
but it should be small enough that the user does not have to worry about his names conflicting
with those assigned by other users. That is, the personal naming context needs to correspond to
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Figure 1-3: An example UIA personal group containing four devices, each with a personal name
the user’s personal administrative domain: the complete set of personal devices (or accounts on
shared devices or services) that the user manages. For this purpose, UIA introduces the concept of
personal groups, which delineate a symmetric group of devices or accounts in which to scope the
user’s naming activities. Figure 1-3 illustrates a personal group containing four devices, which may
be scattered across the Internet, each having its own personal name that may be used from any other
device in the group.
It is crucial for personal groups to be both secure and easy to set up and manage. Since we
expect users may wish to share sensitive personal information among their devices via UIA personal
names, it is important that attackers not be able to “spoof” a user’s device, causing the user to log
in to or leak information to the wrong device. Similarly, an attacker must not be able to add devices
to a user’s personal group or modify the name bindings in the group without the user’s permission,
and if the user retires, sells, or loses a personal device, the user must be able to revoke that device’s
membership in the group so that its new owner does not obtain private information about or access
to the user’s personal group. But the user needs an easy way to set up and manage his personal
group while satisfying all of these security requirements.
For this purpose UIA builds on the idea of device introduction [65, 233]. Users build their per-
sonal groups by introducing them, typically “in person” over a local-area network; the introduction
process includes a simple random phrase comparison procedure that allows the devices to exchange
cryptographic keys securely while ensuring that the devices involved in the procedure are in fact the
ones the user(s) believe to be involved. One the user has introduced more than one device into a
group, UIA uses optimistic replication [106, 134, 245] to keep the user’s personal namespace syn-
chronized among all the devices in the group. UIA personal groups can name not only devices but
other personal groups: thus, if Bob’s personal group has a name alice referring to Alice’s per-
sonal group, and Alice’s personal group includes a device named pda, then Bob can refer to Alice’s
PDA as pda.alice.
Group membership revocation presents a particular challenge in UIA, because there may not be
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a clear central point of control, such as a “master device” or an online service, which can always
uniquely determine the set of members of a group at a particular point in time. If one or more of
Alice’s personal devices are stolen, for example, then she needs to revoke the lost devices’ mem-
bership in her group so that the thief will not be able to use those devices to authenticate as her
or remotely access her personal information, and so that Bob’s name alice will henceforth refer
only to Alice’s remaining devices and not to the stolen ones. But whatever revocation mechanism
Alice may invoke on her remaining devices, the thief could also invoke that mechanism on the
stolen devices (assuming the thief breaks whatever local login/account security those devices may
provide), in order to try to steal the identity of Alice’s group and make Bob’s name alice refer
to the thief’s stolen devices instead of Alice’s remaining ones. Although a variety of approaches to
this revocation and identity management problem are possible, the prototype UIA design explores a
highly decentralized approach in which all personal devices in a group are considered “equals” and
irreconcilable “revocation dispute” must in the worst case be resolved by manual re-introduction.
1.2.4 Centralized Designs for Personal Groups and Personal Naming
UIA’s personal group management mechanism could be substantially simplified by de-emphasizing
the goal of full decentralization and making devices reliant on a central service of some kind. Per-
sonal devices could for example connect to a user’s account on Facebook [76] or another Web-based
social networking service, and rely on that service to define the user’s identity and his namespace
of personal devices and other users. The client-side software for such a mechanism would probably
be substantially simpler than UIA’s because it could always rely on the central Facebook servers to
maintain the “authoritative” state about the user’s identity and personal names in one central loca-
tion. The issues of conflicting namespace changes and revocation disputes would disappear since
there would be only one “master” state repository.
As pointed out already in Section 1.1, however, such a design would require the user to register
with Facebook before his devices can communicate with each other at all, it would render the
personal naming system inoperative whenever the central Facebook service is inaccessible, and it
would create security and privacy concerns by forcing users to disclose complete information about
their personal administrative domains to Facebook and anyone else with (legitimate or otherwise)
access to Facebook’s servers. And replacing the risk of revocation disputes in UIA’s decentralized
design, the centralized design would create the danger of the user’s Facebook account being hacked
and the user’s entire personal administrative domain being effectively stolen all at once, leaving
the user powerless to recover or even safely disable his identity until he can successfully navigate
Facebook’s customer support system and somehow “prove” his rightful ownership of the account.
1.3 Routing
The Internet’s original routing architecture was designed around the assumption that each Internet
host would be given a unique IP address within a single global address space [92, 121, 201], and
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that every host would be able to communicate with every other. A number of evolutionary pressures
have since compromised these assumptions, however.
1.3.1 Eroding Any-to-Any Connectivity
Since all Internet hosts are no longer run by trustworthy (or at least accountable) system adminis-
trators, and security systems built into end hosts are frequently inadequate, users and organizations
have pervasively deployed firewalls [49,89,109,172] to protect private networks from unwanted traf-
fic originating from external sources. While specific firewall policies vary widely, the most common
default policy, which typically applies to all traffic in the absence of application-specific rules, is to
deny “unsolicited” incoming connections originating from the external side of the firewall, while al-
lowing outgoing connections originating from within the private network. While this default policy
has the benefit of protecting the internal network from a wide variety of remote packet-level attacks
while allowing typical client/server applications to operate normally—at least when the client is on
the private network and the server is on the public network—it prevents users from remotely access-
ing even their own devices (e.g., a work PC) located behind such a firewall, without making special
administrative provisions.
Worse, the gradual depletion of the 32-bit address space of IPv4 [121], coupled with the admin-
istrative challenges and costs of allocating and managing IP subnets within the global address space,
have led to pervasive deployment of network address translators (NATs) [70, 113, 228, 230], which
create private IP address spaces [111,198] for corporate or home networks, within which hosts may
be assigned IP addresses independently of the Internet’s “official” hierarchical of IP address alloca-
tion scheme [92,199,201]. NATs typically multiplex many private IP addresses onto one or a small
number of public IP addresses, using the IP addresses and TCP/UDP port numbers of individual
sessions to determine how to translate the addresses in traffic flowing in both directions across the
NAT. Whereas the “deny unsolicited incoming connections” rule for firewalls is an administrative
choice (albeit a particularly common one), for NATs this rule is technically essential: it is a side-
effect of the fact that the NAT simply does not know to what internal host it should route incoming
packets unless a binding for the flow was previously established by earlier packets flowing from the
appropriate internal host to the external network.
IP version 6 [62] may eventually eliminate one motivation for NAT deployment—namely IP
address space depletion—but it does not eliminate other incentives such as the administrative con-
venience of managing private IP address spaces independently of upstream Internet providers, and
in the near term it even creates the additional incentive of providing convenient interoperability be-
tween IPv4 and IPv6 address domains [107, 251]. And firewalls will remain commonplace in the
IPv6 world even if NATs eventually are not.
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1.3.2 Host Mobility and IP Address Instability
Independently of firewalls and NATs, the fact that an increasing percentage of Internet-attached
hosts are small, mobile devices such as laptops and PDAs creates another complication not ad-
dressed by the Internet’s original design: Internet routing protocols depend on the structure of IP
addresses [201] for efficient routing [92], which means that IP addresses must be assigned according
to the topological network location at which the device is attached at a given time. Unfortunately
this means that whenever the device moves, its address changes: if a DNS record associates a host
name with a particular IP address, that host name will no longer work if the host moves to a different
network attachment point and changes its address.
Further, IP address autoconfiguration mechanisms such as Dynamic Host Configuration Proto-
col (DHCP) [5,68], intended to simplify the administration of IP address spaces, make IP addresses
even less stable, in that a host may change IP addresses merely by virtue of being turned off or
disconnected from the network for some time period even if it hasn’t physically moved. Since trans-
port and application protocols typically rely on IP addresses to define end-to-end communication
endpoints, not only does IP address instability complicate device naming, but already-established
transport connections and application sessions generally fail whenever a host’s IP address changes
for any reason.
Various partial solutions to these problems have been developed. Dynamic DNS [258] enables
a host to change its name record whenever it changes IP addresses, but existing transport sessions
still break at this point, and the host generally remains unreachable whenever it is behind a firewall
or NAT. Mobile IP [185] gives each mobile host a static “home” IP address that can tunnel traffic to
the host’s actual, dynamic location: this solution can traverse firewalls and NATs, and can preserve
transport sessions across location changes. Mobile IP’s approach has several downsides, however:
setting up the host’s “home” IP address and the tunneling association requires considerable manual
setup, permanently stable IP addresses to act as these “home” locations are increasingly scarce and
costly, the tunneling indirection adds communication latency to all traffic and increases load on the
host’s home network whenever the device is roaming, and the host is unreachable from anywhere if
its home network or tunneling server become unavailable. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [165]
and shim6 [220] address mobility by introducing a layer between the network and transport layers
that translates between the network layer’s hierarchically structured, location-dependent locators
and flat, location-independent host identities, but neither HIP or shim6 have defined general mech-
anisms to resolve and route on these location-independent identities.
1.3.3 UIA Routing
The Unmanaged Internet Architecture provides an overlay routing layer that operates on top of
the Internet’s existing routing layer to provide robust peer-to-peer connectivity between personal
devices even when those devices are mobile and/or behind firewalls or NATs, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1-4. UIA’s routing layer generalizes HIP’s notion of location-independent host identities into
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Figure 1-4: Global connectivity challenges for the UIA overlay routing layer
a notion of location-independent endpoint identities (EIDs) that can refer not only to hosts but to
individual users or user accounts on a particular host, so each user of a shared host can have a sep-
arate EID with independent application endpoint and service namespaces. The UIA routing layer
furthermore includes a self-organizing distributed protocol allowing cooperating hosts to search for
and connect with arbitrary EIDs on demand, even when the target EID is on a mobile and/or NATted
host.
There are many possible approaches to designing a specific routing protocol to serve as UIA’s
overlay routing layer, and the best approach is not yet clear since the design space is large and in-
volves a wide variety of pragmatic constraints and tradeoffs. We therefore explore three different
approaches to UIA routing: a simple but easily deployed routing protocol optimized for the “com-
mon case” of communication within a social network; and two more general routing schemes, based
on distributed hash tables and compact routing theory, respectively.
Social Routing
UIA’s social routing protocol leverages the user’s social network, as defined by the UIA naming
layer, to optimize for the common case in which the user communicates most frequently with
friends and colleagues. Each UIA host tracks and regularly communicates with some number of
other hosts in order to maintain the overlay routing structure, and prioritizes tracked hosts based on
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social proximity or friendship distance, so that peer-to-peer connections to primary communication
partners will succeed as quickly and reliably as possible. Leveraging the user’s social network in
this way also takes advantage of the implicit trust and incentive structure provided by the social net-
work: users are more likely to want to permit their hosts to serve as rendezvous points or forwarding
intermediaries for their trusted friends than for random strangers.
In the basic, currently deployed version of the UIA routing protocol, a host finds a given target
EID by token-limited flooding. The search initiator first allocates some number of tokens to the
search, which constrains the total amount of network bandwidth (in terms of number of messages)
that can be consumed by the search, and divides these tokens up among the immediate friends
(social neighbors) it can contact. The initiator forwards a search request to each of these friends
with an indicator of the appropriate token count; each of these friends responds directly if has
information about the current location of the target EID, otherwise it further subdivides the tokens
it received among its friends and re-broadcasts the request to those friends, and so on. The original
initiator uses a small token count for the first iteration of the search, but increases the token count
for subsequent search attempts if earlier attempts fail. Thus, successful searches for EIDs close to
the initiator in the social graph tend to complete very quickly and inexpensively, while searches for
EIDs farther away are more expensive but still have a chance of completing.
Identity Hash Routing
A second overlay routing scheme for UIA, identity hash routing, builds on distributed hash table
(DHT) concepts [147,149,157,196,211,236,273]. Each node uses its pseudorandom EID to deter-
mine its logical position within a distributed structure, and registers itself with other nodes having
high identifier affinity with its own EID (i.e., some number of bits of common identifier prefix), so
that searches for a given EID can be guaranteed to succeed in a correct, fully-functioning n-node
network after contacting at most O(log n) identifier lookup stages.
While classic DHTs only provide a scalable lookup service and assume the underlying network
provides full any-to-any connectivity, UIA’s scalable routing protocol makes the more pragmatic
assumption that some pairs of nodes can communicate directly via IP routing and others cannot,
or require NAT traversal techniques [30, 83, 100, 101] involving an intermediary rendezvous node
in order to do so. To handle such asymmetries in connectivity, UIA’s scalable routing protocol
allows DHT routing table entries to contain not just “direct” pointers (i.e., IP addresses) but also
indirect pointers representing either “flat” source routes or virtual links that build hierarchically on
combinations of other routing table entries.
Compact Routing
The third overlay routing scheme explored here is based on recent theoretical results in the area of
compact routing [2, 15, 56, 247]: schemes that use routing tables provably sublinear in the number
of nodes, while provably maintaining a bound on stretch, or the inefficiency of chosen paths with
respect to a non-compact shortest-path scheme. Compact routing schemes present a promising
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basis for UIA routing because of their formal scalability and stretch properties, and because they
work between arbitrary nodes on arbitrary topologies. Unfortunately, these formal schemes have
so far been developed only as centralized algorithms to compute a set of routing tables from a
network graph description; converting these algorithms into practical distributed protocols remains
to be done. Also, compactness and stretch—the properties of primary focus in the compact routing
literature—are only two of the many properties of a routing scheme that are important in a practical
system; other properties, such as congestion caused by the route selection mechanism, robustness
to failure, and the messaging cost of maintaining routing tables, have been largely ignored so far.
We therefore explore techniques and challenges for converting one particular compact routing
scheme—Thorup and Zwick’s variable k-level scheme [247]—into an overlay routing protocol for
UIA. One major issue with this Thorup/Zwick scheme is a tendency to “focus” global traffic through
a few central, randomly chosen “landmark” nodes, which can create congestion bottlenecks: we
explore ways to modify the routing scheme to mitigate this bottleneck effect while preserving the
scheme’s formal compactness and stretch bounds. To better understand the scheme’s viability for
use in large-scale UIA overlay networks, we also examine the scheme’s behavior in terms of stretch,
congestion, and robustness to failure, on a variety of simulated network topologies up to 192,000
nodes in size.
1.3.4 Centralized Alternatives to Overlay Routing
As with the naming layer, reliance on centralized services represents a seductively simple but po-
tentially problematic alternative design for overlay routing. Personal devices could simply connect
to a cluster of well-known rendezvous and forwarding servers operated by the device or software
vendor, keeping a communication session open with at least one such server to receive notifica-
tions of incoming connection attempts even when the device is behind a restrictive NAT or firewall,
and forward traffic through the central server whenever direct peer-to-peer connection attempts fail.
Indeed, such a centralized routing/rendezvous service for peer-to-peer communication between per-
sonal devices is the basis of Apple’s MobileMe [13] and Microsoft’s Live Mesh [161] services.
While the reliance of centralized services such as these would indeed simplify the client-side
part of UIA’s routing layer, doing so would bring the usual attendant issues pointed out in Sec-
tion 1.1. First, the user would have to register with the central service before his devices could
communicate at all. Second, devices would be unable to communicate with each other when dis-
connected from the Internet, or while part of a temporarily disconnected fragment of the Internet
such as a disaster zone. Third, since all the user’s personal devices would have to maintain constant
connectivity with the central service in order to maintain global reachability, the central service
would always have to “know” the user’s location (or at least network attachment point) at any given
moment, which may be a significant privacy concern for his users.
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1.4 Transport
Once devices have been given usable names and a mechanism is available to find and establish con-
tact with named hosts, applications still need a convenient way to exchange both control information
and application data between those hosts, in some fashion appropriate to the specific application.
In the early days of the Internet, the most common applications were remote text-oriented terminal
access via protocols like Telnet [188], Rlogin [129], and eventually the Secure Shell [266–269];
text-oriented messaging systems such as E-mail [58,136,170,203] and USENET [77,115,177]; and
bulk data transfer protocols such as FTP [114,189]. For most of these applications, the reliable byte
stream abstraction provided by TCP [6, 244] generally proved quite suitable, and for applications
like DNS name resolution [163] that needed a lighter-weight transport, UDP [187] was available as
an alternative.
1.4.1 The Demands of Modern Interactive Applications
The evolution of modern personal Internet devices has placed many new demands on applica-
tion protocols, however, with which existing Internet transport protocols have not adequately kept
up. In particular, modern applications are frequently much more delay-sensitive than traditional
text-oriented or bulk transfer applications. In multimedia streaming applications [216, 217], unex-
pected delay translates to user-visible glitches, quality degradation, or temporary interruptions in
audio/video service. Interactive applications such as web browsing and remote file system access
rely on transaction-oriented protocols such as HTTP [78] and NFS [219], in which the delay of a
transaction’s completion is often easily perceptible to the user as an annoying “freeze” in the sys-
tem’s normal operation. Wireless broadband technologies are increasingly used for Internet connec-
tivity and not just voice communication [41], but the high latency and/or lossiness of these networks
exacerbate the challenges faced by modern delay-sensitive applications [7,17,21,23,181,265]. Fur-
thermore, modern interactive applications frequently need to perform many independent transac-
tions concurrently, such as downloading the many individual pictures and other embedded objects
on a web page; the common practice of multiplexing these many transactions onto one TCP stream,
as done in HTTP [78], IMAP [58], or iSCSI [214], for example, causes a delay in processing one
transaction to block all the other transactions queued up behind it in the stream [51, 215, 264], un-
necessarily turning a minor freeze in one transaction into a much more obvious and annoying freeze
affecting many transactions or the whole application.
TCP has seen numerous extensions over the years to improve its performance in various ways,
such as large windows and timestamps [123], rapid connection renewal for transactions [36], se-
lective acknowledgment [155], and duplicate acknowledgment [33, 79], but these partial solutions
do not solve the fundamental limitation of TCP’s byte-stream abstraction: that it unnecessarily im-
poses a total order on all communication even when individual transactions or “application-layer
frames” [51] are naturally order-independent.
Other transports, such as UDP [187], RDP [179,257], SCTP [234], UDP-Lite [143], and DCCP [137],
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forsake the convenience, generality, and conceptual simplicity of TCP’s stream abstraction for a
transport abstraction based on limited-size datagrams. All of these transports force the application
into building atop a different and more restrictive abstraction, in which the application is respon-
sible for breaking up all its logical transactions or application-layer frames into reasonably small
(datagram-size) units, and (in the case of UDP-Lite and DCCP) for handling any necessary reli-
ability provisions. While SCTP can handle multiple concurrent “streams,” these are streams of
datagrams rather than streams of bytes, and SCTP uses datagrams as its atomic units for reordering
and traffic scheduling purposes: thus, if an application transmits a datagram that is too large, the
transmission of that datagram will “block” the entire SCTP connection until its entire content is
completely transmitted and acknowledged, before datagrams from other (perhaps higher-priority)
streams may be sent on the connection.
1.4.2 Structured Streams in UIA
UIA takes a different approach to supporting the modern applications prevalent on today’s personal
devices. Instead of forsaking or drastically changing TCP’s byte stream abstraction, UIA’s struc-
tured stream transport (SST) merely attempts to make classic byte streams easily and efficiently
usable at finer (but completely application-defined) granularity. Thus, SST enables transaction-
oriented interactive applications like HTTP, IMAP, and NFS to create a brand-new byte stream for
every transaction. Similarly, a media streaming application using SST can place each media frame
in a separate ephemeral stream. Since SST preserves TCP’s byte stream semantics, each of these
streams provides strict data ordering within a transaction or frame, while allowing transactions or
frames to be of any size ranging from a few bytes to long-running bulk transfers of megabytes or
gigabytes of data. Since each transaction or frame is in a separate stream, however, different trans-
actions or frames are ordered and delivered fully independently of each other: thus, a temporary
delay in one transaction (caused for example by a server-side processing delay or a packet loss in
the network) need not prevent other ongoing transactions from completing promptly.
To make it easy for applications to create and manage the many per-transaction or per-frame
streams they will require in order to take advantage of this natural transaction/frame independence,
SST augments the traditional stream API with a “fork” operation, which allows the application to
create a new stream from an existing stream at any time. A new stream created this way is consid-
ered a “child” of the existing stream, and child streams can likewise be forked, giving SST streams
a hereditary structure—hence the name “structured streams.” A child stream is semantically inde-
pendent from its parent, in that its data transmission is unordered with respect to data in its parent
stream, and child streams can even outlive their parent streams. Nevertheless, SST maintains this
hereditary relationship during the process of initiating a new stream, so that the host accepting the
new stream has a suitable context (namely the parent stream) in which to interpret the meaning and
purpose of the new child stream. Structured streams make general “out-of-band” communication
very simple, for example: if two hosts are in the process of transferring data related to one trans-
action, such as a long HTTP download, they can fork the stream on which that long transaction is
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Figure 1-5: Example structured stream hierarchy in SST
occurring in order to communicate out-of-band messages relating to that transaction, such as status
updates, priority changes, or graceful cancellations. Figure 1-5 illustrates an example structured
stream hierarchy that an application such as a web browser might create.
The SST protocol is itself broken into two layers: a channel layer that provides transport ser-
vices that are shareable among many application streams, such as sequencing, acknowledgments,
congestion control, authentication, and encryption; and a stream layer that implements the struc-
tured stream abstraction itself atop the channel layer’s services. The channel layer’s sequencing and
acknowledgment services enable the the stream layer to create and destroy streams with very little
per-stream state or on-the-wire overhead, avoiding TCP’s 3-way handshake delay on stream cre-
ation and its four-minute TIME-WAIT state retention period after stream close, for example. SST’s
stream protocol also subsumes the functionality of datagram-oriented transports such as UDP [187],
RDP [179,180], and DCCP [137,138] by providing applications the ability to send small ephemeral
streams efficiently with optional “fire-and-forget” (unreliable) delivery semantics.
1.5 NAT Traversal
Personal mobile devices are often be located behind corporate or home NATs and firewalls, and
although the UIA overlay routing layer inherently supports communication between such devices
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Figure 1-6: Implicit NAT traversal via “hole punching”
by forwarding traffic through some intermediate node on the public network, this UIA-level for-
warding has costs in terms of both network delay and load on these intermediate nodes. The costs
of UIA-level forwarding can sometimes be avoided through NAT traversal techniques, in which an
intermediate node helps to establish a direct IP-layer path between two nodes that may both be lo-
cated behind NATs. Since NAT traversal is useful both as an optimization within the UIA overlay
routing layer, and to standalone non-UIA-based Internet applications, we explore the design space,
behavior, and reliability of NAT traversal independently of a particular routing protocol.
NAT traversal can be implemented using either explicit or implicit communication with NATs
and firewalls on the path. Protocols supporting explicit NAT traversal, such as UPnP [255] and
NAT-PMP [48], provide the greatest flexibility and control, but are supported only on some NATs
and generally do not address increasingly-common scenarios involving multiple levels of NAT.
We therefore focus on implicit NAT traversal techniques, in particular a technique known as hole
punching. With hole punching, illustrated in Figure 1-6, two “client” devices both behind NATs
or firewalls can collaborate using a public rendezvous server on the Internet to open (“punch”) a
pair of forwarding sessions (“holes”) by sending outgoing traffic through their respective NATs, to
form an efficient peer-to-peer data path that thereafter requires no further traffic forwarding or other
assistance from the rendezvous server.
Hole punching for UDP-based applications has been informally known and in use for a while,
but hole punching for TCP connections is more challenging and less well-understood, and scant
prior analysis or experimental research has been done on the generality and robustness of hole
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punching in the context of either transport. This thesis attempts to address this knowledge gap by
laying out hole punching techniques that are robust and efficient as long as NATs in the path satisfy
certain common and generally reasonable requirements, by exploring and identifying solutions for
the problem of NAT traversal over multiple levels of NAT, and by experimentally evaluating the
applicability of these techniques to the NATs commonly found “in the wild” on the Internet.
1.6 Prototyping UIA
Like any general systems architecture, there are many possible ways to implement UIA, different
approaches necessarily offering different tradeoffs. One particularly important practical tradeoff for
our purposes is driven by the goal of incremental deployment: how can we make UIA useful with
as few changes to existing system and application components as possible, and should we prefer
changes to the operating system or to applications?
UIA could be implemented as part of the operating system, for example, which might facili-
tate deployment by making it immediately usable by existing, unmodified applications running on
that operating system. Such a UIA implementation may be tied to that particular operating system,
however, limiting its portability to other operating systems, and the requirement of installing priv-
ileged operating system extensions can be a pragmatic deterrent to use by more casual (or merely
unprivileged) users. Alternatively, UIA might be implemented as part of specific applications that
wish to use UIA’s communication facilities, in which case the UIA implementation need not re-
quire special privileges or any explicit installation step separate from that of the application itself,
making it easily deployable by casual users. Such an implementation may unfortunately become
application-specific and functionally isolated from similar (or even identical) instances of UIA in
use by other applications running on the same system, however.
Since there is no clear “best” implementation strategy, we explore a combination of strategies in
several working prototypes that demonstrate various elements of UIA both together and separately,
and provide an experimental base on which to develop the architecture further. We use a system-
level approach to implementing the personal naming and social routing protocols, allowing both
new and legacy applications to benefit from UIA’s personal naming and overlay routing facilities.
We use simulation frameworks to explore identity hash routing and compact routing. Finally, since
the transport layer is more closely tied to the application than the naming and routing layers are, we
use an application link library approach to prototype UIA’s structured stream transport.
1.6.1 System-level Naming and Routing Prototype
The main UIA prototype is designed to be installed on existing operating systems as a new set
of system-level services implementing the UIA architecture in a modular fashion. This modular
prototype includes a basic social routing layer written in C++ [239], a personal naming layer written
in Python [191], a graphical user interface (GUI) written in C++ using the Qt toolkit [250] for
managing personal groups and personal names, and system daemons to provide compatibility with
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unmodified legacy applications. All components of the prototype are designed to run in user space
for relatively easy portability to multiple platforms: the prototype currently runs in Linux, Mac OS
X, and FreeBSD. The primary advantage of this system-level design is that it allows unmodified
legacy applications to use UIA, resolve UIA personal names, and communicate within and between
personal groups. The main disadvantage of this system-level approach is that deployment requires
a somewhat invasive installation of a set of privileged daemons.
1.6.2 Routing Simulation Frameworks
To provide a basis for developing and analyzing more general overlay routing protocols for UIA,
we develop a set of simulation frameworks in C++ and Python. In order to provide insight on the
behavior of a routing scheme when scaled to networks containing large numbers of interconnected
UIA nodes, these simulation frameworks are designed to support simulation of a very large number
of nodes on one physical machine: the C++ framework has been run on simulated topologies up to
192,000 nodes, for example. The downside of this streamlined approach to routing simulation is
detail and hence, possibly, fidelity: our simulators do not emulate all aspects of the routing protocols
or of realistic network environments, leaving uncertainty about the extent to which these simulations
may be relied upon to predict real-world behavior. More accurate (but perhaps necessarily smaller-
scale) simulations and real-world deployments of the more general routing schemes developed here
remain for future work.
1.6.3 Library-based Structured Stream Transport Prototype
The working prototype of UIA’s structured stream transport (SST) is not yet integrated into the
system-level UIA system, but instead operates as a Qt-based library intended to be linked directly
into applications. This library implementation can be linked into (and distributed with) applications
for existing unmodified operating systems, making it immediately and incrementally deployable on
a per-application basis. The library provides an API similar to traditional sockets APIs, but uses
names that do not conflict with the system’s, and does not require any special (e.g., administrator-
level) privileges in order to operate.
Although the SST prototype is not yet integrated into the prototype of UIA’s naming and routing
layers, they can still be used together, since an SST-based application will appear to the underlying
OS as a UDP application, and an OS with the UIA naming and routing prototype installed will be
able to forward that “UDP” traffic transparently to the application within the user’s UIA personal
group and social network using UIA personal names. This implementation is far from ideal, how-
ever, since the naming and routing prototype’s current use of SSL over TCP for authentication and
communication security defeats many of the responsiveness advantages that SST could otherwise
provide by forcing a total order on all UIA traffic between a given pair of hosts. Integrating SST
properly into the main UIA prototype, so that the UIA routing layer uses SST instead of SSL/TCP
for its transparent tunneling and forwarding functions, remains for future work.
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1.7 Contributions
UIA’s primary architectural contribution is a cross-layer redesign of basic network abstractions
and protocols around the requirements of modern personal devices. Since personal devices
have become mainstream commodities in the emerging world of ubiquitous computing, nontechni-
cal users now frequently own several devices, and these devices need to work together to “manage
themselves,” operating efficiently under a wide variety of network conditions and application re-
quirements without constant help from administrative authorities or technical experts. Although
many networking abstractions throughout the entire Internet protocol suite will ultimately need to
be reconsidered around these new usability requirements, UIA takes a few steps in this direction by
identifying and developing new naming, routing, and transport abstractions that are more suited to
modern personal devices than the traditional, “managed” abstractions the Internet evolved with.
UIA demonstrates that rethinking network abstractions across architectural boundaries in this
way makes it possible to address problems that are impossible to solve by tweaking a single layer
alone. UIA’s personal names depend on the personal group abstraction to provide a scope within
which to interpret these names, and depend on the overlay routing layer to provide devices with
location-independent identities that can be securely authenticated to a named device regardless of
how or where on the network the device is attached. UIA’s distributed personal group management
system in turn depends on the overlay routing layer to enable devices to keep their personal groups
synchronized regardless of how or where they are connected. UIA’s transport layer similarly de-
pends on the overlay routing layer to support peer-to-peer communication directly between mobile
devices on public or private networks. UIA’s overlay routing layer in turn can make use of social
network information provided by the personal name and personal group management system in
order to increase its efficiency, security, and reliability, and can leverage advanced NAT traversal
techniques to minimize unnecessary forwarding of traffic through the overlay.
Within each of the main functional areas it addresses, UIA makes additional technical contribu-
tions as summarized below.
1.7.1 Naming
UIA’s primary naming contributions are its personal name and personal group abstractions:
• Personal groups provide users with a simple, intuitive model for administering a collection
of devices they own and operate, based on pairwise device introduction and automatic syn-
chronization of group management state across devices.
• Personal names provide a more concise and convenient alternative to traditional global DNS
names for purposes of naming devices or other users from within the scope of a user’s own
administrative domain.
In addition to the basic networking abstractions above, UIA makes the following technical con-
tributions in its design for a prototype protocol suite implementing personal groups and personal
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names:
• UIA introduces an always-available namespace consistency model, which ensures that a
user’s personal namespace is always accessible and modifiable on any device regardless of
the device’s connectivity, but that namespace changes always propagate automatically among
devices whenever connectivity permits.
• UIA introduces a decentralized device ownership and revocation algorithm, allowing a
user to remove a device from his group, either gracefully or forcefully, providing assurance
that lost or stolen devices cannot be misused to gain unwarranted access to the user’s personal
group.
1.7.2 Routing
UIA’s primary routing contribution is a development and analysis of several approaches to scal-
able overlay routing among devices with self-configuring, location-independent identities. In
particular, UIA introduces:
• A routing scheme that leverages the user’s social network, to provide secure, robust con-
nectivity among devices in a user’s personal group and social neighborhood with minimal
protocol complexity or maintenance overhead.
• A routing scheme that leverages distributed hash table (DHT) concepts, to build a more
general routing and traffic forwarding mechanism directly on top of UIA’s flat endpoint iden-
tifier (EID) space.
• A routing scheme that builds on compact routing theory, which provides provable bounds
on routing table size and stretch, but also addresses congestion, fault tolerance, and other
practical issues ignored in the theoretical groundwork.
In support of this exploration of specific overlay routing schemes, UIA introduces the first
detailed exposition and experimental analysis of practical NAT traversal techniques. The ex-
position analyzes the previously unaddressed problem of traversal of multiple levels of NAT, and
identifies a crucial behavioral property for NATs, dubbed hairpin translation, which enables au-
tomatic and transparent multi-level NAT traversal. UIA’s experimental analysis of NAT traversal
techniques includes data covering a wide variety of NATs deployed in the field, examining NAT
behavioral properties required for both single-level and multi-level NAT traversal via both UDP and
TCP.
1.7.3 Transport
UIA’s primary contribution to the Internet’s transport layer is the structured stream abstraction,
a novel extension to TCP’s traditional byte-stream abstraction that enables modern interactive ap-
plications to create and manage many concurrent streams easily by “forking” new streams from
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existing ones. To demonstrate that this transport abstraction can be implemented efficiently, UIA
introduces structured stream transport (SST), a prototype transport protocol based on structured
streams. The SST protocol design makes two additional technical contributions:
• SST introduces a division of the transport layer into two sublayers, where the “bottom
half” or channel layer implements network-oriented services such as sequencing, acknowl-
edgments, congestion control, and security, and the “top half” or stream layer implements
application-oriented services such as logical byte streams and receiver-directed flow control.
• SST’s stream sublayer introduces a datagram optimization that provides either reliable or
unreliable transmission of datagrams as “ephemeral streams,” providing the efficiency bene-
fits of datagram transports without the attendant datagram size limitations or other restrictions.
1.8 Limitations
While UIA explores some promising approaches to rethinking the Internet architecture around the
requirements of personal devices, in terms of a “grand solution” to the Internet’s current difficulties
with personal devices, UIA is still incomplete in many ways—necessarily so due to the breadth of
the topic and the design space. UIA’s naming system explores one particular design for personal
groups and personal names, using a particular introduction mechanism for building groups and
a particular revocation mechanism for pruning them, but it is easy to envision other alternative
naming designs that might be more user friendly or effective in some usage scenarios (and perhaps
less so in others). The three routing schemes explored in this thesis cover some breadth in in design
space but do not yet yield a single obvious “winner”—the deployed social routing scheme is simple
and efficient in most cases but cannot support all types of applications effectively, whereas the
other two schemes have only been evaluated under simulation and have known practical issues that
might deter full implementation and large-scape deployment. UIA’s structured stream transport is
similarly promising for what it does, but there are many ways its design could be evolved further,
such as by supporting multihoming as SCTP [235] already does. Finally, there may be are a variety
of potential technical, economic, and political barriers to the widespread adoption of an architecture
like UIA. Chapter 9 will describe these limitations and potential barriers to adoption in more detail.
1.9 Thesis Organization
In terms of overall organization, this thesis first develops and explores each of the main functional
areas in the network stack that UIA addresses—naming, routing, and transport—fairly indepen-
dently of each other in Chapters 2–4, then after a brief diversion into NAT traversal techniques in
support of UIA’s routing functionality, each of the remaining chapters addresses all of the functional
areas together to take a broader perspective in evaluating the architecture. A quick summary of each
chapter follows:
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• Chapter 2 introduces UIA’s personal group management and naming paradigm, and de-
scribes protocols and algorithms to implement that naming model.
• Chapter 3 addresses the challenge of overlay routing among UIA’s location-independent
endpoint identifiers, exploring three specific schemes: social routing (Section 3.2), identity
hash routing (Section 3.3), and compact routing (Section 3.4).
• Chapter 4 describes UIA’s structured stream transport abstraction, and presents a protocol
design representing one approach to implementing this transport abstraction efficiently.
• Chapter 5 describes NAT traversal background, hole punching techniques for UDP (Sec-
tion 5.2) and TCP (Section 5.3), and delineates the requirements NATs and firewalls must
satisfy in order to support these techniques (Section 5.4).
• Chapter 6 describes the current prototype implementations of UIA’s personal naming (Sec-
tion 6.1), overlay routing (Section 6.2), and structured stream transport (Section 6.3).
• Chapter 7 evaluates UIA experimentally based on both real-world use and simulation, and
informally through pragmatic experience with its personal naming model.
• Chapter 8 describes in detail the relationship of UIA to other prior work.
• Chapter 9 finally concludes the thesis, discussing limitations and potential barriers to adop-
tion, and avenues for future work.
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Chapter 2
Naming
As network-enabled mobile devices such as laptops, smart phones, media players, personal digital
assistants, gaming consoles, and digital cameras become ubiquitous in the lives of ordinary people,
the proliferation of these devices makes it increasingly important for users to have a convenient
way to name and connect them over the Internet, while preserving users’ security and privacy.
This chapter details UIA’s naming layer, which provides a naming infrastructure enabling users
to connect and communicate conveniently among mobile personal devices. We first explore the
motivation and goals of UIA’s naming system in Section 2.1, then examine UIA naming from the
(nontechnical) user’s perspective in Section 2.2, and finally delve into the technical details of the
naming system in Section 2.3.
2.1 Motivation and Purpose of UIA Naming
The Internet’s current naming infrastructure has evolved to be well-suited to client/server commu-
nication—e.g., a user connecting to an online service like Google or Amazon.com. Networked per-
sonal devices also require peer-to-peer communication, however, in order to be maximally useful.
While on a trip, for example, a user in a cyber cafe may wish to copy photos from his WiFi-enabled
camera to his PC at home for storage and backup. Two users who meet in a park or other off-Internet
location may wish to connect their WiFi devices to exchange photos or other information, and later
re-establish a connection between the same devices over the Internet after returning to their homes.
A Voice-over-IP user would like his WiMax phone to be easily reachable by his friends wherever
he and they are located, but not to be reachable by unknown telemarketers.
2.1.1 Global Names and Their Limitations
Convenient global communication over the Internet, however, currently requires the target device to
have a global name in the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) [162, 163]. Users must register
with central naming authorities to obtain these global names, and since DNS names are global in
scope, users can only obtain names that are not already taken by someone else. Ever since the
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Internet’s commercialization and “.com boom,” short, convenient, memorable global names have
become ever more difficult and more expensive to obtain.
Furthermore, for a DNS name to work, the named host must have a stable IP address [121],
and the user must understand how to obtain and assign that IP address, or at least know it, in order
to enter it into the DNS record for the named host. Protocols such as Dynamic DNS [258], Mo-
bile IP [185], and Virtual Private Networks [96] can provide ways of naming hosts with no stable
IP address, but the additional configuration effort and technical expertise they require makes them
deployable in practice only by organizations with dedicated network administration staff. User
interface refinements alone cannot overcome this deployment roadblock, because the protocols de-
pend on centralized resources—global domain names and static, public “home” IP addresses—that
are not part of most consumer-oriented Internet service packages. Ordinary users require a solution
that “just works.”
2.1.2 An Alternative Model: “Virtual USB Cables”
In contrast with the operation of the global name system, there is one implicit “naming system”
we can take inspiration from that is both straightforward and trivially secure: plugging two devices
together via a USB cable. The cable itself physically indicates which devices should participate in
the transfer (the naming aspect), and the isolated physical medium guarantees that no other devices
can eavesdrop or interfere with the communication (the security aspect). As personal devices begin
to support wireless networking and Internet connectivity, we would like to extend the simplicity
and security of a USB cable to device connectivity on a global scale. We would like to develop
a naming model in which Alice can connect her WiFi-enabled iPod to her home PC via a “virtual
USB cable,” so that she can browse photos or play music stored there from a WiFi-enabled coffee
shop or friend’s house. Setting up this “virtual cable” should not require technical knowledge or
special configuration on Alice’s part, it should not require Alice to obtain any form of scarce global
resources from any central organization, and it should continue working even when the devices it
connects are behind firewalls or NATs.
Extending the “virtual USB cable” model to inter-user communication, if Alice meets Bob in a
coffee shop, she should easily be able to share with him information or services located on any of
her personal devices simply by “plugging” their two devices together. Bob should be able to connect
to Alice’s devices even after he leaves the coffee shop, until she chooses to sever their relationship—
i.e., the virtual USB cable should be able to “stretch” invisibly across arbitrary distances. No one
else should be able to impersonate Bob, however, in order to gain access to Alice’s shared resources.
2.1.3 UIA Personal Names and Personal Groups
The Unmanaged Internet Architecture uses the above “virtual USB cable” analogy to build a peer-
to-peer connectivity architecture that gives nontechnical users a simple and intuitive way to connect
their mobile personal devices, via convenient personal names organized into personal groups. A
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personal group represents an administrative cluster of devices all owned or controlled by the same
user—but all devices need not be in the same location. A personal name is a name for a device,
user, or other object that is locally scoped to a particular personal group: thus, a personal name only
needs to be unique within the context of a given personal group (administrative domain), and not
within a global namespace like DNS that is potentially shared by everyone in the world.
The way a user defines and builds a personal group in UIA is a generalization of the “virtual
cable” analogy. By introducing devices to each other “in person,” on a local-area network for
example [65, 233]—a process analogous to “plugging in” a cable between the two devices—a user
can merge UIA devices to form a personal group. Unlike the ephemeral names used in rendezvous
schemes such as Apple Bonjour [11], UIA devices once introduced work together to offer secure
remote access to any device in the group from any other, even if some or all the devices move to other
network attachment points. The devices forming the group present the user with a shared personal
namespace, which they optimistically replicate [106, 134, 245] to ensure constant availability on
each device whether on or off the Internet. The devices gossip namespace changes as connectivity
permits [63], and can propagate updates via mobile devices carried by the user [178].
Since UIA interprets personal names relative to personal groups, users can assign concise,
meaningful names like ipod instead of long globally unique names like ipod.alicesm5186.
myisp.com. In this way UIA conforms to the intuitive model with which users already manage
their cell phones’ address books. Users normally create personal names by introducing devices lo-
cally on a common WiFi network, for example, but they can also introduce devices remotely by
“bootstrapping” from DNS or another global name system, if at least one device to be introduced
has a global name. Since UIA names persist and remain securely bound to their targets as devices
migrate, once Alice introduces her iPod to her home PC, her iPod can continue accessing her PC by
the same name from anywhere she finds Internet access.
Personal names are intended to supplement and not replace global DNS names: users can re-
fer to personal names like phone alongside global names like usenix.org in the same appli-
cations. Global names are the right naming abstraction to represent global “brand names” like
amazon.com, for which the basic idea is that the owner of the global name should be able to ad-
vertise it on billboards, on TV, etc., and expect people to be able to remember the global name and
type it into any web browser in the world to reach the named business or organization. So personal
names and global names serve different and complementary roles: in the long term the Internet
needs both.
2.1.4 Cryptographically Secure Naming
Once created, UIA personal names remain persistently bound to their targets as devices move, via
self-certifying cryptographic identities [158, 165, 205] that are fully self-configuring and hidden
from the user. Besides ensuring that a given personal name always securely refers to the same
device, these cryptographic identities permit applications and services running on the user’s personal
devices to authenticate other users wishing to access shared information. For example, Alice can
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instruct a desktop application to allow remote access to her home PC from any device in her personal
group, but not from other devices, effectively placing a “virtual firewall” around her personal group
that corresponds to her administrative domain rather than to any physical network topology.
In contrast with SDSI [205] and PKI-based secure naming [14, 116], UIA does not use public
keys to represent a user’s identity or require the user to know about and manage his keys directly
across the multiple personal devices he may own. Each UIA device instead maintains its own per-
device keys automatically,
2.1.5 Social Networking via Personal Names
Different users can introduce their devices to name other users and link their respective personal
groups. Bob can refer to his friend Alice as Alice, and if Alice calls her VoIP phone phone then
Bob can call Alice’s phone using the name phone.Alice. In this way, UIA adapts peer-to-peer
social networking ideas previously explored for other purposes [60, 146, 154, 186, 190] to form a
user-friendly peer-to-peer naming infrastructure. UIA replicates a user’s personal namespace across
all devices in the group to ensure constant availability on each device regardless of connectivity,
implementing a relaxed consistency model reminiscent of Bayou [245], but without dependencies
on centralized resources such as Bayou’s primary commit servers. Users can also create and collect
names into ad hoc shared groups to reflect common interests or informal organizations.
The UIA naming system makes the following primary contributions, expanding on previously
proposed ideas [86]. First, UIA introduces a simple and intuitive model for connecting mobile
devices into personal groups, providing ad hoc user identities, personal names, and secure remote
access, without requiring the user to manage keys or certificates explicitly. Second, UIA presents
a novel gossip and replication protocol to manage the naming and group state required by this
user model, adapting optimistic replication principles previously developed for file systems and
databases.
2.1.6 Goals of UIA Naming
The purpose of UIA naming is to provide users with a convenient and intuitive way to communicate
among their own and their friends’ personal devices. To this end, we can briefly summarize the
primary goals of UIA’s naming system as follows:
• Names must be user-relative, so as not to require global uniqueness. If Alice owns only one
laptop and has only one friend named Bob, she should be able to refer to them simply as
laptop and Bob, despite the millions of other laptops and people named Bob in the world.
• Names must have strong bindings to the identities of the objects named, independent of
their current physical location or network attachment point. When Alice refers to her name
laptop, the name should always resolve to her laptop or fail to resolve; no other device
should be able to impersonate it.
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Figure 2-1: Bob and Alice introduce their devices
• Assigning names must be a simple and intuitive process. If Alice meets Bob at a conference
and their laptops share a common WiFi network, assigning a name to Bob should be as simple
as looking him up in a local network browser and clicking “Introduce”.
• A user should only have to manage one namespace. If Alice already owns several devices,
she should only have to name a newly purchased device once, and should not have to re-enter
or manually copy the new name onto each of her existing devices.
• A user’s personal namespace should be constantly available, remaining accessible on any
of the user’s devices even while that device is disconnected from the others and/or from the
Internet.
• Users should be able to authenticate each other and selectively share information and device
services by referring to each others’ personal namespaces. If Alice gives Bob permission to
access some files on her desktop PC, he should have access to them via a name as simple as
PC.Alice.
• Finally, UIA personal names should coexist cleanly with DNS, allowing users to refer to
personal names like laptop alongside global names like amazon.com seamlessly within
the same application.
2.2 UIA Naming from the User’s Perspective
This section describes UIA’s operating principles from the perspective of a non-technical user; later
sections detail how the system provides this user experience.
2.2.1 Introducing Devices
A UIA device ideally ships from its manufacturer pre-configured with a name for itself such as
laptop or phone, which the user can keep or change as desired. The device learns additional
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names as its user introduces it to other devices owned by the same user or different users. The in-
troduction process assigns persistent names by which the device can securely refer to other devices.
UIA’s introduction process builds on previously explored ideas for secure associations, such as the
Resurrecting Duckling security model [233] and SPKI/SDSI introduction [65], but UIA is unique
in providing the ability to build symmetric, self-managing, distributed personal groups solely out of
pairwise introductions.
In a typical introduction, the owner(s) of two devices bring the devices together physically and
connect them to a common local-area network. Each user then invokes a local-area rendezvous
tool similar to Bonjour’s [11] on his device, finds the other device on the network, and selects
“Introduce.” Each device displays an introduction key consisting of three words chosen randomly
from a dictionary, as shown in Figure 2-1. Each user then picks the other device’s introduction
key from a list of three random keys. If one of the devices has unintentionally connected to the
wrong endpoint, such as an impersonator on the same network, then the matching key is unlikely
to appear on the list, so the user picks “None of the above” and the introduction procedure aborts.
Unlike other analogous procedures [65], UIA uses short, user-friendly “one-time” keys that only
need to withstand online and not offline attacks, and its multiple-choice design prevents users from
just clicking “OK” without actually comparing the keys.
Users can follow the same procedure to introduce UIA devices remotely across the Internet, as
long as one device has a global DNS name or IP address and the users have a trustworthy channel
through which to exchange introduction keys: e.g., a phone conversation or an authenticated chat
session. We also envision alternative introduction mechanisms adapted to specific rendezvous chan-
nels such as E-mail, web sites, SMS messages, or short-range wireless links; the details of particular
introduction mechanisms are not crucial to the UIA architecture.
A user can introduce UIA devices either to merge his own devices into a personal group shar-
ing a common namespace, or to create named links from his own group to other users’ personal
groups. The following sections describe these two forms of introduction, and other important group
management actions, with the help of an example scenario illustrated in Figure 2-2.
2.2.2 Device Names and Personal Groups
At Time 1 in the scenario, Bob purchases a new laptop and Internet phone, which come pre-
configured with the default names laptop and phone, respectively. At Time 2, Bob uses UIA’s
local rendezvous tool on each device to find the other device on his home WiFi network and selects
“Introduce devices” on each. Bob chooses the “Merge devices” option in the introduction dialogs
(see Figure 2-1) to merge the devices into a personal group.
The devices in Bob’s group gossip both existing names and subsequent changes to the group’s
namespace as physical network connectivity permits. Each device attempts to preserve connectivity
to other named devices as they leave the network and reappear at other locations, without user
intervention whenever possible. Bob now sees his two personal names phone and laptop on both
devices, and can use these names for local and remote access. Working on his laptop at home, he
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Figure 2-2: Example personal device scenario
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uses his personal name phone to reach the phone via his home WiFi LAN. When Bob subsequently
takes his laptop on a trip, he can remotely access his home phone from his laptop over the Internet
(e.g., to check his voice messages), still using the name phone. UIA uses cryptography to guarantee
that an adversary cannot impersonate the device Bob calls phone, and cannot eavesdrop on his
communication.
2.2.3 User Names and Social Networking
With the second form of introduction, users link their personal groups together and assign user
names to each other, but retain exclusive control over their respective personal groups. In the ex-
ample scenario, Bob purchases a new WiFi-enabled cell phone at Time 3 and meets Alice at a cafe
before he has merged his cell phone with his other devices. Bob finds Alice’s iPod using his cell
phone’s local rendezvous tool and selects “Introduce as a new contact” (see Figure 2-1), and Alice
does likewise. Bob’s phone suggests Alice’s self-chosen user name Alice, but Bob can override
this default (e.g., to Alice-Smith or Alice-from-OSDI) if he already knows another Alice.
Bob and Alice can now refer to each others’ devices by combining device names with user
names in DNS-like dotted notation. If Alice runs a web server on her home PC, named PC in
Alice’s personal namespace, then Bob can connect to Alice’s server by typing PC.Alice into his
laptop’s web browser, exactly as he would use a global DNS name like usenix.org.
If Alice’s personal web server is UIA-aware, she can use her name Bob in the server’s access
control lists so that only Bob’s personal devices may browse certain private areas. UIA authenticates
clients so that no one else can impersonate Bob’s devices to gain access to these areas.
2.2.4 Transitive Merging and Gossip
Bob now returns home and merges his cell phone with his home phone, as shown at Time 4 in
Figure 2-2. Bob’s home phone in turn gossips the cell phone’s group membership to Bob’s laptop,
so the laptop and cell phone can name each other without him having to merge them explicitly.
Alice’s devices similarly gossip her new link named Bob and learn about Bob’s three devices, after
which she can, for example, refer to Bob’s laptop as laptop.Bob.
Users can access or edit their personal groups from any of their devices while other devices are
unreachable. If Bob and Alice are on a bus together and disconnected from the Internet, Alice can
still reach Bob’s laptop from her iPod via her name laptop.Bob, even if they have left all their
other devices at home. Bob and Alice can continue adding names for contacts they meet on the bus,
and their other devices learn the new names via gossip later when they re-connect.
2.2.5 Resolving Conflicts
Unfortunately, both of Bob’s phones happened to have identical default names of phone, resulting
in their names conflicting in his newly merged namespace. UIA notifies Bob of the conflict, and
he can continue using the non-conflicting name laptop, but must resolve the conflict before the
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name phone will work again. Bob resolves the conflict on his cell phone at Time 5, by renaming it
cell while leaving the home phone with the name phone. Bob’s other devices learn the resolved
name bindings via gossip, as do Alice’s devices, so Alice now sees Bob’s phones as phone.Bob
and cell.Bob.
If Bob makes conflicting namespace changes on two of his devices while they are partitioned
from each other, UIA detects the conflict once the devices reconnect. Bob can continue using other
non-conflicting names in the same group while conflicts exist, and he can resolve such conflicts at
leisure on any of his devices.
2.2.6 Shared Groups
In addition to personal groups, users can create shared groups to help organize and share their
personal names. Bob and Alice discover at Time 6 that they share an interest in photography, and
decide to start a photo club for themselves and other friends sharing this interest. To enable members
of the club to find each other easily and share photos among their personal devices, Bob uses his
laptop to create a shared group named PhotoClub in his personal namespace. On creation, the
shared group’s only member is Bob himself. To add Alice to the group, Bob drags the name Alice
from his personal group into PhotoClub, copying his name binding for Alice into the shared
group and making her the second member. Bob can similarly add other friends to PhotoClub,
and these names automatically appear in Alice’s view of the group as the devices gossip the changes.
Although Alice can now refer to the new group as PhotoClub.Bob, she might like this group
to appear directly in her own personal group instead of naming it relative to Bob. Alice drags the
PhotoClub name from Bob’s personal group into her own, giving herself a copy of the name
leading to the same shared group. She can now refer to group members using the same names that
Bob uses, such as Charlie.PhotoClub.
2.2.7 Group Ownership
One or more members of a UIA group may be designated as owners, or members allowed to modify
the group. As Figure 2-3 illustrates, Bob’s devices laptop, phone, and cell are owners of his
personal group by default, allowing Bob to edit his personal group using any of his devices. The
names Alice and PhotoClub are not owners, so Alice and members of PhotoClub can only
browse and resolve names in Bob’s namespace.
Groups can own other groups. When Bob creates his shared PhotoClub group, UIA automat-
ically includes a name Bob in the new group that gives Bob’s personal group ownership of the new
group. After adding Alice to the group, Bob can give her co-ownership by clicking the owner flag
by her name in the group listing, enabling her to add or remove other members herself. Ownership
is transitive: Bob can modify PhotoClub using his laptop because Bob’s laptop is an owner of
Bob’s personal group and Bob’s personal group is an owner of PhotoClub.
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Figure 2-3: Groups and ownership
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2.2.8 Security and Ownership Revocation
Returning to the scenario in Figure 2-2, Bob loses his cell phone at Time 7, and he is not sure
whether it was stolen or just temporarily misplaced. If the cell phone was stolen and has no local user
authentication such as a password or fingerprint reader, the thief might obtain not only Bob’s data
on the cell phone itself, but also remote access to services authorized to his personal group via UIA
names. UIA devices capable of accessing sensitive information remotely should therefore provide
strong local user authentication, and should encrypt personal data (including UIA state) stored on
the device, as Apple’s FileVault does for example [12]. The details of local user authentication and
encryption are orthogonal to UIA, however.
To minimize potential damage if a thief does break into Bob’s user account on his cell phone,
Bob can revoke the cell phone’s ownership of his personal group. If the cell phone re-appears and
Bob realizes that he just misplaced it, then he can “undo” the revocation and return the phone to its
normal status. If the cell phone remains missing, however, UIA ensures that no one can remotely
access personal information or services on Bob’s other devices via the lost phone once the revocation
announcement has propagated to those devices. Similarly, the cell phone loses its access to the files
Alice shared with Bob as soon as Alice’s PC, on which the files reside, learns of the revocation from
any of Bob’s remaining devices.
2.2.9 Ownership Disputes
Revocation cuts both ways: a thief might try to “hijack” Bob’s personal group, using the stolen cell
phone to revoke the ownership of Bob’s other devices before Bob finds that the phone is missing.
In UIA’s current ownership scheme in which all owners have full and equal authority over a group,
Bob’s devices cannot distinguish the “real” Bob from an impostor once a stolen device’s local
access control is broken. UIA therefore allows any device to dispute another device’s revocation of
its ownership.
In the example scenario, when Bob next uses his laptop, UIA informs him that his laptop’s
ownership of his personal group has been revoked by the cell phone, which Bob realizes was stolen.
In response, Bob issues a revocation of the cell phone’s ownership from his laptop. The two mutual
revocations effectively split Bob’s original personal group into two new, independent groups: one
containing only the cell phone, the other containing Bob’s remaining devices. All existing UIA
names referring to Bob’s old personal group, and any access authorizations based on those names,
become unusable and must be manually updated to point to the appropriate new group. Alice’s name
Bob for example is now marked “disputed” in Alice’s namespace, and Alice’s PC rejects attempts
by any of Bob’s devices to access the files she shared with Bob earlier using that UIA name. To
update her name for Bob and safely renew his access, Alice can re-introduce her devices directly
to Bob’s the next time they meet, or obtain a fresh link to Bob’s new personal group from a trusted
mutual friend who already has one.
Group ownership disputes need not be permanent. Suppose two people who co-own a shared
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group get into an argument, and split the group by issuing mutual revocations. If the original co-
owners later settle their differences, they can undo their conflicting revocations or simply merge
their respective “splinter” groups back together via UIA’s normal merge mechanism. Links to the
original group become unusable during the dispute, but function again normally after the dispute is
resolved.
2.3 Personal Naming System Design
This section describes the design of the UIA personal naming system, beginning with the system’s
basic architecture, followed by the details of how UIA devices manage and synchronize the name-
space state comprising their users’ personal and shared groups.
2.3.1 Basic Architecture
The design of the UIA personal naming system is based on three crucial elements: a mechanism
for identifying personal devices uniquely, securely, and persistently; a process for resolving names
within personal groups; and a storage management and gossip mechanism for optimistically repli-
cating namespace state across devices. This section briefly introduces these three architectural
components, for which subsequent sections provide further details.
Personal Endpoint Identities
UIA devices identify each other using cryptographically unique endpoint identifiers or EIDs. Whereas
DNS maps a name to an IP address, UIA maps a personal device name such as Bob’s laptop to
an EID. Unlike IP addresses, EIDs are stable and do not change when devices re-connect or move.
UIA’s routing layer, described in Chapter 3, tracks mobile hosts by their EIDs as they change IP
addresses, and can forward traffic by EID when IP-level communication fails due to NAT or other
Internet routing discontinuities. Thus, EIDs represent the “point of rendezvous” between UIA’s
naming and routing systems.
A UIA device creates each EID it needs automatically by generating a fresh public/private key
pair and then computing a cryptographic hash of the public key. As in SFS [158], EIDs are crypto-
graphically unique, self-configuring, and self-certifying, but not human-readable. As in HIP [164],
UIA-aware network transports and applications use EIDs in place of IP addresses to identify com-
munication endpoints. (UIA can also disguise EIDs as “actual” IP addresses for compatibility with
unmodified legacy applications, as described later in Section 6.1.)
An EID corresponds to a particular user’s presence on a particular device. A user who owns
or has access to several devices has a separate EID for each. A device accessed by only one user
needs only one EID, but a device shared among multiple users via some form of login mechanism
creates a separate EID for each user account. Unlike cryptographic host identifiers in SFS and HIP,
therefore, EIDs are not only stable but personal.
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Personal EIDs allow multiple users of a shared UIA host to run independent network services on
the device. Since each user’s services bind to the user’s EID rather than to a host-wide IP address,
UIA-aware network applications can run exclusively in the context of the user and rely on UIA to
provide user-granularity authentication and access control. When Bob connects his laptop to the
HTTP port at the EID to which PC.Alice resolves, he knows he is connecting to Alice’s personal
web server and not that of another user with an account on the same PC. Alice’s web server similarly
knows that the connection is coming from Bob and not from someone else using his laptop, because
her name laptop.Bob resolves to an EID specific to Bob’s account on his laptop.
Resolving Names in Personal Groups
Each UIA device acts as an ad hoc name server to support name lookups and synchronize namespace
state across devices. UIA names follow the same formatting rules as DNS names, consisting of a
series of labels separated by dots, and devices resolve UIA names one label at a time from right
to left. To resolve the name PC.Alice, for example, Bob’s laptop first resolves the rightmost
component Alice to find Alice’s personal group, and from there resolves the second component
PC to find the EID for Alice’s PC as named in Alice’s personal group.
Whereas DNS resolution traverses a strictly hierarchical tree of “zones” starting from a centrally-
managed global root zone, each UIA device has a unique root for resolving UIA names, and users
can link UIA groups to form arbitrary graphs. After Bob meets Alice at Time 3 in Figure 2-2,
for example, Bob’s “root” group for UIA name resolution, corresponding to his personal group,
appears to Alice as a “sub-group” named Bob. Conversely, Alice’s “root” group appears to Bob
as a “sub-group” named Alice. Since Bob’s and Alice’s naming relationship forms a cycle in
the graph of UIA groups, Bob could for example refer to his own phone via the redundant name
phone.Bob.Alice.
UIA groups may at times contain label conflicts, or bindings of a single name to multiple distinct
targets. When Bob at Time 4 merges his new cell phone with its default name phone into his
personal group, which already contains another device named phone, the two phone bindings
result in a label conflict. Label conflicts also arise if an ownership dispute splits the target that a
group name refers to, as described in Section 2.2.9. Name resolution fails if it encounters a label
conflict, preventing the user from following ambiguous links before resolving the conflict. A conflict
on one label does not affect the usability of other labels in the same group, however.
State Management
UIA uses optimistic replication [106,134,245] to maintain a user’s personal UIA namespace across
multiple devices, guarding namespace state against device loss or failure and keeping the name-
space available on all devices during periods of disconnection or network partitions. Each device
stores in an append-only log all persistent naming state for its user’s personal group and any other
groups of interest to the user, and uses an epidemic protocol [63] to distribute updates of each
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Figure 2-4: Basic log record format
group’s state among the devices interested in that group. Devices use rumor mongering to prop-
agate newly-written or newly-learned records aggressively through the network, and they perform
periodic anti-entropy exchanges to ensure that updates reliably reach all interested devices as net-
work connectivity permits.
2.3.2 Device Log Structure
Each UIA device keeps an append-only log holding all persistent UIA naming-related state. The
records comprising the log collectively hold all of the persistent state for the user’s personal group
and any other UIA groups of interest to the user. A device’s log typically holds both records gen-
erated by the device itself and gossiped replicas of relevant records generated by other devices.
Devices sharing a namespace propagate updates via gossip, copying any relevant new records from
other devices’ logs to their own as they appear and as network connectivity permits. Storing all
persistent namespace state in log form facilitates automatic synchronization of namespace changes
across devices, and also provides the ability to undo accidental name deletions or malicious changes
from a compromised device.
UIA organizes the records comprising a device’s log into series, each series representing the
sequence of changes a particular device writes to a particular group. The state defining a group
consists of one or more series, one for each device that has written to the group. All devices partic-
ipating in a group gossip and replicate all records in each of the group’s series, preserving the order
of records in a given series, but do not enforce any order between records in different series. Since
UIA separates the naming state for each group by series, devices can limit gossip to the records
relating to groups they’re interested in, instead of scanning their neighbors’ entire device logs.
As shown in Figure 2-4, each log record contains a series ID, a sequence number, data specific
to the record type, and a signature. The series ID (SID) uniquely identifies the series to which the
record belongs. The sequence number orders records within a series. The device that owns a series
signs each record in that series with its private key, so that other devices can authenticate copies
of records they receive indirectly. A cryptographic hash of the record yields a Record ID, which
uniquely identifies the record for various purposes described later.
UIA currently defines four record types, listed in Figure 2-5 and summarized briefly below:
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Figure 2-5: Specific log record types
• Create: A create record initiates a new series owned by the device writing the record, as
identified in the record’s owner field. The owner EID fixes the public/private key pair other
devices use to authenticate records in the new series. The record ID of the create record
becomes the new series ID; a random nonce ensures the new SID’s cryptographic uniqueness.
The create record itself is not part of the new series: its own series ID field is usually empty
to indicate that it is not part of any series, but it can be non-empty for revocation purposes as
described later.
• Link: A link record binds a human-readable label such as Alice to an endpoint ID or series
ID denoting the link’s target. Links to devices, such as Bob’s names laptop and phone,
contain the EID of the target device. Links to groups, such as Alice and PhotoClub,
contain the SID of some series in the target group. A link record has an owner flag indicating
whether the link grants ownership to the link’s target, allowing the target to write changes to
the group containing the link record. We refer to a link with its owner flag set as a link-owner
record.
• Merge: A merge record joins two series to form a single UIA group. The union of all link
and cancel records in all merged series determines the set of names that appear in the group,
thereby forming a common distributed namespace. A merge takes effect only if the device
that wrote the merge record also owns the target group, or if there is a corresponding merge
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record in the target group pointing back to the first group.
• Cancel: A cancel record nullifies the effect of a specific previous record, specified by the
target’s record ID. With certain restrictions described below, link records can be canceled to
delete or rename group members. Create, merge, and cancel records cannot be canceled.
2.3.3 Namespace Operations
This section describes how UIA devices implement the important user-visible namespace control
operations, in terms of the specific records the devices write to their logs at the events in the example
scenario from Figure 2-2. The following section will then explain how devices evaluate the contents
of their logs to determine the effective state of each group at any point in time.
Device Initialization: When Bob and Alice install or first start UIA on a device at Time 1, the
device first writes a create record to its log, forming a new series to represent the user’s personal
“root” group on that device. The device then writes a link record to the new series, giving itself a
suitable default name such as laptop. The device sets the owner flag in this link record to make
itself the sole initial owner of the group.
Merging Device Groups: When Bob introduces and merges his devices at Time 2 to form a
personal group, each device writes to its own root series a merge record pointing to the other device’s
root series. These cross-referencing merge records result in a merge relationship between the two
devices, which begin to gossip the records comprising both series so that each device eventually
holds a complete copy of each. This merging process does not actually create any new link records,
but causes each device to obtain copies of the other device’s existing link records (the laptop’s link
record for its default name laptop and the phone’s record for its name phone) and incorporate
those names into its own root group.
Aside from merging devices’ root series via introduction, a user can use a single device to merge
two arbitrary groups, provided the same device already has ownership of both groups. If Bob creates
two shared sub-groups and later decides they should be combined, for example, he can merge them
on any of his devices. The device writes cross-referencing merge records to the relevant series,
exactly as in the introduction scenario.
If a user accidentally merges the wrong groups, the device that wrote a merge record can “undo”
the merge via a cancel record written to the same series. Once either merge record is canceled
this way, the groups return to their pre-merge state, retaining their original identities as defined
by the disjoint sets of original series IDs. The restriction that a merge can only be undone on the
same device results from the membership and ownership evaluation algorithm described later in
Section 2.3.4, but appears a reasonable constraint for undo purposes. Cross-device “un-merge” can
be approximated via revocation, as described later, but revocation cannot restore the distinctness of
the original group identities: two links referring to the two separate groups before the merge refer
to the same group after the revocation.
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Meeting Other Users: When Bob and Alice introduce their devices to each other at Time 3, the
devices exchange the series IDs of their respective root series, and each device writes a link record
to its own root series referring to the other device’s root series. Bob’s new link record named Alice
gives Alice a name in his personal group, and Alice’s new link record named Bob likewise gives
Bob a name in her group. The devices do not set the owner flags in these new link records, giving
Alice and Bob only read-only access to each others’ namespaces.
Transitive Merge: Individual merge relationships in UIA are always pairwise, between exactly
two series, but merge relationships combine transitively to determine effective group membership.
When Bob introduces his cell phone to his home phone at Time 4, the two devices form a merge
relationship between their respective root series. Since Bob’s home phone and laptop already have
a merge relationship, Bob’s laptop and cell phone transitively learn about each other via gossiped
records they receive from the home phone, and the union of the records in the three root series
determine the contents of the resulting group. Since the merged group has two link records named
phone with different target EIDs, the devices flag a label conflict on phone and refuse to resolve
this name.
Renaming Labels and Resolving Conflicts: When Bob renames his cell phone to cell at
Time 5 to resolve the conflict, his device writes to its root series a cancel record containing the
record ID of the link record defining the cell phone’s previous name, then writes a new link named
cell that is otherwise identical to the original link. Since one of the two conflicting link records is
now canceled, the label conflict disappears, and the names phone and cell become usable on all
of Bob’s devices once they receive the new records via gossip. Bob can resolve the conflict on any
of his devices, because any group owner can cancel a link written by another device.
The user can also delete a name from a group outright, in which case the device writes a cancel
record without a new link. The ownership granted by a link-owner record, however, can only be
nullified by the revocation process described later in Section 2.3.4.
Because UIA implements renames non-atomically with a cancel record coupled with a new link
record, if Bob renames Alice to Alice1 on his laptop and renames Alice to Alice2 on his
phone while the two devices are temporarily partitioned, on reconnection he will have two names
Alice1 and Alice2 with no conflict detected. This corner-case behavior, while perhaps slightly
surprising, seems acceptable since it “loses” no information and at worst requires Bob to delete one
of the resulting redundant names. At the cost of added complexity, a non-idempotent “Rename”
record type could be added to enable UIA to detect conflicting renames of a single original link
record.
Creating Groups: Bob uses his laptop at Time 6 to create his shared PhotoClub group. To
create the group, the laptop first writes a create record to generate a fresh series ID. The laptop then
writes two link records: first, a link named PhotoClub in its root series pointing to the new series,
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and second, a link named Bob in the new series pointing back to the root series. The laptop sets the
owner flag in only the latter link record, giving Bob’s personal group ownership of the new group,
without giving PhotoGroup ownership of Bob’s personal group.
Suppose that Bob now uses a different device, his cell phone for example, to add Alice to
PhotoClub. Bob’s cell phone is already an indirect owner of PhotoClub, because the cell phone
is an owner of Bob’s personal group and Bob’s personal group owns PhotoClub. The cell phone
does not yet have a series in PhotoClub, however, to which it can write records: initially only the
laptop, which created the new group, has a series in the group, and only it can sign records into that
series. The cell phone therefore creates its own PhotoClub series, by writing a create record to
form a new series owned by itself, and then writing a merge record to this new series pointing to the
laptop’s PhotoClub series. Although no corresponding merge record in the laptop’s PhotoClub
series points back to the cell phone’s new series (in fact the laptop may be offline and unable to sign
such a record), the cell phone’s merge record takes effect “unilaterally” by virtue of the cell phone’s
indirect ownership of PhotoClub. The cell phone then writes a copy of Bob’s link to Alice into
its new PhotoClub series, and other devices learn of the new series and the new name as they
gossip records for PhotoClub.
Revoking Ownership: When Bob learns at Time 7 that his cell phone is missing, he uses his
laptop to revoke the cell phone’s ownership of his personal group, either by deleting the name cell
from his personal group or by clearing its owner flag. To implement this revocation, however, Bob’s
laptop cannot merely write a cancel record pointing to the link record for cell: the cell phone
would still own a series in Bob’s personal group and thus retain “hidden” control over the group.
To revoke the cell phone’s ownership, therefore, Bob’s laptop creates a new personal group for
Bob and copies the original group’s name content into it. To create the new group, the laptop writes
a create record whose series ID field is not empty as usual, but instead contains the SID of the
laptop’s original root series. The laptop then writes link records to the new series corresponding
to all the active links in the old series, omitting links or ownership flags to be revoked. The create
record written into the old root series indicates to all interested devices that the new series forms a
group that is intended to replace or act as a successor to the original group.
As long as only one such “create successor” record exists in Bob’s old personal group, all
devices treat links to any series in the old group as if they linked to the successor group instead.
Upon receiving via gossip the records describing Bob’s new group, for example, Alice’s devices
subsequently resolve her name Bob to the new group, and use it to calculate which devices should
be given access to resources she has authorized Bob to access, effectively revoking the cell phone’s
access.
If the cell phone writes a conflicting “create successor” record to its series in Bob’s original
group, however, then the original group becomes disputed, and other devices refuse to resolve links
to any series in the original group as soon as they learn about the dispute. Alice’s devices thus
refuse to resolve her name Bob and deny access to any resources she authorized using that name.
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Once Alice updates her broken link to refer to the correct successor group, either by re-introducing
with Bob or by copying a fresh link from a mutual friend, her device writes a new link referring
to a series in Bob’s new group, the old group becomes irrelevant and Bob can again access Alice’s
resources via the devices in his new personal group.
If link or cancel records exist on Bob’s other devices that his laptop has not yet received at
the time of revocation, the laptop cannot copy these change records into the new group and they
become orphaned. Bob’s devices continue to monitor and gossip records in the old group after the
revocation, however, to detect both orphans and ownership disputes. If a device with ownership
of the new group detects an orphaned record written by itself or another device with ownership of
the new group (not a revokee), it automatically “forwards” the change by writing a corresponding
record to the new group.
Key Compromise and Retirement: Besides handling the issue of retired, lost, or stolen devices,
UIA’s revocation mechanism may also be useful if a device’s public/private key pair is compromised
and the user wishes to re-key the device, or if the public-key cryptography or hash algorithms the
device’s EID is built from become obsolete. In such a situation, the device can simply generate
a new, fresh public/private key pair and EID for itself, merge this new EID into the existing group
with the same device name as that associated with the old EID, and then perform a “self-revocation”
of the device’s old EID using the normal revocation mechanism to ensure that only the new EID and
not the old one is considered a member of the user’s personal group.
In the case of gradual cryptographic key or algorithm retirement (as opposed to a key compro-
mise requiring immediate revocation), it may be useful to allow both the device’s old and new EIDs
to be active at once during some transition period. Allowing a single device name to be assigned
more than one EID at once without this situation being interpreted as a conflict would require a
minor extension to UIA’s current group management mechanism.
2.3.4 Group State Evaluation
This section describes the algorithms UIA devices use to determine the current state of a given
group from the set of log records they have on hand. Devices evaluate group state in three stages:
(1) membership and ownership, (2) group successorship, and (3) name content.
Membership and Ownership
In the first stage, a UIA device collects the series IDs referred to by all records in its log, and
clusters them into sets based on merge relationships to form UIA groups. At the same time, the
device computes the set of device EIDs to be considered owners of each group, either directly or
transitively. Group membership and ownership must be computed at the same time because they
are mutually dependent: group membership expansion via merge can introduce additional owners,
and owner set expansion can place additional merge records under consideration.
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global M : membership table: SID→ SID set
global O: ownership table: SID set → EID set
function eval membership ownership():
for each known series sid:
M [sid]← {sid}
O[{sid}]← EID of device that owns series sid
do:
for each link-owner record in each series sid:
if link target is a device teid:
O[M [sid]]← O[M [sid]] ∪ teid
else if target is a series tsid:
O[M [sid]]← O[M [sid]] ∪O[M [tsid]]
for each merge record in each series sid:
tsid← target series ID of merge record
O[M [sid]]← O[M [sid]] ∪O[M [tsid]]
if owner EID of series sid ∈ O[M [tsid]]:
O[M [sid] ∪M [tsid]]← O[M [sid]] ∪O[M [tsid]]
for each series ID msid ∈ M [sid] ∪M [tsid]:
M [msid]← M [sid] ∪M [tsid]
until M and O stop changing
Figure 2-6: Membership and ownership evaluation pseudocode
Figure 2-6 shows pseudocode for membership and ownership evaluation. The algorithm uses a
membership table M mapping each known series ID to a set of series IDs sharing a group, and an
ownership table O mapping each group (represented by a set of series IDs) to a set of owner device
EIDs. The algorithm first initializes the entry in M for each series to a singleton set containing only
that series, and initializes the owner set entry in O for each such singleton group to the EID of the
device that owns that series. The algorithm then repeatedly merges groups and expands ownership
sets until it reaches a fixed point. The algorithm terminates because member and owner sets only
grow, and each device knows of a finite number of series IDs at a given time.
The algorithm considers only live merge and link-owner records. A record is live if it is not
targeted by any cancel record in the same series. The same-series restriction prevents cancel records
from decreasing the sets O and M across iterations and violating the algorithm’s monotonicity
assumptions, hence the restrictions mentioned earlier on undo of merge and link-owner records.
In each iteration, the algorithm first follows link-owner records, expanding the ownership set of
the group containing a link-owner record according to the target device EID or the current ownership
set of the target group, as applicable. Across iterations, this step handles transitive propagation of
ownership across multiple groups, such as Bob’s laptop’s ownership of PhotoClubvia the laptop’s
ownership of Bob’s personal group.
Second, for each merge record, the algorithm expands the ownership set of the group containing
the merge record to include the ownership set of the target group, then checks whether the device
that wrote the merge record is authorized by virtue of having ownership of the target group. The
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Figure 2-7: Example group successorship scenarios
authorization check prevents a device from merging a series into an arbitrary group without permis-
sion. In the symmetric case where two merge records refer to each others’ series IDs, each merge
is authorized by the fact that the other merge grants ownership of its own series to its target. Once
a merge is authorized, the algorithm combines the SID sets of the respective groups to form one
group containing all the merged SIDs, and similarly combines the respective owner sets.
Group Successorship
In the second stage, a device computes the successorship status of each group resulting from the
first stage, in order to handle revocations and ownership disputes. The device first forms a directed
graph reflecting immediate successor relationships: a create record in series A yielding a new series
B makes the group containing B a successor to the group containing A. Next, the device takes the
transitive closure of this graph to form a transitive successorship relation: if B succeeds A and C
succeeds B, then C transitively succeeds A.
The device now assigns to every group G one of three states as follows. If G has no successors,
it is a head group: no revocations have been performed in the group, and links to series IDs in
the group resolve normally. On the other hand, if there is a second group G′ that is a transitive
successor to G and is also a transitive successor to all other transitive successors to G, then G′ is the
undisputed successor to G. In this case, links to series IDs in group G resolve to group G′ instead.
Finally, if G has successors but no undisputed successor, then group G is disputed, and links to
series IDs in G do not resolve at all.
Figure 2-7 illustrates several group successorship scenarios and the corresponding results of
this algorithm. In scenario (1), two conflicting revocations have placed group A under dispute; A’s
successor B also has a successor due a second revocation in B but B is not under dispute. Scenario
(2) is like (1) except a revocation has also been performed in group C, forming a new head group E.
Scenario (3) shows the result after the warring owners in (2) settle their differences and merge their
head groups D and E, resolving the original dispute over group A. Scenario (4) shows a pathological
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situation that should never arise under normal use but could be obtained artificially by merging A
with D and B with C in (1); in this case the two groups in the cycle both become disputed. Scenario
(5) shows the pathological dispute resolved by a revocation in group A. (Alternatively, the cyclic
groups could simply be merged together.)
Name Content
In the third and final stage, for each head group to be used for name resolution, a device computes
the group’s namespace state as follows. Given the set of all link records in every series in the group,
the device removes all link records targeted by a cancel record in any series of the group to form the
set of active links. Any device that owns a group can cancel a link written by another device, but a
cancel cannot revoke ownership.
The set of active labels in a group, shown in a namespace browser for example, is the set of
labels appearing in any active link record in the group. To be usable, all active links for a given
label must have the same permissions, and must target the same device EID or SIDs in the same
group. Otherwise the label is in conflict, as Bob’s home and cell phone are at Time 4 in the example.
If Bob creates identical links on different devices independently, such as by separately introducing
both his cell phone and his laptop to Alice to yield duplicate Alice links, this action does not
create a label conflict when Bob merges his home and cell phone together because the redundant
links have the same target and permissions.
2.3.5 Naming State Gossip and Replication
The UIA devices participating in a given personal group gossip and proactively replicate new
records pertaining to the group among their respective logs. A UIA device by default considers
itself a “participant” in a group if it owns a series in that group—i.e., if it has ownership permission
and has written any records to the group.
UIA’s epidemic protocol uses a classic two-phase “push/pull” algorithm [63]. In the “push”
phase, when a device creates a new log record or obtains a previously unknown one from another
device, it repeatedly pushes the new record to a randomly-chosen peer until it contacts a peer that
already has the record. This rumor mongering technique works well when few devices have the
record, propagating the “rumor” aggressively until it is no longer “hot.” In the “pull” phase, each
device periodically contacts a randomly-chosen peer to obtain any records it is missing. These anti-
entropy exchanges work best when most devices already have a record, complementing the rumor
mongering phase and ensuring that every device reliably obtains all available records.
To initiate a gossip transaction, each device periodically selects a peer and initiates a query to
that device. The initiator sends a vector of (SID, timestamp) tuples indicating the newest records the
initiator holds for each series, and the responder replies with any log records in those series that the
initiator does not yet have. The responder may also include additional records relevant to the group,
such as records from another series newly merged into the group.
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When a device writes new records to a given series, it may opt to notify other interested devices
that are reachable at that moment with the new records; otherwise, new records propagate lazily. In
the current design, a device picks a random peer and gossips with it once per minute.
Devices gossip the records comprising a particular series in order, guaranteeing that the set of
records each holds for a given series is complete up to some particular time in the series owner’s
timeline. UIA imposes no gossip ordering constraints among different series, however, so changes
Bob made on his home phone and on his laptop might arrive at his cell phone out of the original
order in which Bob made them. Since UIA must operate during network partitions and periods of
disconnection, the potential for such misordering is unavoidable.
2.3.6 Remote Name Resolution
As outlined earlier in Section 2.3.1, a device resolves a multi-component UIA name by starting
with its own device-specific root group, and resolving the labels comprising the name in right-to-
left order as in DNS. When the name resolution process only traverses groups in which the resolving
device participates directly, and thus for which the device keeps replicas of all the records relevant
to the group in its own log, the group state calculations described above provide all the information
necessary to resolve the name locally.
Resolving a name may however require traversing groups to which the resolving device only
has read access, and whose records the resolving device does not proactively replicate. If Bob refers
to the name PC.Alice on his laptop, for example, Bob’s laptop may have to contact one of Alice’s
devices to obtain the link record required to resolve the label PC with respect to Alice’s personal
group. UIA’s remote resolution protocol serves this purpose, and it operates similarly to traditional
DNS.
UIA’s remote resolution protocol does not use DNS’s timeout-based cache consistency model,
however, since we do not assume that users managing UIA groups understand cache consistency
and know how to configure appropriate timeouts for their groups. UIA instead uses a simple lease-
based protocol. When a device attempting to resolve a UIA name (the “requestor”) contacts a
remote device (the “responder”) to resolve a particular label, the responder can return along with
the lookup result a lease on the lookup result, or a promise to notify the requestor proactively if
the result subsequently changes within a particular time period [98]. The requestor may then safely
cache the result for any subsequent lookups it makes during the lease period, but flushes the result
from the cache if it receives a change notification from the responder in the meantime.
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Chapter 3
Routing
Regardless of whether names are global as in traditional DNS or locally scoped as in UIA’s per-
sonal name system, devices must have a way to use those names to locate (resolve) and connect to
(route to) their targets in order to make them useful for communication. This chapter first intro-
duces the motivation and goals for the UIA routing layer in Section 3.1, then explores three specific
approaches to routing in the remaining sections.
3.1 Motivation and Goals of UIA Routing
The Internet traditionally assumes that DNS names resolve to IP addresses, and that the IP routing
mechanism alone provides the means for devices to communicate with each other via these names
and IP addresses. This assumption means in practice that the target of a DNS host name must have a
static, public IP address, and static IP addresses are both increasingly rare and expensive on today’s
commoditized Internet, and are management-intensive to assign and use even once obtained.
By default, today’s mobile personal devices usually have dynamic IP addresses assigned by the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [68], and these devices are often located behind fire-
walls or network address translators [113], where their private IP addresses are not reachable or even
globally unique outside of their private networks. Forwarding protocols like Mobile IP [185] can
give a mobile device the illusion of having a static IP address independent of its actual attachment
point, but this solution does not eliminate the necessity or attendant cost and difficulty of obtaining
the static “home” IP address for the mobile host, and increases the cost and latency of all commu-
nication when the mobile host is away from its home location, since all traffic must be forwarded
through the home address.
In UIA, whenever physically possible, we would like personal devices to provide fully auto-
matic connectivity between each other whenever the user requires—especially between devices that
have social affinity by virtue of being in the same user’s personal group or nearby in the user’s
social network. When the user refers to a personal name, UIA should automatically find a way
to communicate without requiring the user to understand or set up IP addresses or other protocol
technicalities. Communication should function smoothly in a variety of scenarios such as across the
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Internet, between Internet-connected private LANs, and within ad hoc networks disconnected from
the Internet (e.g., among passengers in a train).
To provide this automatic connectivity, UIA devices cooperate in an overlay routing protocol to
provide robust location-independent connectivity in the face of changing IP addresses, Internet rout-
ing failures, network address translators, or isolation from central network infrastructure. The rest
of this chapter explores three specific approaches to designing this overlay routing protocol: social
routing in Section 3.2, identity hash routing in Section 3.3, and compact routing in Section 3.4. The
first approach is simple, works well in scenarios we expect to be common, and is implemented and
working in the deployed UIA prototype. The other two approaches are more general and ambitious,
but have as yet been validated only under simulation and will require further development before
widespread deployment. All three approaches have strengths and limitations; it is not yet clear
which—or what combination of ideas from each—will eventually yield the best long-term solution.
3.2 Social Routing
Because of UIA’s goal of providing names that persistently refer to a particular device regardless
of how they move or where they are attached to the Internet, UIA’s endpoint identifiers (EIDs), to
which UIA personal names resolve (see Section 2.3.1, cannot and do not contain any embedded
information about the current location of the device, because that information would have to change
whenever the device moves. This design contrasts with the hierarchical CIDR [201] structure of
IP addresses on the Internet, in which varying-length prefixes of an IP address indicate the node’s
attachment point at different administrative levels, such as edge network, service provider, and
network provider. The CIDR structure makes Internet routing simple and efficient, but is also the
source of many of the difficulties UIA is trying to fix. Therefore, the UIA overlay routing layer
must address the more difficult problem of routing over topology-independent or flat identifiers,
also known as name-independent routing in the theory literature [2, 15].
Since efficient, scalable routing with location-independent node identities is inherently challeng-
ing in its most general form [93], we would like to find an appropriate set of simplifying assumptions
that will yield a robust, efficient solution for the scenarios we primarily care about. The primary
purpose of UIA’s personal name system, as described in Chapter 2, is to provide connectivity with
devices that are administratively related, by virtue of having been merged into the same personal
group, or that are socially related, by virtue of being located in the personal groups of users who
are “friends” or otherwise have personal naming relationships between their devices, and thus are
likely to wish to communicate.
Given this primary purpose, the first overlay routing approach we explore—social routing—
leverages the “social network” provided by the naming layer to reduce the scope of the routing
problem, from routing between arbitrary devices, to routing “between friends.” The total number
of interconnected devices may ultimately be very large, but the number of devices in a particular
user’s personal group and the personal groups of his immediate friends should generally be much
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smaller, which immediately reduces the scalability challenges to a more reasonable degree. Also,
since a user’s own devices and those of his friends are likely to be both more trustworthy and more
willing to spend resources forwarding the user’s packets if needed, the naming layer’s social network
provides a trust framework that the routing layer can take advantage of.
The social routing protocol we develop here is optimized for connecting to devices in the user’s
immediate social neighborhood: primarily the user’s own devices and those of friends named in the
user’s personal group, and occasionally “friends of friends,” but rarely more indirect contacts. In
practice we expect users to create (or copy from other users) names in their own personal groups for
others with whom they wish to interact regularly, justifying our assumed usage model.
In brief, a UIA device builds and maintains an overlay network between itself and other devices
nearby in its social neighborhood. To locate a remote device by its EID, a device floods a location
request through the overlay to discover the EIDs, IP addresses, and ports of devices forming a path
through the overlay to the target. The originating device then connects directly to the target’s dis-
covered IP address and port, or if the target is not directly reachable (e.g., because of an intervening
NAT), forwards traffic to it by source-routing data via existing connections in the discovered path.
3.2.1 Overlay Construction and Maintenance
Each UIA device maintains an open TCP connection with up to a configurable number of overlay
peers. A device chooses its peers from the larger set of devices in its social network based on a
number of criteria. Ideally, a device’s peers should be on the public Internet, so that a device behind
a NAT can receive messages from devices outside via its active peering connections. A device
should choose other devices when none on the public Internet are reachable, however, so that the
overlay remains useful in ad hoc environments. Furthermore, the devices of friends should be close
to each other in the overlay, so that location or forwarding paths between them are short.
To meet these goals, a device first prefers as peers devices that are stable, and secondarily
prefers those that are closest to it in friendship distance. A device is considered stable if it does not
have a private IP address [198] and has met a threshold level of availability in the recent past. A
peer’s friendship distance is roughly the number of labels in the local device’s shortest name for that
peer. The rest of this section explains how a device discovers stable peers and calculates friendship
distances.
Each device maintains a potential peer set that contains potential peers’ EIDs and the times, IP
addresses, and ports at which the device has connected to those peers in the past. Initially, a device
populates this set with the devices to which the user has directly introduced the device. To discover
new potential peers, a device periodically exchanges its potential peer set with those of other devices
within a configurable maximum friendship distance. A device adds to the set only those devices to
which it is able to establish a TCP connection when it discovers them.
A device classifies a potential peer as stable if it meets an availability threshold (e.g., 90%) at
the same public IP address and port in the recent past (e.g., the last week). To monitor availability,
a device periodically chooses a random potential peer and attempts a connection to its last known
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location. A device need not have a static IP address to be classified as stable: a device with a
dynamic non-private IP address that changes infrequently, such as a home PC left on and connected
via a DSL or cable modem, will also typically be classified as stable.
A device computes the friendship distance of each of its potential peers by assigning a distance
of 1 to its direct peers: those the naming layer identifies as devices in the user’s personal group
and in groups to which the user has linked (the user’s immediate friends). The device then assigns
distances to indirect peers transitively, giving the direct peer of a direct peer a distance of 2, for
example.
To improve robustness, a device manufacturer can seed the potential peer sets of its products
with a set of default peers, which devices treat as having an infinite friendship distance. Two newly-
purchased mobile devices, after being introduced and exchanging potential peer sets, thus have at
least one stable peer in common at the outset to help them re-connect after a move. Once the
mobile devices discover other stable peers at smaller friendship distances, however, they prefer the
new devices over the default peers, mitigating the manufacturer’s cost in providing this robustness-
enhancing service.
3.2.2 Token-limited Flooding
To communicate with a remote device, a device first attempts a direct TCP connection to the IP
address and port at which it last connected to the target, if any. If this connection fails or the
originator has no address information for the target device, it floods a location request through the
overlay to locate the target by its EID.
UIA uses a token count, in place of the traditional hop count [42], to limit the scope of location
request floods. The token count bounds the total number of devices to which a request may be
forwarded, rather than the number of times each request may be re-broadcast. This distinction is
important for two reasons. First, although devices seek to connect with a fixed number of peers,
the number of devices that choose a given device depends on the target’s stability and popularity,
so the overlay’s degree is highly non-uniform. Hop count is thus a poor predictor of the number of
devices a request will reach. Second, the overlay network is highly redundant: two friends’ devices
are likely to share many common peers, for example, so searching all devices within some distance
of a request’s source is often unnecessary.
Location requests contain the EIDs, IP addresses, and ports of devices they have traversed;
devices forward responses back through the overlay along the same path.
A device with an open TCP connection to a request’s target immediately responds with the
target’s IP address and port. Otherwise, it subtracts one token for itself, divides the other tokens
among its peers not already in the path, distributing any remainder randomly, and forwards the
request to those peers that receive a non-zero count. The device retains the request’s target EID
and return path for a short period, waiting for the forwarded requests to complete, and replying to
the original request when any of the forwarded ones succeed or when all of them have failed. A
request also fails if the source has not received a successful response within a timeout. If a device
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receives a duplicate request for the same EID as an outstanding request (e.g., along a different path),
it forwards the new request anyway according to its token count, giving peers for which there were
not enough tokens in previous instances another chance to receive the request.
As we find in Section 7.2, most location requests succeed within the near vicinity of the source
in the overlay network. To limit the cost of the search, a device thus initially sends each request with
a limited number of tokens and retries after each failure with a multiplicatively increased number,
up to some maximum.
3.2.3 Source-Routed Forwarding
To communicate with the target device after receiving a successful location response, the originator
tries to open a direct connection to each device in the response path, starting with the target itself
and proceeding backwards along the path until a connection succeeds. In the best case, the first
connection attempt in this sequence—the one directly to the target device—succeeds, and no for-
warding is necessary; in this case the UIA overlay routing layer merely functions as a “resolver,”
mapping location-independent EIDs to location-dependent IP addresses. If the first, direct connec-
tion attempt fails, however, the originator source-routes messages to the target along the tail of the
path starting with the device to which it successfully connected directly.
Consider for example two devices a and b behind different NATs, both of which peer with
a common stable device s. When a performs a location request for b’s EID, it discovers the path
a→ s → b. Device a then tries to open a direct connection to b, but b’s NAT blocks that connection,
so a forwards traffic to b through s instead. Device s itself initiates no location requests, but merely
forwards traffic along the path specified by a.
3.3 Identity Hash Routing
The social routing protocol described in the last section achieves scalability by assuming that users
mostly wish to communicate with their friends, an assumption that is likely to hold in many scenar-
ios but not all. If the user wishes to run applications on top of UIA that depend on large-scale self-
organizing protocols, such as swarm downloading [55], such protocols frequently require commu-
nication between arbitrary nodes that are administratively and socially unrelated. Thus, we would
like to develop a more general overlay routing protocol for UIA that efficiently provides scalable
routing between any indirectly connected pair of UIA nodes, not just between friends.
This section introduces Identity Hash Routing (IHR), a routing scheme inspired by Distributed
Hash Table (DHT) algorithms [147,157,196,211,236,273]. DHTs normally provide only resolution
service—the ability to look up a value in a self-organizing distributed structure given its key or
content hash—and assume that the network in which they are operating is fully-connected: i.e., that
every node can communicate directly with every other node on demand. But many nodes on today’s
Internet cannot be reached directly except via forwarding or NAT traversal through other nodes, and
the rules determining which nodes can and can’t directly reach which others are complex, subtle,
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and dynamic results of the interplay between interdomain and intradomain routing, firewall policies,
NATs, and many other factors. In a traditional DHT, when many member are persistently reachable
by some DHT members but not others, this condition causes widespread “disagreement” in the DHT
about which nodes are alive and which aren’t, which can prevent convergence and make lookups
unreliable [90].
With UIA routing, in contrast, we want each node to be able to find and connect to any other
even if many pairs of nodes are connected only indirectly, requiring explicit forwarding through
intermediate nodes (or NAT traversal) to facilitate that communication. Nevertheless, we find in
this section that it should be feasible to adapt DHT lookup algorithms into scalable overlay routing
schemes. Unlike traditional DHTs, IHR does not assume that underlying protocols provide con-
nectivity between any two nodes. When the underlying network fails to provide direct connectivity
for any reason, such as intermittent glitches, network address translators, or incompatible address-
based routing technologies, we want IHR to route around these discontinuities by forwarding traffic
through other IHR nodes.
Key Properties of IHR
The crucial scalability property IHR provides is that it efficiently allows each UIA node to find a
route to any of a large number N of total nodes in the connected network, while directly storing
information about (and routes to) only about O(log N) other nodes. Like the DHT algorithms
it builds on, IHR achieves this scalability by distributing routing information throughout the net-
work in a self-organizing structure: in particular, IHR uses a structure adapted from the Kademlia
DHT [157].
The cost of distributing routing information throughout the network for scalability is that indi-
vidual IHR nodes rarely have enough information to determine the shortest or “best” possible route
to another node. In effect, IHR does not implement a distributed “all-pairs shortest paths” algorithm
like conventional protocols for flat namespaces do [127]. In fact, it is known to be impossible to
achieve shortest-path routing with o(N) state per node [93]. Instead, IHR attempts the more moder-
ate goal of efficiently finding some path whenever one exists, and usually finding “reasonably short”
paths. This goal is appropriate for the UIA routing layer because its purpose is to provide some
usable communication path in the unfortunate situations when IP cannot find any (e.g., due to the
devices being in different IP address domains).
In general we cannot expect IHR to be as efficient as routing protocols that take advantage of the
locality and aggregation properties of structured addresses. IHR is not intended to replace address-
based routing protocols, but to complement them. By using address-based protocols such as IP
to move data efficiently across the many “short” hops comprising the core Internet infrastructure
and other large managed networks, IHR only needs to route data across across a few “long” hops,
resolving the discontinuities between address domains and bridging managed core networks to ad
hoc edge networks. For this reason, it is less important for IHR to find the best possible route all the
time, and more important for the algorithm to be scalable, robust, and fully self-managing.
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We explore two specific IHR forwarding mechanisms based on the same routing protocol. One
mechanism guarantees that nodes can operate in O(log N) space per node on any network topology.
The other forwarding mechanism allows IHR to find somewhat better routes and still uses O(log N)
space on typical networks, but may require O(N) space on worst-case network topologies. With
either forwarding mechanism, simulation results presented later in Chapter 7 indicate that IHR
consistently finds paths that are on average within 2× the length of the best possible path. IHR
occasionally chooses paths that are much longer than the best possible path, but these bad paths are
rare.
3.3.1 Routing Protocol Design
This section describes the distributed lookup and routing structure that enables IHR nodes to locate
and communicate with each other by their topology-independent identities.
Neighbors and Links
Each node in a IHR network maintains a neighbor table, in which the node records information
about all the other IHR nodes with which it is actively communicating at a given point in time,
or with which it has recently communicated. The nodes listed in the neighbor table of a node
A are termed A’s neighbors. A neighbor of A is not necessarily “near” to A in either geographic,
topological, or node identifier space; the presence of a neighbor relationship merely reflects ongoing
or recent pairwise communication.
Some neighbor relationships are mandated by the design of the IHR protocol itself as described
below, while other neighbor relationships are initiated by the actions of upper-level protocols. For
example, a request by an upper-level protocol on node A to send a packet to some other node B
effectively initiates a new IHR neighbor relationship between A and B. These neighbor relation-
ships may turn out to be either ephemeral or long-term. A IHR node’s neighbor table is analogous
to the table an IPv4 or IPv6 host must maintain in order to keep track of the current path maximum
transmission unit (MTU) and other vital information about other endpoints currently or recently of
interest to upper-level protocols.
As a part of each entry in a node’s neighbor table, the node’s IHR implementation maintains
whatever information it needs to send packets to that particular neighbor. This information de-
scribes a link between the node and its neighbor. A link between two nodes A and B may be either
physical or virtual. A physical link is a link for which connectivity is provided directly by the un-
derlying protocol (IP). For example, if A and B are both well-connected nodes on the Internet that
can successfully communicate via their public IP addresses, then AB is a physical link from the
perspective of the IHR layer, even though this communication path may in reality involve many
hops at the IP layer and even more hops at the link layer. If a physical link is available between A
and B, then A and B are termed physical neighbors, and each node stores the other’s IP address or
other address information for underlying protocols in the appropriate entry of its neighbor table.
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Figure 3-1: Forwarding via virtual links
A virtual link, in contrast, is a link between two nodes that can only communicate by forwarding
packets through one or more intermediaries at the IHR level. We describe such nodes as virtual
neighbors. The mechanism for IHR-layer packet forwarding and the contents of the neighbor table
entries for a node’s virtual neighbors will be described later in Section 3.3.2. For now, however, we
will simply assume that the following general principle holds. Given any two existing physical or
virtual links AB and BC with endpoint B in common, nodes A and C can construct a new virtual
link AC between them by establishing a IHR-level forwarding path through B. That is, IHR nodes
can construct new virtual links recursively from existing physical and virtual links.
In Figure 3-1, for example, virtual link AC builds on physical links AB and BC , and virtual
link AD in turn builds on virtual link AC and physical link CD. Once these virtual links are set up,
node A has nodes B, C , and D in its neighbor table, the last two being virtual neighbors. Node D
only has nodes C and A as its neighbors; D does not necessarily need to know about B in order to
use virtual link AC .
Constructing Virtual Links
IHR nodes construct new virtual links with a single basic mechanism, represented by the build link
procedure shown in Figure 3-2. A node n can only build a virtual link to some other node nt if n
already has some “waypoint” node nw in its neighbor table, and nw already has nt in its neighbor
table respectively. Node n can then use the build link procedure to construct a link from n to nt.
In the build link procedure, n first attempts to initiate a direct connection to nt via the under-
lying routing protocol, using any network- or link-layer address(es) for nt that n may have learned
from nw. For example, if nt is a node with several network interfaces each in different address
domains, then nt might publish both the IP addresses and the IEEE MAC addresses of all of its
network interfaces, so that other IHR nodes in any of these domains can initiate direct connections
with nt even if they don’t know exactly which domain they are in. If at least one of these direct
connection attempts succeeds, then n now has nt as a physical neighbor, and a virtual link is not
necessary.
If all direct connection attempts fail (or do not succeed quickly enough), however, then n con-
structs a virtual link to nt using nw as a forwarding waypoint. In this way, the build-link procedure
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// build a link from node n to target node nt,
// using node nw as a waypoint if necessary
n.build link(nw, nt) {
assert (n and nw are neighbors)
assert (nw and nt are neighbors)
try to contact nt by its IP address, MAC address, etc.
if direct contact attempt succeeds {
build physical link from n to nt
} else {
build virtual link from n to nt via nw
}
assert (n and nt are neighbors)
}
Figure 3-2: Pseudocode to build a physical or virtual link
takes advantage of underlying connectivity for efficiency whenever possible, but succeeds even
when only indirect connectivity is available.
IHR Network Structure
While virtual links provide a basic forwarding mechanism, IHR nodes must have an algorithm to
determine which virtual links to create in order to form a communication path between any two
nodes. For this purpose, all IHR connected nodes in a network self-organize into a distributed
structure that allows any node to locate and build a communication path to any other by resolving
the target node’s identifier one bit at a time from left to right. The IHR network structuring algorithm
is closely related to peer-to-peer distributed hash table (DHT) algorithms such as Pastry [211] and
Kademlia [157]. Unlike DHTs, however, IHR uses this self-organizing structure not only to look up
information such as the IP or MAC address(es) of a node from its IHR identifier, but also as a basis
for constructing IHR-level forwarding paths between nodes for which underlying protocols provide
no direct connectivity.
For simplicity of exposition we will assume that each node has only one identifier, each node’s
identifier is unique, and all identifiers are generated by the same l-bit hash function. UIA’s endpoint
identifiers (EIDs) already meet these requirements. We will treat IHR node identifiers as opaque l-
bit binary bit strings. The longest common prefix (LCP) of two nodes n1 and n2, written lcp(n1, n2),
is the longest bit string prefix common to their respective IHR identifiers. The proximity of two
nodes prox(n1, n2) is the length of lcp(n1, n2): the number of contiguous bits their identifiers have
in common starting from the left. For example, nodes 1011 and 1001 have an LCP of 10 and a
proximity of two, while nodes 1011 and 0011 have an empty LCP and hence a proximity of zero.
Nodes that are “closer” in identifier space have a higher proximity. Since node identifiers are unique,
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Figure 3-3: Neighbor tables, buckets, and node ID space
0 ≤ prox(n1, n2) < l if n1 6= n2, and prox(n, n) = l.
Each node n divides its neighbor table into l buckets, as illustrated in Figure 3-3, and places
each of its neighbors ni into bucket bi = prox(n, ni) corresponding to that neighbor’s proximity
to n. This distance metric, also known as the XOR metric [157], has the important symmetry
property that if node n2 falls into bucket b of node n1’s neighbor table, then n1 falls into bucket b of
n2’s neighbor table. This symmetry facilitates the establishment of pairwise relationships between
nodes, and allows both nodes in such a relationship to benefit from requests flowing between them
in either direction.
In order for a IHR network to be fully functional, the network must satisfy the following connec-
tivity invariant. Each node n perpetually maintains an active connection with at least one neighbor
in every bucket b, as long a reachable node exists anywhere in the network that could fit into bucket
b. In practice each node attempts to maintain at least k active neighbors in each bucket at all times,
for some redundancy factor k.
Building Communication Paths
If the connectivity invariant is maintained throughout a IHR network, then any node n can commu-
nicate with any target node nt by the following procedure, outlined in pseudocode in Figure 3-4.
Node n first looks in bucket b1 = prox(n, nt) of its own neighbor table. If this bucket is empty,
then nt does not exist or is not reachable, and the search fails. If the bucket contains nt itself,
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// build a communication path from node n
// to target node nt
n.build path(nt) {
i = 1
b1 = prox(n, nt)
n1 = n.neighbor table[b1]
while (ni 6= nt) {
bi+1 = prox(ni, nt)
assert (bi+1 > bi)
ni+1 = ni → find neighbor in bucket (bi+1)
if find neighbor in bucket request failed {
return failure: node nt does not exist or is not reachable.
}
n.build link(ni, ni+1)
assert (ni+1 is now n’s neighbor)
i = i + 1
}
return success: we now have a working link to nt.
}
Figure 3-4: Pseudocode to build a path to any node
then the target node is already an active neighbor and the search succeeds. Otherwise, n picks any
neighbor n1 from bucket b1. Since n1’s and nt’s proximity to n are both b1, the first b1 bits of n1
and nt match those of n’s identifier, while their immediately following bits are both opposite that
of n. The proximity of n1 to nt is therefore at least b1 + 1.
Node n now sends a message to n1 requesting n1’s nearest neighbor to nt. Node n1 looks in
bucket b2 = p(n1, nt) in its neighbor table, and returns information about at least one such node,
n2, if any are found. The information returned includes the IHR identifier of the nodes found along
with any known IP addresses, IEEE MAC addresses, or other underlying protocol addresses for
those nodes. Node n then uses the build link procedure in Figure 3-2 to establish a connection to
n2, via a direct physical link if possible, or a virtual link through n1 otherwise.
Now n2 is also an active neighbor of n, falling into the same bucket of n’s neighbor table as n1
but closer in proximity to nt. The original node n continues the search iteratively from n2, resolving
at least one bit per step and building additional recursive virtual links as needed, until it finds the
desired node or the search fails. If the search eventually succeeds, then n will have nt as an active
(physical or virtual) neighbor and communication can proceed.
In practice, nodes can improve the robustness and responsiveness of the build path procedure
by selecting a set of up to k neighbor nodes at each iteration and making find neighbor requests
to all of them in parallel, in much the same way that Kademlia parallelizes its DHT lookups. Par-
allelizing the construction of IHR communication paths has the added benefit that the originating
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node is likely to end up having discovered several alternate paths to the same node. The originating
node can evaluate these alternative paths using some suitable criteria and choose the best of them
for subsequent communication, and keep information about the others stored away for use if the
primary path fails. The two endpoint nodes can even balance their traffic load across these paths if
they can find reason to believe that the paths are sufficiently independent for load-balancing to be
effective in improving overall performance.
The Merge Procedure
The above build path procedure is much like the lookup procedure used in the Kademlia DHT,
modified to support construction of indirect forwarding paths between nodes that cannot commu-
nicate directly via underlying protocols. For network construction and maintenance, however, IHR
requires a much more robust algorithm than those used in Kademlia and other DHTs. DHTs gener-
ally assume not only that underlying protocols provide full any-to-any connectivity between nodes,
but also that nodes join or leave the network at a limited rate and relatively independently of each
other. In the discontinuous network topologies on which IHR is intended to run, however, a single
broken link can split the network at arbitrary points, causing the nodes in either partition to perceive
that all the nodes in the other partition have disappeared en masse. If the network split persists for
some time, the nodes on either side will re-form into two separate networks, which must somehow
be merged again once the networks are re-connected.
IHR assumes that underlying protocols provide some means by which topologically near IHR
nodes can discover each other and establish physical neighbor relationships. For example, IHR
nodes might use Ethernet broadcasts IPv4 subnet broadcasts, or IPv6 neighbor discovery to detect
nearby neighbors automatically. The current UIA prototype depends on Bonjour [11] to provide
this local-area discovery function.
Nodes might also contain “hard-coded” IP addresses of some well-known IHR nodes on the In-
ternet, so that nodes with working Internet connections can quickly merge into the public Internet-
wide IHR network. Finally, the user might in some cases explicitly provide the address information
necessary to establish contact with other relevant IHR nodes. Whenever a new physical link is es-
tablished by any of the above means, the node on each end of the link performs the merge procedure
outlined in Figure 3-5, to merge itself into the network reachable from the other node.
The merge process works as follows. Suppose that node n has node n1 as a neighbor, falling
in bucket b1 = p(n, n1) in its neighbor table. If b1 > 0, then n and n1 have one or more initial
identifier bits in common, and any neighbors of n1 in buckets 0 through b1 − 1 are also suitable for
the corresponding buckets in n’s neighbor table. Node n therefore requests information from n1
about about at least one of n1’s neighbors in each of these buckets, and builds a physical or virtual
(via n1) link to that node. Assuming n1’s neighbor table satisfied the connectivity invariant, n’s
neighbor table now does as well for buckets 0 through b1 − 1.
Node n now asks n1 for any neighbor from n1’s bucket b1 other than n itself, as if n was
searching for its own identifier in n1’s network. If such a node n2 is found, then its proximity
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// merge node n into the portion of a network
// reachable from neighbor n1
n.merge(n1) {
i = 1
b1 = prox(n, n1)
while (bi < l) {
for j = 0 thru (bi − 1) {
if n.neighbor table[j] not already full {
nj = ni → find neighbor in bucket (j)
if find neighbor in bucket request succeeded {
n.build link(ni, nj)
}
}
}
ni+1 = ni → find neighbor in bucket (bi)
if find neighbor in bucket request failed
break
bi+1 = prox(n, ni+1)
assert (bi+1 > bi)
n.build link(ni, ni+1)
i = i + 1
}
}
Figure 3-5: Pseudocode to merge a node into a network
b2 = p(n, n2) must be at least b1 + 1. Node n builds a link to n2 via n1, fills any empty buckets
0 < bi < b2 from n2’s neighbor table as above, and then continues the process from n2 for neighbors
with proximity greater than b2. Eventually n reaches some node ni with proximity bi, whose bucket
bi contains no neighbors other than n itself. This means that there are no other nodes in n1’s
network with greater proximity to n than pi, and so n has satisfied the connectivity invariant in its
own neighbor table, at least with respect to the portion of the network reachable from n1.
Merge Notifications
After a node n merges into another node n1’s network via the merge procedure above, however,
there may be other nodes in n1’s network besides the ones that n contacted directly that also need
to learn about n before their neighbor tables will satisfy the connectivity invariant for the new,
larger network. In addition, n may not be just a “lone” node joining n1’s network, but may instead
be a member of a larger existing network (reachable from n’s neighbor table) that previously split
from or evolved independently from n1’s network. In this case, many nodes in n’s network may
need to learn about nodes in n1’s network, and vice versa, before the connectivity invariant will be
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re-established globally.
To cause other nodes to update their neighbor tables appropriately, IHR uses a simple notifica-
tion mechanism. Whenever a node n makes contact for any reason with a new physical or virtual
neighbor nn, and bucket bn = prox(n, nn) of n’s neighbor table was not full before the addition of
nn, n sends a message to all of its existing neighbors notifying them of the new node nn. In response
to this notification message, each of n’s existing neighbors ni contacts nn via ni.build link(n, nn),
and then likewise merges into nn’s network via ni.merge(nn). If this process helps ni to fill any
of its previously underfull neighbor table buckets, then ni subsequently sends notifications to its
neighbors, and so on. The chain reaction stops when all of the affected nodes cease finding new
nodes that fit into underfull buckets in their neighbor tables.
To understand this process, consider two initially separate IHR networks: a “red” network con-
sisting of i nodes r1 . . . ri, and a “green” network consisting of j nodes g1 . . . gj . We say that any
given node n satisfies the red connectivity invariant if each bucket in n’s neighbor table contains
at least one red node if any red node exists that could fit into that bucket. Similarly, we say that a
node n satisfies the green connectivity invariant if each of n’s buckets contains at least one green
node if any green node exists that could fit into that bucket. We assume that all green nodes initially
satisfy the green connectivity invariant, but no green nodes satisfy the red connectivity invariant
because there are initially no connections between the red and green networks. Similarly, all red
nodes satisfy the red connectivity invariant but no red nodes satisfy the green connectivity invariant.
Now suppose that a physical link is somehow established between nodes r1 and g1, connecting
the two networks. In response, r1 performs a merge(g1), filling any underfull buckets in its neighbor
table that can be filled from green nodes reachable from g1, and g1 likewise performs a merge(r1)
to fill its buckets from nodes in the red network. Node r1 effectively locates and builds links with its
nearest (highest-proximity) neighbors in the green network, and g1 likewise locates and builds links
with its nearest neighbors in the red network. As a result, after the merge process r1 satisfies the
green connectivity invariant and g1 satisfies the red connectivity invariant. Since r1 and g1 already
satisfied the red and green invariants, respectively, and adding new neighbors to a node’s neighbor
table cannot “un-satisfy” a previously satisfied connectivity invariant, both r1 and g1 now satisfy
the global connectivity invariant covering both red and green nodes.
Assuming node identifiers are reasonably uniformly distributed, with high probability one or
both of r1 and g1 will find one or more new nodes in the opposite network that fit into previously
underfull buckets. Before the merge, bucket b = prox(r1, g1) in both r1 and g1 may already have
been full, which is likely if r1 and g1 are far apart in identifier space. There may even be no nodes
in the green network that fall into underfull buckets in r1, but this event is unlikely unless the green
network is much smaller than the red network. Similarly, there may be no nodes in the red network
that fall into underfull buckets in g1, but only if the red network is much smaller than the green
network. If the two networks are similar in size, then both r1 and g1 will almost certainly find new
neighbors that fit into underfull buckets.
At any rate, the discovery of new neighbors falling in these underfull buckets causes r1 and/or g1
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to send merge notifications to their existing neighbors in the red and green networks, respectively,
supplying a link to the opposite node as a “hint” from which other nodes in each network can
start their merge processes. Each node in either network that is notified in this way initiates its own
merge process to fill its neighbor table from nodes in the other network, in the process triggering the
merge process in its other neighbors, eventually leaving all nodes satisfying the global connectivity
invariant.
In practice it is important to ensure that the inevitable flurry of merge notifications does not
swamp the whole network, especially when two relatively large networks merge. Standard protocol
engineering solutions apply to this problem, however, such as rate-limiting the acceptance or spread
of notifications, propagating merge notifications periodically in batches, and keeping a cache in
each node of recently-seen merge notifications to avoid performing the same merge many times in
response to equivalent merge notifications received from different neighbors.
3.3.2 Packet Forwarding
The previous section described how IHR nodes form a self-organizing structure in which any node
can build a communication path to any other node by recursively constructing virtual links on top
of other links, but did not specify exactly how virtual links operate. In this section we explore
the construction and maintenance of virtual links in more detail. We will explore in particular two
alternative methods for implementing virtual links: one based on source routing, the other based
on recursive tunneling. Source routing potentially enables nodes to find more efficient routes and
keeps the basic forwarding mechanism as simple as possible, while the recursive tunneling approach
minimizes the amount of state each node must maintain in its neighbor table.
Source Routing
With source routing, each entry in a node’s neighbor table that represents a virtual neighbor contains
a complete source route to the target node. The source route lists the IHR identifiers of a sequence
of nodes, starting with the origin node and ending with the target node, such that each adjacent pair
in the sequence has (or recently had) a working physical link between them. Of course, since these
links need only be “physical” from the perspective of the IHR layer, each link in a IHR source route
may represent many hops at the IP routing or link layers.
Consider for example Figure 3-6, in which the five nodes A,B,C,D,E are connected by a
chain of physical links. Nodes A and C have established a virtual link AC by building a two-hop
source route via their mutual neighbor B, and nodes C and E have similarly established a virtual
link CE via D. Suppose node A subsequently learns about E from C and desires to create a
virtual link AE via C . Node A contacts C requesting C’s source route to E, and then appends C’s
source route for CE (A,B,C) to A’s existing source route for AC (C,D,E), yielding the complete
physical route A,B,C,D,E.
To send a packet to E, node A includes in the packet’s IHR header the complete source route for
the virtual link AE stored in its neighbor table entry for E. Each IHR node along the path examines
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Figure 3-6: Source routing versus recursive tunneling
the header to find the packet’s current position along its path, and bumps this position indicator to
the next position before forwarding the packet to the next IHR node in the path. Forwarding by
source routing in IHR is thus essentially equivalent to source routing in IP [121].
In theory each node may have to store up to l × k entries in its neighbor table, where l is the
node identifier size and hence the number of buckets in the neighbor table, and k is the redundancy
factor within each bucket. In practice only the top log2 N buckets will be non-empty, where N
is the total number of nodes in the network. With source route forwarding, neighbor table entries
may have to hold source routes for paths up to N − 1 hops in length, in the worst-case network
topology of N nodes connected together in one long chain. In this case each node may require
O(N log N) storage. In practical networks these source routes will of course be much shorter, so
this large worst-case storage requirement may not be a problem.
Recursive Tunneling
In contrast with source routing, where each entry in a node’s neighbor table for a virtual neighbor
contains a complete, explicit route that depends only on physical links, recursive tunneling preserves
the abstraction properties of neighbor relationships by allowing the forwarding path describing a
virtual link to refer to both physical and (other) virtual links. As a result, each neighbor table entry
representing a virtual link only needs to hold two IHR identifiers: the identifier of the target node,
and the identifier of the “waypoint” through which the virtual link was constructed. Recursive
tunneling therefore guarantees that each node requires at most O(log N) storage, since neighbor
table entries have constant size.
In the example in Figure 3-6, node A has constructed virtual link AC via B, and node C has
constructed virtual link CE via D, and as before, A learns about E from C and wants to construct
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Figure 3-7: Forwarding by Recursive Tunneling
a virtual link AE via C . With recursive tunneling, A does not need to duplicate its route C or ask C
for information about its route to E in order to construct its new virtual link to E. Instead, A merely
depends on the knowledge that it already knows how to get to C , and that C knows how to get to
E, and constructs a neighbor table entry for E describing the “high-level” two-hop forwarding path
A,C,E.
Recursive tunneling has several beneficial properties. First, since each neighbor table entry for
a virtual neighbor needs to store only two IHR identifiers, the size of each neighbor table entry can
be limited to a constant, and the size of a node’s entire neighbor table depends only on the size
of IHR identifiers (and hence the number of buckets), and the number of entries in each bucket.
Second, if “low-level routes” in the network change, all “higher-level routes” that are built on them
will immediately use the correct, updated information with no information propagation delays. For
example, if node D above goes down making the path C,D,E unavailable, but C finds an alternate
route to E, then the virtual link AE will automatically use this new route without A even having to
be aware that something in C’s neighbor table changed.
The actual packet forwarding mechanism for recursive tunneling is of course slightly more
involved than for source routing. As illustrated in Figure 3-7, to send a packet to E, node A wraps
the packet data in three successive headers. First, it prepends a IHR tunneling header describing
the “second-level” virtual path from A to E via C . Only nodes C and E will examine this header.
Second, A prepends a second IHR tunneling header describing the “first-level” virtual path from
A to C via B. Finally, A prepends the appropriate lower-layer protocol’s header, such as an IP or
Ethernet header, necessary to transmit the packet via the physical link from A to B.
When the packet reaches node B, B strips off the lower-layer protocol header, and looks in the
first-level (outer) IHR tunneling header to find the IHR identifier of the next hop. B then looks up
this identifier in its neighbor table, prepends the appropriate (new) lower-layer protocol header, and
transmits the packet to C .
When the packet reaches node C , C strips off both the lower-layer protocol header and the first-
level IHR tunneling header (since C was the destination according to that header), and examines
the second-level tunneling header to find the final destination, E. C now looks up E in its neighbor
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table and, finding that E is a first-level virtual neighbor, C prepends a new first-level tunneling
header describing the route from C to E via D. Finally, C prepends the lower-layer protocol header
for the physical link from C to D and forwards the message to D. D subsequently forwards the
message to E, which finally strips off the lower-layer protocol header and both of the tunneling
headers before interpreting the packet data.
Path Optimization
When an upper-layer protocol on one node attempts to contact some other node via IHR, the
build path procedure described in Section 3.3.1 searches the network structure for the requested
node identifier, and in the process may build one or more virtual links using the build link pro-
cedure of Section 3.3.1. The search process through which these virtual links are constructed is
essentially driven by the distance relationships in IHR identifier space, which have nothing to do
with distance relationships in the underlying physical topology.
Each IHR node has complete flexibility, however, in the way it chooses the k nodes to fill a
particular bucket in its neighbor table whenever there are more than k nodes in the network that
could fit into that bucket. If the network contains N nodes with uniformly distributed identifiers,
then we expect nodes to have some flexibility in their choice of neighbors throughout the first
log2 N − log2 k buckets. Further, we naturally expect nodes to select the “best” k nodes they
find for each such bucket: either the closest in terms of physical topology (IHR hop count), or the
best according to some other pragmatic measure involving latency, bandwidth, and/or reliability for
example.
In general, therefore, we expect the first few iterations of the build path process to stay within
the node’s immediate topological vicinity, with subsequent hops covering larger topological dis-
tances as the remaining distance in identifier space is progressively narrowed. While the first few
build path hops will depend only on physical or inexpensive “low-order” virtual links, the last few
hops might each depend on an expensive “high-order” virtual link, eventually resulting in a commu-
nication path that criscrosses throughout the network in a highly non-optimal fashion. It is therefore
important that we find a way to optimize the routes produced using this process.
The most basic path optimization is inherent in the build link procedure. If a node A locates
target node B via the build path process, but A subsequently finds that it can contact B directly
using underlying protocols such as IP using address information it discovers during the process,
then build link will “short-circuit” the path from A to B with a physical link requiring no IHR-
level forwarding.
A second important path optimization is for nodes to check for obvious redundancies in the
routes produced as higher-order virtual links are built from lower-order virtual links. Source routing
makes this type of path optimization easier, since each node has information about the complete
physical route to each neighbor in its neighbor table, but we will explore a more limited form
of path optimization as well that works with recursive tunneling. Other path more sophisticated
forms of path optimization are certainly possible and desirable, such as optimizations relying on a
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Figure 3-8: Path optimization opportunities on different topologies, when A builds a virtual link to
F via D.
deeper analysis of the relationships between known neighbors, or based on additional information
exchanged between neighbors beyond the minimal information required to maintain the network
and build virtual links. We leave more advanced path optimizations for future work, however, and
focus for now on the effects of simple optimizations that rely on strictly local information.
Source Route Optimization
In IHR forwarding by source routing, we optimize source routes when combining two shorter paths
into a longer one simply by checking for nodes that appear in both shorter paths. For example,
in Figure 3-8(a), suppose node A has established a virtual link AD via B with path A,B,C,D,
by building on virtual link BD with path B,C,D. A virtual link also exists between D and F .
A now learns about F through D and attempts to create a virtual link AF via D. Without path
optimization, the resulting path will be A,B,C,D,C,B, F . The path can be trivially shortened to
the optimal A,B,F , however, simply by noting that B appears twice and eliminating the redundant
hops between them.
The same optimization shortens the path from A to F in Figure 3-8(b) from A,B,C,D,C,E, F
to the optimal A,B,C,E, F . This path optimization does not help in the case of Figure 3-8(c),
however, since A does not necessarily know that B and E are direct neighbors.
Recursive Tunnel Optimization
Path optimization is not as easy in forwarding by recursive tunnels, because the information needed
to perform the optimization is more spread out through the network. For example, in Figure 3-8(a),
node A knows that the first hop along virtual link AD is the physical link AB, but A does not
necessarily know what type of link BD is and may not even know that node C exists.
In general, for any virtual link from n to n1 via n2, node n also contains in its neighbor table
a virtual or physical link representing the first hop from n to n2. If the lower-order link from n to
n2 is a virtual link via some node n3, then n also contains in its neighbor table a physical or virtual
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link from n to n3, and so on. We call this chain of intermediate nodes along the path from n to n1
that n inherently knows about n’s first hop chain for n1. For example, A’s first hop chain for D in
Figure 3-8(a) is A,B,D, whereas D’s first hop chain for A is D,C,B,A.
To implement path optimization for recursive tunnels, we extend the build link procedure of
Section 3.3.1 so that when a node n attempts to build a new virtual link to nt via waypoint node nw,
n contacts its existing neighbor nw requesting nw’s first hop chain for nt. Node n then compares
the information returned against its own first hop chain for nw, and short-circuits any redundant
path elements.
For example, in Figure 3-8(a), node A is building a virtual link to F via D, so A requests D’s
first hop chain to F , which is D,C,B,F . A compares this chain with its first hop chain for D,
which is A,B,D, discovering redundant node B and shortening the path to A,B,F .
This form of path optimization does not help in Figure 3-8(b), however, where the redundant
path component between C and D is hidden from A because C is not in A’s first hop chain. Sim-
ilarly, this optimization does not handle Figure 3-8(c) for the same reason that the source routing
optimization above fails.
3.4 Compact Routing
Scaling pressures resulting from the Internet’s growth have created a strong interest in compact
routing, which promises provably short routes and small forwarding tables [2,15,56,140,141,247].
Compact routing would in theory be very useful in the context of UIA, because it would ensure
that (as with Identity Hash Routing) a large number of nodes may participate in a self-organizing
routing structure while requiring each node to maintain only a small (sublinear in the network size)
amount of state, and (unlike Identity Hash Routing) the routing algorithm would also guarantee a
small (typically constant or O(log N)) bound on stretch or inefficiency of paths chosen. Existing
compact routing schemes have so far failed to bridge the gap from theory to practice, however,
in part because they were formally developed and described as centralized algorithms that take a
monolithic network map (assumed to be static), and compute a set of routing tables for all nodes at
once. Practical routing protocols such as UIA requires, in contrast, must perform their computations
in a decentralized and incremental fashion, and must be robust against dynamic topology changes
and failures.
This section explores one possible design for a practical compact routing protocol for UIA,
based on the theoretical work of Thorup and Zwick (TZ) [247]. This decentralized protocol com-
putes routing tables with O(logN) entries and bounds path stretch by O(logN). When more space
and bandwidth are available, routes shorten smoothly and automatically. Previous compact routing
work did not consider congestion caused by the choice of routes: we find that the TZ protocol is
unfortunately subject to hot spots, and modify our protocol to improve congestion on a variety of
simulated topologies.
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3.4.1 Introduction to Compact Routing
Scaling pressures caused by the Internet’s ongoing explosion in size and diversity have fueled an
increasing interest in new approaches to Internet routing [37,47,80,140,237]. Recent theoretical ad-
vances in compact routing algorithms [2, 15, 56, 247] suggest the possibility of much more scalable
routing techniques with formally provable performance properties, but these techniques have yet
to cross the chasm from formal, centralized “algorithm” to practical, distributed “protocol.” Some
practical issues that still must be solved before any of these algorithms will become usable include:
(a) creating protocols to compute compact routing tables incrementally using locally available in-
formation, (b) analyzing the performance of the resulting routes on diverse network topologies, (c)
ensuring that routing table maintenance does not cause too much control traffic overhead [141],
(d) providing the administrative controls over routing policy demanded by network operators, (e)
providing resiliency against topology changes and temporary failures, and (f) designing a realistic,
evolutionary deployment strategy. We do not solve all of these problems here, but merely attempt to
take a step forward in understanding and addressing them, and to evaluate the suitability of compact
routing as a method of providing overlay routing in UIA.
This section explores one approach to developing a practical compact routing protocol, based on
Thorup/Zwick’s variable (k-level) compact routing scheme [247], which we refer to as TZk. TZk
uses a selection of landmarks distributed throughout the graph as the roots of multiple overlapping
routing trees; two nodes wishing to communicate choose the “best” routing tree of which they are
both members and route within that tree. TZk arranges these landmarks in a configurable number
(k) of levels; routing trees built around the more numerous low-level landmarks have smaller mem-
bership, ensuring globally that every node participates in only a few trees. With one level (k = 1),
TZk behaves similarly to classic distance-vector routing, finding optimal routes using O(n)-size
routing tables. Two levels (k = 2) yields worst-case stretch of 3 and routing tables of size O(√n).
With log n levels, TZk has O(log n) worst-case stretch and routing tables of size O(log n). We
choose TZk as a starting point because its variable-level design makes it theoretically much more
flexible and scalable than fixed, two-level compact routing schemes [56], whose requirements of
O(
√
N) state per node may be reasonable for large networks of large devices (e.g., core routers)
or small networks of small devices (e.g., personal devices on an ad hoc network of limited size),
but are probably not reasonable for an Internet-size network containing of billions of small personal
devices participating in one overlay routing cloud.
Analysis of compact routing algorithms in prior work has focused primarily on routing table
size and stretch, but other factors such as path congestion, resilience to failures, route computa-
tion/convergence delays, and control message costs are equally important in practice. The primary
contributions of the present work are to build a simple distributed routing protocol based on TZk in
order to evaluate the scheme’s usefulness for UIA overlay routing, and to perform a large-scale
simulation-based analysis of the protocol on a variety of graph types, including both synthetic
graphs constructed from different theoretical models and realistic graphs of up to 190,000 nodes
derived from actual Internet topology. We will note differences between our protocol and TZk as
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they become relevant.
We find later in Chapter 7 that TZk creates substantial congestion of global routing paths near
high-level landmarks, and we introduce a means to control the severity of this congestion via an
adjustable tradeoff against per-node routing table size. Congestion probably cannot be eliminated
entirely, however, leading to the practical observation that landmarks may need to be chosen not
randomly as in “pure” TZk but deliberately to be nodes adequately provisioned to handle this con-
gestion. This need for careful landmark selection may unfortunately limit TZk’s potential usefulness
for UIA overlay routing, since we prefer UIA nodes to be fully “self-managing,” but it may be pos-
sible to limit the negative effects of this congestion in the situations most normal users care about,
for example by combining the techniques explored here with some of the techniques explored in the
previous sections on Social Routing and Identity Hash Routing.
Our compact routing protocol also refines TZk by enabling nodes to use multiple independent
routing trees for resilience against temporary network failures. We have not yet developed or ana-
lyzed the protocol in a fully dynamic setting in the context of long-term topology changes, however.
3.4.2 Routing Protocol Design
We assume that the network is represented by a weighted, undirected graph whose edge weights rep-
resent some suitable distance or cost metric for each link: round-trip delay for example. We assume
that all network nodes are routers (which is typically the case in UIA), and we leave consideration
of link capacity issues for later.
The key idea of TZk and our protocol is to replace the single routing tree of the Kleinrock/Kamoun
model [135] with many overlapping routing trees of varying sizes. All nodes share membership in
a few large routing trees, which they use to route between distant nodes, but many smaller rout-
ing trees provide efficient local routes. This shift from one routing tree to many enables TZk to
achieve low stretch on arbitrary networks, including on highly-connected graphs where the Klein-
rock/Kamoun model fails [141]. Figure 3-9 illustrates three routing trees in an example network—
those centered at nodes A, B, and C—and the distinct but overlapping “clouds” of nodes participat-
ing in those trees.
There are four main processes comprising our protocol: landmark selection, routing tree con-
struction, global addressing, and route selection. The first three processes compute the tables that
nodes require to route messages; this computation could in principle be done either centrally or in
distributed fashion, and either offline or online, although for UIA overlay routing we naturally want
to support distributed online computation. The final route selection process occurs dynamically
when a given pair of nodes wish to communicate.
In the landmark selection process, each node receives—or assigns itself—an integer landmark
level. The total number of landmark levels, k, is a configurable parameter, and the specific choices
of landmarks and levels may be either automatically or administratively controlled; for UIA routing
we of course prefer automatic control. The basic goal is for each higher level i + 1 to contain
approximately a constant, evenly distributed fraction of the landmarks from level i. In Figure 3-9,
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Figure 3-9: Landmarks in Thorup/Zwick (TZk) scheme
all nodes are landmarks, and dots of different sizes indicate different landmark levels.
Routing tree construction is largely automatic but can also be tuned administratively if neces-
sary. In this process, every node in the network searches outward from itself for nearby landmarks,
and joins a shortest-path routing trees rooted at a subset of those landmarks. To maintain TZk’s
worst-case stretch guarantee of 2k − 1, each node u joins the routing tree of every landmark at
each level i that is closer to u than u’s closest level i + 1 landmark. With a suitable distribution
of landmarks, each node is required to join only a few routing trees at each level, keeping routing
tables compact. Nodes may join the routing trees of additional, more distant landmarks beyond this
minimum requirement as their storage permits, however, improving both stretch and congestion.
In a dynamic network, nodes may join the routing trees of new landmarks that appear within their
“range” for that landmark level, and may leave the routing trees of landmarks that fail or go outside
of the node’s range for that level.
Figure 3-9 shows three overlapping routing trees: two at level 1, and a level 2 tree covering the
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Figure 3-10: Routing tree selection
whole network. Figure 3-10 illustrates how a particular node collects nearby landmarks, using its
closest level i + 1 landmark as a “horizon” at which to stop collecting level i landmarks.
Finally, each node forms a global address for itself consisting of the identities of its closest
r landmarks at each level, and a locator on each of those landmarks’ routing trees, where r is a
redundancy factor for robustness against failures. A node u wishing to send a message to another
node v searches v’s global address for the best landmark also known to u and routes the message
over that landmark’s routing tree. The two nodes may optionally further improve their route for
ongoing communication by exchanging information about additional landmarks that may be present
in their routing tables but not “published” in their global addresses.
The following sections describe each phase in detail.
3.4.3 Landmark Selection
There are many possible ways to choose landmarks. The specific property we wish this assignment
to satisfy is that if any network node performs a best-first search outward from itself and places all
the landmarks it encounters in order of distance from itself, it should encounter a small number of
landmarks at each level i before encountering the first landmark at level i + 1. This is the property
that determines the compactness of a given node’s routing table.
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Randomized Landmark Selection
The original TZk algorithm makes every node a landmark, and assigns landmark levels by a random
process. Every node begins as a level 0 landmark. If k total landmark levels are desired in a network
of n nodes, then TZk selects the landmarks for level i + 1 by including each level i landmark
independently with probability n−1/k. With this distribution of landmarks, every network node
encounters about n1/k landmarks at any level i as it searches outward from itself before finding the
first level i + 1 landmark.
If k = 2, for example, then TZk randomly chooses about
√
n of the n total nodes to be level
1 landmarks, leaving all remaining nodes as level 0 landmarks. If k = logb n for some constant
b > 0, then the total number of landmarks decreases by a factor of b at each level. In this latter
case, randomized landmark selection is easy to perform in a fully decentralized fashion: each node
chooses a random identifier expressed in base b, and its landmark level i is simply the number of
leading zero digits in its identifier.
Explicit Landmark Selection
Although TZk’s randomized landmark selection process provides a simple means of guaranteeing
compact routing tables, in a practical large-scale network, some landmarks may have to be chosen
deliberately for reasons of bandwidth and reliability. As we will see later in Section 7.4.3, global
traffic routes tend to converge on and around high-level landmarks in a TZk network. This route con-
vergence may cause network overload unless these landmarks are deliberately chosen (or designed)
to be nodes that are adequately provisioned to handle the load incurred by this route convergence.
In addition, a failure at or near a high-level landmark is likely to affect a disproportionately large
portion of the network, so the highest-level landmarks should be chosen to be highly reliable nodes.
For these reasons, unlike TZk, our protocol assumes that some or all landmarks may be chosen
administratively. Although for UIA overlay routing purposes we would prefer if all participating
devices were fully self-managing, it may be reasonable to assume that a small percentage of devices
may be administratively assigned to the highest landmark levels: e.g., high-capacity UIA routing
“hubs” deployed by companies wishing to ensure that the UIA-based personal devices they sell
perform well.
If a network operator is not sufficiently careful about landmark selection, however, some net-
work nodes may end up with larger routing tables than others. If there are many level 1 but not
enough level 2 landmarks in a given area of the network, for example, then nodes in that area may
have overly full routing tables at level 1 because they must search outward through many level 1
landmarks before encountering the closest level 2 landmark. Such situations are easy both to detect
and to rectify, however. A node whose level 1 routing table grows too large might trigger an alarm,
for example. In response to this alarm, a network operator could simply pick a level 1 landmark
from the middle of the node’s routing table and promote it to level 2, thereby “chopping off” the
node’s level 1 routing table at that point. Once too many landmarks in the area have been promoted
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to level 2, the network operator may have to promote some of those to level 3, and so on. Our
protocol thus allows routing table compactness to be ensured either automatically, through TZk’s
random selection process, or administratively as the network evolves, simply by “oiling the wheel
that begins to squeek.”
Landmark Pruning
The original TZk algorithm makes every node a landmark, each serving as the root of a distinct
shortest-path routing tree. In our protocol, however, we assume that the set of landmarks may be
a subset of all nodes; a non-landmark node participates on the routing trees of nearby landmarks
but does not have a routing tree of its own. Although omitting landmarks may in general increase
stretch, it is easy to prove that certain landmarks may be omitted or pruned without affecting the
routes chosen by the protocol.
Consider for example any pair of adjacent nodes u and v such that when the edge between
them is removed, the graph component containing u forms a tree. All nodes in this “edge tree”
including u may be pruned from the set of landmarks, leaving v as their nearest landmark. Since
the pruned nodes can only reach the rest of the network through v, the shortest-path routing trees
their landmarks would form beyond v would use exactly the same routes as v’s routing tree itself,
and there is only one loop-free way to route within the edge tree itself.
Similar pruning optimizations may be possible even within graph cycles, but this simple edge
tree optimization may be particularly useful for Internet-like topologies, which tend to be highly
connected at the core but treelike at the fringes [148]. Indeed, in the large Skitter [38] graph we
used as one of our test topologies, about 26% of the nodes are located in edge trees and thus need
not be landmarks.
3.4.4 Routing Tree Construction
Once the landmarks are selected and assigned levels, our protocol computes a routing tree rooted
at each landmark permitting any two nodes residing on the same tree to communicate. There are
essentially three parts to this problem: determining the structure and extent of each routing tree,
assigning addresses or locators to each node on a tree, and using those addresses to route messages
over the tree. Only the first part of the problem is highly specific to our protocol or TZk; for
assigning locators and routing on a particular tree many well-known techniques may be used.
Forming Routing Trees
The size and shape of the routing tree around each landmark is determined implicitly by the set
of nearby nodes that “choose” that landmark for their routing tables, which in turn depends on the
topology of this neighborhood. As explained above, every node u joins at least the routing trees of
all level i landmarks closer than any level i+1 landmark, and may join the trees of additional more
distant landmarks if desired to optimize stretch or congestion at the expense of routing table size.
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Since there are no landmarks at level k to serve as a “horizon” for level k − 1 landmarks, every
node in the network participates in the routing trees rooted at each of the level k−1 landmarks; these
form the network’s global routing trees. The membership of the smaller routing tree surrounding a
lower-level landmark l is termed the landmark’s cluster by Thorup and Zwick, and is suggestive of
though not the same as a cell in a Voronoi diagram.
Each landmark’s routing tree should be a shortest-path tree: that is, the path taken along the tree
from any member node u to the landmark l serving as the tree’s root should be a shortest path from
u to l. This shortest path property is crucial to the TZk algorithm’s formal stretch guarantee.
Distributed Routing Tree Construction
In principle, routing tree computation may be performed centrally on a complete graph of the net-
work and the resulting routing tables shipped to the nodes for use, or the nodes themselves could
compute their own routing tables via a distributed protocol. The original TZk algorithm was pre-
sented in terms of a centralized computation, but to permit more detailed analysis we developed
and simulated a simple distributed message-based protocol based on the algorithm. Although our
current message-based protocol is rudimentary, it demonstrates that computation of TZk routing
tables has deep similarities to classic distance-vector routing, so many techniques used in existing
distance-vector protocols may be reapplicable to compact routing.
In our protocol, each node learns about nearby landmarks and builds its routing tables incre-
mentally by gossiping with its neighbors. Each node’s routing table stores the set of landmarks the
node has discovered so far for each level, and for each such landmark, the length of the shortest
known path to that landmark and the identity of the “next hop” along that path. In this respect
our protocol works much like a classic Bellman-Ford distance-vector protocol, except that in our
protocol each node sets a “distance horizon” on the set of landmarks it learns at a given level i,
based on the closest known level i + 1 landmark it has learned (if any). Whenever a node learns
from a neighbor about a new landmark at some level i—or a better route to an already-known level
i landmark—that is closer than the closest currently-known level i + 1 landmark, the node updates
its routing table and then broadcasts the route to all of its neighbors. If the node learns a route to
a level i + 1 landmark that is closer than one or more known routes to level i or lower landmarks,
then the protocol can either throw away the “excess” lower-level routes to keep each node’s routing
table to the minimum size, or retain a limited number of extra routes in order to reduce stretch and
congestion, as described later.
Addressing and Routing on Individual Trees
The simple distributed protocol above effectively forms a shortest-path tree around each landmark
containing the appropriate set of member nodes as per the requirements of the TZk algorithm. How-
ever, the simple distance-vector protocol only provides the information necessary to route packets
inward on each tree toward the landmark; we require the ability to route both inward and outward
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on the tree, from any node on the tree to any other node. For this purpose a variety of well-studied
routing schemes are suitable; we only point out a few particularly relevant ones.
The simplest solution is to extend the distance-vector protocol above so that nodes gossip and
store complete source routes to their nearest landmarks instead of just the “next hop.” A node u’s
“address” on a landmark l’s routing tree is simply u’s source route to l. If u wishes to reach another
node v over l’s tree, u simply reverses v’s source route to l, appends the result to u’s own source
route to l yielding a source route from u to v through l, and trims any cycle from the resulting
path. The danger of this approach is that source routes may become long, O(n) on arbitrary graphs,
although this should not be a major problem on Internet-like scale-free graphs, which have low
diameter.
As an alternative to source routing, interval routing [213] can route over trees using addresses
that are always of size O(log n) regardless of network topology. Classic interval routing requires
each node to have storage proportional to its degree, but Thorup and Zwick propose a scheme
that combines interval and source routing so as to use tree-addresses of size O(log2 n) and constant
storage per node regardless of topology [247]. Most realistic network nodes use storage proportional
to their degree anyway, however, just to keep track of the status of each link for example, so classic
interval routing techniques may be adequate from a practical compactness perspective.
The primary practical disadvantage of interval routing is that it requires ongoing maintenance of
the address space and perhaps occasional renumbering as the network topology evolves. A straight-
forward way to address this challenge is for each landmark to divide time into epochs, and compute
a new set of routing tree addresses for each epoch, tagging each tree-address with the epoch counter
so that more than one epoch’s addresses may be used at once and nodes in the landmark’s routing
tree may transition gracefully from one epoch to the next. This approach is reminiscent of the Des-
tination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) routing algorithm [184] for mobile ad hoc networks,
although the epochs used for compact routing may need to be longer since our protocol must as-
sign addresses and build a routing structure usable for routing “outward” from landmarks to nodes
participating in its tree, and not just “inward” toward destinations as in DSDV.
3.4.5 Global Addresses
Once the above routing trees are constructed and all nodes have located their nearest landmarks at
each level, each node chooses a global address for itself. In our protocol, the global address of any
node u contains the identities of the r landmarks closest to u (i.e., the first r landmarks at each level
of u’s routing table), u’s distance from each of those landmarks, and u’s tree-address on the routing
trees of each of those landmarks. Using source routes as tree addresses, for example, each node’s
global address consists of its closest r landmarks at each level and its distances and source routes to
those landmarks.
Our protocol’s redundancy factor r ≥ 1 is an adjustable parameter that controls a tradeoff be-
tween global address size and robustness against failures, as we will explore in detail later. A value
of r = 1 corresponds to the original TZk algorithm, which guarantees all nodes global reachability
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and bounded worst-case stretch, but only in the absence of failures. If tree-addresses are of size
O(log n), as with interval routing or source routing on a scale-free graph, then each node’s global
address is of size O(rk log n).
The fact that a node’s global address has a structure that depends on network topology creates
two challenges, however. First, this means that TZk provides name-dependent rather than name-
independent routing, so to use it in an architecture like UIA that relies on nodes having flat, location-
independent endpoint identities (EIDs), nodes still require a way to resolve an EID into a global ad-
dress that is directly usable for routing. Fortunately, this distributed lookup/resolution is precisely
what DHTs were designed to accomplish, so a standard DHT protocol [147,157,196,211,236,273]
built on top of TZk but below UIA’s naming layer provides an obvious approach to addressing this
challenge. Other potentially useful, “locality-aware” techniques for resolving location-independent
names have been developed for ad hoc networking [43] and in the formal literature on name-
independent compact routing [2, 15].
Second, since network topology changes may result in changes to the node’s set of closest
landmarks, as well as to the node’s position and tree-address on those landmarks’ routing trees, the
node’s global address must change over time and the EID-to-address resolution mechanism must
adapt to those global address changes, ideally while maintaining continuous connectivity during
these changes whenever possible. DHT protocols generally support dynamic changes to key/value
pairs they index and store, so in theory these dynamic updates are not a problem, but in practice
there may be efficiency issues if many nodes’ global addresses change too rapidly. We leave most
of these EID resolution and dynamic adaptation challenges for future work.
3.4.6 Route Selection
There are two situations to consider when two nodes u and v wish to communicate: one in which
u must “unilaterally” choose a route to v with no information other than u’s routing table and v’s
global address, and one in which u and v are already in contact but wish to choose the best route for
ongoing traffic. We consider each of these cases in turn.
Unilateral Route Selection:
If a node u wishes to communicate with an arbitrary target node v in the network, u must first obtain
v’s global address—by looking it up in a directory such as DNS or a DHT as suggested above, for
example. Given the target v’s global address, u then compares v’s published list of landmarks with
those in u’s own routing table, picks the “best” landmark l known to both nodes, extracts v’s tree-
address on l’s routing tree from v’s global address, and uses that tree-address to send a message to
v over l’s routing tree. In the original TZk algorithm, in which each node’s global address contains
only the single closest landmark at each level (corresponding to r = 1 in our protocol), u simply
picks the lowest-level landmark and tree-address from v’s global address. When u picks a route to v
“unilaterally” this way without cooperation from v, TZk guarantees a worst-case stretch of 4k − 3,
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somewhat higher than the theoretical optimum of 2k− 1 [247]. To obtain 2k− 1 worst-case stretch
TZk requires a handshaking phase, described below.
In our protocol, however, v’s global address contains r entries per level, and the best route
between u and v could be via the routing tree of some landmark (slightly) farther from v than v’s
closest landmark at that level but (much) closer to u. Since our protocol includes v’s distance to
each of its landmarks in v’s global address, u can estimate the total distance over a given landmark’s
routing tree by adding u’s distance to the landmark and v’s distance to the same landmark. This
result is a conservative estimate, since a message will not actually reach the landmark if the source
and target nodes are within the same “branch” of the tree.
Cooperative Route Selection:
Once u and v are in communication over some route, they may be able to find a better route through
handshaking. The original TZk algorithm requires such a handshaking step in order to achieve the
optimal stretch bound of 2k− 1. Once u first contacts v over its unilaterally-chosen path, v uses the
same unilateral route selection procedure to find a route back to u; in doing so, v may find a better
(lower-level) landmark known to both u and v. v then responds to u with an indication of the best
landmark, and both nodes use the chosen landmark for subsequent communication. TZk’s optimal
worst-case stretch depends on the two nodes routing on the lowest-level landmark that either node
can discover unilaterally, hence the handshaking requirement.
An interesting and potentially useful property of TZk and our protocol is that its worst-case
stretch bound for the path between a particular pair of nodes, u and v, becomes smaller if u and
v are close together. In particular, if two nodes u and v agree through handshaking to use a level i
tree, the worst-case stretch for their subsequent communication is 2i + 1.1 Thus, routing between
nearby nodes on a level 0 tree is always optimal (stretch 1), routing on a level 1 tree has a worst-case
stretch of 3 regardless of the total number of levels k in the network, and so on.
In our generalization to TZk with the redundancy parameter r, u can unilaterally estimate the
cost of the (at least r) available redundant paths to v as described above, but u and v may find still
better paths by dynamically exchanging additional routing table information not included in their
respective global addresses. For a precise selection of the best path, the two nodes could simply try
several paths and dynamically select the best (e.g., the one with the shortest delay), or ideally even
use multiple paths simultaneously if supported by upper-layer protocols [122].
In the limit, if we set r =∞ in our protocol, then each node publishes in its global address all of
the landmarks it knows at each level—i.e., its full routing table. If k = log n and each tree-address
is O(log n) size, then each node’s global address is of size O(kn1/klog n), or O(log3 n) in the case
of k = log n. This additional log n factor in global address size not only purchases redundancy
against failures, but also guarantees the asymptotically optimal 2k − 1 worst-case stretch without
handshaking, since u already has all the information v might provide in TZk’s handshaking step.
1Thorup and Zwick do not point out this property explicitly but it may be read easily from their proofs.
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If u finds v’s global address in a directory or DHT, u need not necessarily retrieve v’s entire
global address; u could instead send the directory service a Bloom filter [34] summarizing the
identities of the landmarks in u’s routing table, and the directory service merely returns those entries
from v’s global address for landmarks u may know about.
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Chapter 4
Transport
Once personal devices are conveniently nameable via the UIA personal naming system, and can
efficiently locate and connect with each other via UIA’s overlay routing system, devices still need to
be able to utilize their connection effectively in order to support the wide variety of applications that
current and future users expect to run on their personal devices. In contrast with the terminal- and
batch-oriented applications that the Internet was originally designed around, modern applications
are often highly interactive, allow multiple communication activities to occur at once in parallel,
and can be very sensitive to network transmission or reordering delays.
This chapter rounds out UIA by introducing Structured Stream Transport (SST), a new transport
protocol developed specifically to support the highly interactive and concurrent applications that are
becoming common on modern personal devices. We first explore the motivation and goals for the
new transport in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 then introduces the structured stream abstraction that
the new transport is built on, and Section 4.3 explores how this new transport abstraction may be
leveraged in a variety of different applications. Finally, Section 4.4 details the design of the new
transport protocol.
4.1 Motivation and Goals
Current Internet transports offer applications a choice between two abstractions: reliable byte streams
as in TCP [244] or SCTP [234], or best-effort datagrams as in UDP [187] or DCCP [137]. Streams
are convenient for large or long-running activities that must preserve data content and order, such
as terminal sessions or file transfers, but datagrams more efficiently support numerous small trans-
actions that need to proceed independently as quickly as possible, such as DNS requests or frames
of a media stream.
The classic stream and datagram abstractions are conceptually simple and worked reasonably
well for the types of applications that dominated the early Internet. Long-lived TCP streams are
well-suited to character-stream-oriented terminal protocols like Telnet [188], Rlogin [129], and
Secure Shell [266–269]; batch text messaging systems such as E-mail [58, 136, 170, 203] and
USENET [77,115,177]; and bulk data transfer protocols such as FTP [114,189]. Small, ephemeral
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UDP datagrams are suitable for simple transactional protocols with small requests and replies, such
as DNS queries [258] and NFS block I/O [219].
4.1.1 The Mismatch of Traditional Transports with Modern Applications
Modern Internet applications, especially interactive applications designed for today’s mobile per-
sonal devices, are placing increasing strain on the traditional stream and datagram abstractions,
however. Modern interactive applications such as web browsers, for example, often use a mixture of
small and large transactions: such an application faces awkward tradeoffs, because it could benefit
from the efficiency of UDP for small transactions but needs TCP to handle the occasional large ones.
Using one TCP stream per transaction as in HTTP/1.0 [29] makes poor use of network resources
and is unfair to other applications when a client uses many concurrent streams; serializing trans-
actions onto persistent streams increases transaction latency [173]; and implementing pipelining
correctly in web servers has proven challenging enough that seven years after the standardization of
HTTP/1.1 [78], popular browsers still leave pipelining disabled for compatibility [142, 167].
Similarly, multimedia streaming applications are becoming increasingly important on modern
personal devices. RTP [258] over UDP may be adequate for fixed-rate voice communication in
which all media frames are small, but modern high-definition, variable-bit-rate video encoding
schemes can produce occasional very large frames. These large frames are especially likely to
be dropped, because UDP drops an entire datagram if any of its composite fragments are lost in
transit due to congestion or transmission errors, and cannot retransmit lost fragments. At the same
time, these large frames are often semantically the most critical ones not to drop, since they typically
represent “key” frames with respect to which other nearby frames are represented via differential en-
coding. Multimedia streaming applications can and sometimes do use TCP instead of UDP because
of its reliable delivery, but this approach does not work well if the multimedia stream is delay-
sensitive (e.g., a real-time audio/video conferencing stream), because one dropped packet in a TCP
stream delays delivery of all data behind it in the stream until the dropped packet is successfully
retransmitted.
Modern applications for personal devices face further tradeoffs because neither streams nor
datagrams offer a means to associate related transport instances. Applications such as FTP [189]
and SIP [208] associate transport instances manually by passing IP addresses and port numbers
in messages, causing protocol fragility and problems traversing NATs [113]. Other applications
multiplex many activities onto one TCP stream, as with SSH tunneling [266], but performance
suffers from TCP’s total ordering of the multiplexed stream, where one lost packet blocks delivery
of all data queued behind it in the stream.
4.1.2 A Transport Abstraction for Personal Device Applications
To address the above problems, the UIA architecture introduces a new transport protocol called
Structured Stream Transport, or SST, which is specifically designed around the needs of modern
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interactive applications running on today’s personal devices.
SST addresses the problems of transaction size and instance association by augmenting tradi-
tional streams with an explicit hereditary structure. A structured stream provides not only reliable
data delivery as in TCP, but also permits the creation of additional lightweight child streams or
substreams. When an application spawns a child from an existing stream, SST conveys this par-
ent/child relationship to the remote application, ensuring that only the intended recipient can accept
the new stream and preserving its structural context. Each stream delivers data reliably and in order
within that stream, with its own receiver-directed flow control and optional record marking, while
other streams may proceed independently with no head-of-line blocking. SST shares sequencing,
congestion control, and security state among all streams between a pair of hosts, minimizing per-
stream state overhead and allowing the application to use as many concurrent streams as convenient
to match its logical structure. The application may also create and destroy streams rapidly to match
the natural longevity of its transactions, because SST eliminates TCP’s 3-way handshake delay on
all streams after the first, and also eliminates the 4-minute TIME-WAIT period on close that can
cause TCP state overload [75]. The application can transmit datagrams on an SST stream with
best-effort delivery, but SST treats these datagrams as ephemeral substreams that are semantically
indistinguishable to the receiving application from ordinary substreams, allowing SST to fall back to
stream-oriented delivery for “datagrams” too large to transmit as such without unacceptable prob-
ability of loss. Finally, the application can prioritize SST streams relative to each other, giving
preference to interactive or multimedia streams over background activities, and applications can use
substreams for out-of-band signaling to change priorities mid-stream, e.g., expediting the loading
of images in the currently visible area of a web page.
Although SST is primarily intended for use in new or evolving applications, analyzing the
requirements of well-established protocols can serve to illustrate the general utility of structured
streams. Applications like FTP and SIP that modularize their operation across several transport
instances, for example, can use a top-level SST stream for control signaling and open private sub-
streams for data or media transfers, instead of separate transport connections. Allowing SST to
manage and associate the application’s transport instances makes the application protocol sim-
pler, more robust, and friendlier to other applications due to SST’s shared congestion control.
Transaction-oriented protocols like HTTP can adopt a simple one-transaction-per-stream model as
in HTTP/1.0 [29], relying on SST to multiplex many transactions efficiently onto one persistent
connection, and avoiding both the serialization-induced latencies of persistent streams [173] and
the application-level complexity and fragility of pipelining [167]. Applications based on RPC [227]
can use SST either as a datagram-oriented transport that combines the efficiency and statelessness of
UDP for small messages with support for messages of arbitrary size, as a transaction-oriented trans-
port using lightweight streams to associate requests with responses, or as a stream-oriented transport
that eliminates the need for RPC’s record marking layer. Character-oriented streaming applications
such as Telnet [188] and Rlogin [129] can use structured streams in place of TCP’s legacy Urgent
mechanism to handle asynchronous attention signals such as CTRL-C, improving their promptness
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by eliminating TCP’s need to deliver all data already in the pipeline reliably before it can begin
delivering the actual urgent data.
4.1.3 Design and Implementation Features
In addition to the new structured stream abstraction, several other novel aspects of SST’s design
may suggest useful transport design principles:
• SST builds its structured streams on top of an intermediate channel protocol: a connection-
oriented sequenced datagram service reminiscent of DCCP [137] but semantically closer to
IPsec’s packet sequencing [132, 133]. The channel protocol’s monotonic sequence numbers
and replay protection logic, in particular, enable SST’s lightweight streams to avoid 3-way
handshakes or TIME-WAIT periods.
• The SST channel protocol selectively acknowledges packets via acknowledgment ranges,
which provide more information than TCP’s SACK [155] and D-SACK [79] extensions, fa-
cilitate forward acknowledgment [156] and reordering tolerance [32], and offer redundancy
against lost acknowledgments, without the complexity or overhead of variable-length SACK
headers.
• SST separates the multiplexing and rendezvous functions that port numbers serve in traditional
transports, using small, temporary local stream identifiers for multiplexing and more friendly
service and protocol names for rendezvous during connection initiation.
• SST can attach a stream to multiple underlying datagram channels successively or at once, to
insulate application streams from temporary failures, IP address changes, and channel lifetime
limits.
• SST jumpstarts a child stream’s flow control state by borrowing from its parent’s receive
window, allowing the initiator to start sending data on the child stream without waiting for
the receiver’s initial window update.
• SST demonstrates how layering and functional reuse enables substantially more functionality
than TCP with no additional per-packet overhead in comparable scenarios.
A user-space prototype implementation of SST, running on real and simulated networks, at-
tests to SST’s practicality and utility. The prototype achieves within 10% of the bandwidth of
mature native TCP implementations on “consumer-grade” DSL and WiFi connections, and its con-
gestion control is TCP-fair to within ±2%. Under a simulated web browsing workload, using one
HTTP/1.0-style transaction per stream with SST achieves the performance of HTTP/1.1 pipelining,
with lower application complexity, and more flexibility as demonstrated by a simulation of dynamic
Web download prioritization in response to user actions. Although the SST prototype is not yet
integrated with the deployed UIA prototype, it should serve well both as a secure point-to-point
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connection and authentication protocol for the UIA routing layer to use in place of SSL over TCP,
and as a new end-to-end transport for UIA naming layer communication and for new UIA-aware
applications at higher levels.
The primary contributions of SST are: (a) the structured stream abstraction, (b) a novel protocol
design that implements this abstraction by splitting the transport into separate stream and channel
layers, and (c) a user-space prototype for easy experimentation and deployment.
4.2 Structured Streams
This section describes the structured stream abstraction as viewed by an application using SST,
leaving technical details of the SST protocol itself to Section 4.4.
4.2.1 Data Transfer Semantics
Like a TCP stream [244], an SST stream is a reliable, byte-oriented conversation between applica-
tions. Apart from the ability to create substreams, SST streams are semantically almost identical
to TCP streams, so porting application protocols from TCP to SST is straightforward. Each partic-
ipant sends and receives segments of bytes, and the transport guarantees reliable in-order delivery
of those segments in the absence of connection failure, but may fragment, combine, and buffer seg-
ments. Each endpoint may close its end of the stream independently, so a client may for example
close its end to signal the completion of a request before awaiting the server’s reply on the same
stream.
SST data transfer semantics differs from TCP’s in only two respects. First, SST dispenses
with TCP’s Urgent feature, but this feature may be emulated using substreams as described later in
Section 4.3.4. Second, senders may set explicit record marks in an SST stream, which SST reliably
delivers to the receiver, simplifying many applications and making their buffer management more
efficient at little cost in the transport layer.
4.2.2 Creating and Accepting Substreams
An application can use an SST stream not only to transfer data but also to “fork off” child streams
or substreams. The terms “substream” and “child stream” refer only to hereditary relationships
between streams: once created, there is no semantic difference between a “top-level” stream and
a substream. SST extends the traditional sockets API with three new operations for creating sub-
streams:
• create_substream(stream)→ new stream:
creates a new child stream from an existing stream.
• listen_substream(stream):
indicates willingness to accept substreams on a stream.
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• accept_substream(stream)→ new stream:
accepts a substream initiated by the other endpoint.
An application calls listen_substream to indicate willingness to accept new streams as
children of an existing stream, much as the application would use a traditional listen socket to re-
ceive incoming top-level streams. The peer application on the existing stream’s other endpoint may
then initiate a substream by calling create_substream on the existing stream. SST notifies the
listening application of the incoming substream, and the listener accepts it via accept_substream.
Once created and accepted, child streams are independent of and may outlive their parents.
4.2.3 Inter-Stream Semantics
Since SST conveys parent/child relationships on substream creation, the application can use con-
textual state negotiated in a parent stream to determine communication behavior on child streams.
A videoconferencing application may for example initiate a call in a “root” stream, then initiate one
child substream for video and a second for audio, negotiate codec parameters for each media stream
on its respective SST substream, and finally transmit media frames themselves on “grandchild” sub-
streams. SST’s inter-stream structure enables applications to modularize and associate their related
communication activities, without having to multiplex all activities onto one stream or manually
track logical associations between separate transport instances. SST endeavors to make streams
“lightweight enough” for the application to use a new stream for each logical transaction regardless
of size, enabling the application to “frame” its protocol data units according to its needs [51].
SST ensures reliability and data ordering within a stream but not between streams, so the loss
and retransmission of a data segment on one stream does not delay communication on other streams.
If a client issues many requests to a server at once on separate streams, for example, the server may
accept several requests concurrently and respond to them in any order, completing “easy” requests
quickly without blocking them behind long-running requests submitted earlier. Each stream pro-
vides independent flow control, so the receiving application may accept data at different rates on
different streams, or accept data continuously on one stream while temporarily blocking the sender
on another. SST’s flow control applies to new child streams as well as to stream data, allowing a
server to prevent its clients from overloading it with too many concurrent requests.
4.2.4 Datagrams as Ephemeral Substreams
TCP delivers data reliably if the participants wait for all necessary retransmissions and acknowl-
edgments, as the TCP standard dictates [244], but most TCP stacks offer an option to limit the time
a host buffers unacknowledged data after stream close (e.g., SO LINGER in BSD). By imposing a
fixed deadline, this option can have the side-effect of deviating from TCP’s usual reliable semantics
and turning it into a “best-effort” delivery service. Suppose an application opens a stream, sends
some data, then closes the stream with a short linger timeout without ever receiving on the stream.
The sending TCP transmits the data and closing FIN, but does not hold unacknowledged segments
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beyond the linger timeout. The receiver obtains the data and a graceful close indication if every
segment including the FIN arrives intact, or if retransmissions complete before the linger timeout;
otherwise the receiver sees a connection reset. If the linger timeout expires within one round-trip
time of the first data transmission, then no retransmissions are possible, making this usage of TCP
semantically equivalent to a best-effort, “fire and forget” datagram delivery service—if less efficient.
SST has a send_datagram operation providing best-effort delivery, but SST treats this op-
eration as equivalent to creating a child stream, sending data on it, and closing the child with a
short linger timeout to avoid buffering the sent data. SST’s receive_datagram operation is
similarly a shorthand for accepting a substream, reading data, and closing the substream. Since an
SST “datagram” is semantically just an ephemeral substream, the receiver can accept the substream
with accept_substream instead of receive_datagram, and can then read the substream’s
content as it would with a normal substream. The receiver gets a connection reset if it ever tries
to send on this ephemeral substream. The receiving application thus cannot tell whether the sender
invoked send_datagram or the equivalent sequence of operations.
SST can use an optimization described later to deliver best-effort datagrams efficiently and state-
lessly as in datagram transports such as UDP or DCCP. Because the receiving application cannot
tell whether this optimization was used, however, the sending SST is free not to use it when net-
work conditions may not be suitable. If for example a datagram to be sent is large enough that at
least one fragment is likely to be lost, given the current loss rate computed from congestion con-
trol statistics, SST forgoes the datagram delivery optimization and sends the datagram instead on a
“real” substream, transparently to the application. SST thus solves the “large datagram” problem of
traditional best-effort services, where datagram loss rates quickly become unacceptable as datagram
size increases.
4.2.5 Other Application-Visible Features
SST may be deployed either at system level as a “native transport” alongside TCP and UDP, or at
application level atop UDP. The latter usage allows applications to ship with a library implemen-
tation of SST without requiring special privileges or extensions to existing operating systems, and
they can use it as they would SSL/TLS [64] or DTLS [202]. Deploying SST atop UDP also allows
it to traverse existing NATs that only natively support TCP and UDP.
Since communication security is now essential for most applications on today’s Internet, but
IP-layer security [133] is still not widely deployed other than for VPNs, SST provides optional
transport-layer security built on standard practices. SST’s security is mostly transparent to appli-
cations, except for configuration of security parameters and secure identification of communication
peers.
Since a large percentage of hosts on the Internet today are connected behind NATs or firewalls,
many applications require traversal of these barriers, especially applications with peer-to-peer com-
munication patterns such as Voice-over-IP. For this reason, SST supports hole-punching [82] to
traverse BEHAVE-compliant NATs [16], and provides an optional host registration protocol to as-
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sist applications in establishing peer-to-peer connectivity between communication partners behind
NATs.
4.3 Using Structured Streams
To examine the practical benefits of structured streams, this section briefly explores requirements
and challenges faced by several classic application protocols. We use these protocols for illustrative
purposes only, without implying that specific applications should necessarily be migrated to SST.
4.3.1 Application Protocol Modularity
FTP [189] modularizes its operation across multiple transport instances: one TCP stream for control
signaling and a separate stream for each file transfer. Internet telephony similarly uses a TCP stream
for call setup via SIP [208], and separate UDP streams for media delivery via RTP and RTCP [216].
With SST, such applications can use a top-level stream for control and simply open substreams
for data communication. Since SST conveys the parent/child relationship on substream creation,
the application protocols need not communicate IP addresses or port numbers explicitly to asso-
ciate the related transport instances, simplifying the application and avoiding difficulties traversing
NATs [113].
The disconnect between these streams at the transport layer, and the resulting need for SIP
messages to carry IP addresses and UDP port numbers, causes even worse NAT traversal problems
than in FTP, resulting in complex extensions [207] as well as competing proposals for ground-up
redesign using application-level multiplexing [226]. With SST, a telephony application could run
SIP in a top-level stream, open substreams for RTP and RTCP during a call, and send individual
media datagrams as ephemeral substreams of those respective substreams, using SST to multiplex
the streams while preserving their association.
4.3.2 Transactional Protocols
The need to support transaction-oriented applications efficiently has long been recognized [31, 35,
46]. In the absence of a general transport satisfying this demand, HTTP/1.0 [29] used a separate
TCP connection for each request, each requiring a 3-way handshake and TIME-WAIT period af-
ter close, leading to unacceptable overhead as the Web became riddled with small images. Since
TCP congestion control distributes available bandwidth per stream, opening many concurrent TCP
connections is also unfair to other users [18]. HTTP/1.1 [78] allows reuse of a TCP connection for
successive requests, reducing the total number of connections, with the disadvantage of serializing
requests and often making pages take longer to load [173]. In theory requests may be pipelined to
improve latency, but seven years after the publication of HTTP/1.1, today’s common browsers still
avoid pipelining by default because many servers implement it incorrectly [142, 167]. Pipelining
also fixes response order to request order, blocking the server from satisfying simple static con-
104
tent requests promptly until it finishes processing dynamic content requests submitted earlier for
example.
HTTP could benefit from UDP’s efficiency—particularly for the many conditional GET requests
browsers use to test the freshness of cached objects, whose responses are usually small—but HTTP
cannot use UDP because responses may be arbitrarily large, and the client has no way of knowing
this when it submits the request. SIP supports operation over UDP, but gets into trouble for precisely
this reason [103].
With SST, applications can use one stream per transaction, with minimal startup latency on all
streams after the first, and without serialization of independent requests or long-term state retention
after close. Alternatively, applications can use SST as a best-effort datagram transport, sending re-
quests and replies in separate ephemeral streams, achieving UDP’s statelessness for small messages
without UDP’s message size limits. In either case, SST ensures fairness relative to TCP applications
that use only one stream, since all of an application’s SST streams between the same pair of hosts
share a single congestion control context.
4.3.3 RPC
ONC RPC [227] can run over either TCP or UDP, but the choice between the two transports presents
application designers with an awkward tradeoff. Many applications would like to use UDP for its
efficient handling of small requests, lack of unnecessary serialization or head-of-line blocking, and
minimal server state requirements. Because of the “large datagram” problem discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.4, however, an RPC application can only use UDP if it guarantees that every possible re-
quest and reply message fits in a “reasonable” size for datagram-oriented delivery—typically around
8KB by current conventions.
By running RPC in “datagram mode” over SST, the application can obtain the same efficient
delivery for small requests via the optimization described in Section 4.4.3, while still being able
to rely on the transport to convey occasional larger requests reliably. Alternatively, RPC could run
over SST using one transaction per stream as discussed above for HTTP, using SST to associate
requests with replies and ensuring reliable delivery of all messages, at minimal performance cost
since substreams impose no round-trip startup delays or serialization. If serialization is actually
desired, running RPC in “stream mode” over one SST stream eliminates the need for RPC’s record
marking layer since SST provides reliable record marking.
4.3.4 Out-of-Band Signaling
Many application protocols require some form of out-of-band signaling, and traditionally must use
ad hoc methods to implement it due to the lack of transport layer support. Internet telephony sets
up two separate UDP media sessions, for example: an RTP stream for data and a parallel RTCP
stream for related out-of-band signaling [216]. With SST, an application need not set up out-of-
band control channels in advance: the application can create a new substream at any time in which
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Figure 4-1: SST protocol architecture
to convey an out-of-band message relating to the parent stream, without interfering with the normal
operation of the parent. Section 7.5 explores one experimental use of out-of-band signaling in SST.
TCP’s Urgent feature is a limited out-of-band signaling mechanism, used primarily in terminal
protocols such as Telnet [188] and Rlogin [129] to clear the communication pipeline when the user
invokes an “attention” signal such as CTRL-C. Although SST does not support the Urgent feature,
an SST application can emulate it by opening an ephemeral substream and transmitting an explicit
urgent pointer, expressed as a byte offset in the parent stream for example.
In the specific case of terminal applications, while TCP reliably delivers all data up to the Ur-
gent pointer, terminal applications typically just discard this intervening data—a semantic mismatch
resulting in unnecessary network transmission and delays. Instead of just emulating the Urgent fa-
cility, a terminal application designed for SST could achieve better responsiveness by using its main
stream only for control and opening two substreams for character data, one for each direction. To
clear its character transmit pipeline, a host resets its character send substream and opens a new one,
prepending a generation counter to each new stream so the receiver can distinguish the most recent.
SST immediately stops sending obsolete data in the old stream and promptly begins delivering the
new stream, as desired for the terminal application’s semantics. (Adapting a particular existing pro-
tocol such as Telnet or Rlogin this way would involve additional subtleties such as avoiding the
loss of control signals embedded in the character stream; this example is intended only to suggest a
general approach and not a precise recipe.)
4.4 Protocol Design
SST consists of three related protocols, organized as shown in Figure 4-1. The channel protocol
is a connection-oriented best-effort delivery service that provides packet sequencing, integrity and
privacy protection, selective acknowledgment, and congestion control. The negotiation protocol sets
up the channel protocol’s state, negotiating shared security keys and optional features. Finally, the
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Figure 4-2: SST communication abstractions
stream protocol builds on the channel and negotiation protocols to implement the reliable structured
stream abstraction SST presents to the application. For space reasons this paper focuses on the
channel and stream protocols, which are of primary importance for implementing the structured
stream abstraction.
4.4.1 Packets, Channels, and Streams
Figure 4-2 illustrates three key communication abstractions that form the interfaces between SST’s
layers—packets, channels, and streams—and how instances of these communication abstractions
relate to each other over time.
At the lowest level, SST assumes that the underlying protocol (e.g., IP or UDP) provides only an
unreliable, connectionless, unicast packet delivery service, in which packets are independent of each
other and have ephemeral lifetimes. Each packet carries some number of bytes, up to the network
path’s current maximum transfer unit (MTU), which may change at any time. All communication
within a channel or stream ultimately reduces to a series of packets at this level.
On top of this connectionless service SST’s channel protocol builds a connection-oriented packet
delivery service. Semantically, the channel protocol’s most important functions are to associate each
transmitted packet with a particular connection instance or channel, and to assign monotonically
increasing packet sequence numbers to all packets transmitted within a particular channel. The
channel protocol also attaches acknowledgment information to packets to determine when pack-
ets have arrived successfully, and uses this acknowledgment information internally to implement
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congestion control at channel granularity. Finally, the channel protocol protects each packet with
a message authenticator and an optional encryption wrapper to provide end-to-end security for all
packets transmitted over the channel.
The stream protocol builds on this intermediate channel abstraction to provide TCP-like reli-
able byte streams to the application. The stream protocol handles segmentation and reassembly,
retransmission of lost segments, receiver-directed flow control, and substream creation and man-
agement. At any point in time, the stream protocol normally multiplexes all streams between the
same pair of hosts onto a single channel. All streams multiplexed onto one channel therefore share
that underlying channel’s packet sequence number space, and the channel’s congestion control, ac-
knowledgment, and security state. Each stream has its own byte sequence number space, however,
which the stream protocol uses to preserve the order of data segments within a stream in much the
same way that TCP does.
The stream protocol leverages the channel protocol’s association of packets with channel in-
stances, and the channel protocol’s monotonic packet sequence numbers, to manage per-stream state
efficiently. The channel protocol’s services in particular enable the stream protocol to avoid TCP’s
3-way handshake on stream startup, and TCP’s TIME-WAIT state after close, enabling lightweight
stream creation and shutdown. The fact that a channel’s sequence number space does not wrap
facilitates efficient stream creation and termination, but this property also implies that the stream
protocol must migrate long-lived streams from one channel to another to give streams unlimited
lifetimes as in TCP.
Figure 4-3 shows the layout of a typical SST packet, not including any lower-layer headers
for the underlying packet delivery service. SST can be layered directly atop most any best-effort
packet delivery service, such as directly atop IP, atop UDP for compatibility with NATs and firewalls
on today’s Internet, or atop UIA’s overlay routing layer (see Chapter 3). The channel header is
always eight bytes in the current version of SST, and includes fields for channel identification, packet
sequencing, and acknowledgment. The stream header is typically four or eight bytes depending on
packet type, and contains fields for stream identification, receive window control, and sequencing
bytes within a stream. Following the application payload, the channel protocol’s trailing message
authenticator is typically four bytes for lightweight TCP-grade security, and 12 or more bytes for
cryptographic security.
The next section details SST’s channel protocol, and Section 4.4.3 describes the stream protocol.
Finally, Section 4.4.4 briefly outlines the negotiation protocol.
4.4.2 Channel Protocol
The channel protocol’s purpose is to provide transport services that are independent of how the ap-
plication “frames” its communication into protocol data units [51], or streams in SST. The commu-
nication state required to provide these services is thus shareable across many application streams.
The channel protocol’s services consist of associating transmitted packets with connection state in-
stances or channels, assigning monotonic sequence numbers to packets within a channel, providing
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Figure 4-3: SST packet layout
integrity and optional privacy protection for each packet, acknowledging packets and passing this
acknowledgment information to upper layers, and providing congestion control.
SST borrows its connection state, sequencing, and packet security model from IPsec [133] in-
stead of TCP. SST channels are inspired by IPsec security associations, and SST packet sequence
numbers work like those IPsec uses for replay protection in the AH and ESP [132]. While IPsec
“hides” its sequencing semantics from upper layers in the interest of operating invisibly to existing
transports, one of SST’s design insights is that this sequencing model provides a useful building
block for new, richer transport services.
The following sections detail the channel protocol’s identification, sequencing, security, ac-
knowledgment, and congestion control services. While one packet submitted to the channel pro-
tocol currently translates to one packet in the underlying protocol (e.g., IP or UDP), the channel
protocol could be extended to provide services such as chunk bundling [234] or quality-of-service
enhancement [240].
Channel Identification
SST’s negotiation protocol sets up a channel’s initial state when an application first connects to a
target host: each run of the negotiation protocol yields a new channel. As part of channel negotia-
tion, each host assigns a channel ID for each direction of flow. Each transmitted packet includes the
receiver’s channel ID, enabling the receiver to find the associated channel instance state; channel
IDs thus play the role of IPsec’s security parameters index (SPI). A channel’s ID may be reassigned
immediately once the channel’s lifetime ends: the packet authenticator described below rejects old
or replayed packets from prior channel instances. As SST’s channel protocol is designed for use by
the stream protocol, which needs at most a few active channels at once, the channel ID field may be
relatively small (currently 8 bits). Channel zero is reserved for the negotiation protocol.
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Packet Sequencing and Replay Protection
TCP uses its byte sequence numbers for three different purposes: to distinguish and order data
segments within a connection instance, to distinguish segments belonging to entirely different con-
nection instances [241,248], and to protect against packet forgery [26]. SST uses its packet sequence
numbers for only the first purpose, leaving the other two functions to an explicit packet authentica-
tor.
Each channel has a 64-bit packet sequence number space for each direction of flow, from which
the channel protocol assigns sequence numbers consecutively to each packet transmitted. As in
IPsec or DCCP [137], every packet sent gets a new sequence number, including acknowledgments
and retransmissions. The sequence number space does not wrap, so if a host sends 264 packets on
one channel, it negotiates and switches to a new channel with a fresh space. A channel’s lifetime
may also be limited in other ways, such as by key expiration or a change in a host’s IP address. If
a host foresees the imminent expiration of a channel, it can begin negotiating a new one while still
using the old one for a seamless handover.
Like IPsec’s 64-bit sequence number extension [132], SST authenticates packets using full se-
quence numbers but transmits only the low bits explicitly in each packet. While the size of the
sequence number space limits a channel’s total lifetime, the size of the sequence number field in the
packet header limits the window of packets a host may transmit within one round-trip. SST’s current
24-bit sequence number field requires the sender to stay less than about 222 packets ahead of the
receiver to ensure that the receiver extrapolates sequence numbers correctly. To achieve maximum
performance on fast links with long delay, SST may need an optional header extension like DCCP’s
long header format [137], or a timestamp extension as in PAWS [123].
Also like IPsec, the channel protocol checks the sequence number of each received packet
against a bit mask of sequence numbers recently received, and discards without further process-
ing both duplicates and packets too old to be covered by the bit mask. The width of this bit mask
therefore limits how far out of order within a channel’s sequence space a packet may be delivered to
upper-layer protocols; we call this value the channel’s mis-ordering limit (MOL). While IPsec hides
its replay protection behavior from higher-level protocols, SST exposes this behavior, simplifying
the stream layer’s state management as described later in Section 4.4.3.
As one way to protect upper layers from out-of-order packets at critical synchronization points,
the sequencing layer can provide barriers analogous to the memory barriers used in weakly con-
sistent processor architectures [223]. When an upper layer requests a barrier, the sequencing layer
adjusts its replay protection state to reject any packet that subsequently arrives with a sequence
number lower than the highest it has seen so far. Barriers are easy for the sequencing layer to im-
plement, and they enable the stream layer to avoid TIME-WAIT state retention. Setting barriers
too frequently can reduce communication efficiency by limiting the channel layer’s ability to accept
packets received out of order, however, so this facility should be used sparingly by upper layers.
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Authentication and Encryption
SST’s packet security follows the design of IPsec’s ESP [132], including its use of “Encrypt-then-
MAC” composition as per accepted practice [25]. The negotiation protocol determines on channel
setup the cryptographic algorithms and shared secrets used to protect the channel. A channel’s
keys and security parameters remain fixed throughout its lifetime: a host re-keys a connection by
negotiating a new channel and migrating existing application streams to the new channel. Since
SST uses a 64-bit packet sequence number at most once per channel, these sequence numbers can
feed counter-based encryption modes [69], which are easily parallelized and require no plaintext
expansion. SST’s packet security therefore need not add any per-packet overhead other than the
MAC.
If strong security is not needed, the application can disable encryption and request a lightweight
32-bit authenticator in place of a cryptographic MAC. The lightweight authenticator protects the
channel against stale or replayed packets sent in prior channel instances, and against attackers who
can inject forged packets but cannot monitor the communication stream, providing security compa-
rable to other unsecured Internet transports like TCP. SST computes this authenticator by calculating
an ordinary 32-bit checksum over the packet and a pseudo-header containing the full 64-bit sequence
number, then adding two values to the resulting checksum: first, the same 4-microsecond timer that
TCP uses to choose its initial sequence numbers [59, 248]; and second, a hash of the connection
identifiers and a random internal secret, as in Bellovin’s method of “keying” TCP ISNs [26]. SST’s
keyed checksum offers slightly better protection than TCP’s keyed sequence numbers, because an
SST attacker must blindly guess exactly the correct checksum key, not just any sequence number
within some validity window.
Acknowledgments and Congestion Control
The channel protocol attaches acknowledgment information to each transmitted packet, and uses
this information to implement congestion control. Each transmitted packet acknowledges a contigu-
ous range of received sequence numbers, indicated in the packet header’s Ack Sequence Number
(ASN) and Ack Count (AckCt) fields. A host sends an acknowledgment for every one or two upper-
level data segments received as in TCP [6], but sets the AckCt field as large as possible reflecting
the most recent contiguous run of packets received. Successive acknowledgments therefore usually
cover overlapping sequence number ranges, minimizing the effects of a lost acknowledgment. Fig-
ure 4-4 for example illustrates the behavior of a host that acknowledges every packet, upon receiving
sequence numbers 1 through 7 in order except for a lost packet with sequence number 4.
Sending an acknowledgment range in each packet gives SST the benefits of selective acknowl-
edgment without the overhead or complexity of variable-length SACK headers [155]. Because SST
assigns each packet a fresh sequence number, including retransmissions of previously-transmitted
data, its acknowledgments provide more information than even TCP with D-SACK [79]: the sender
can tell exactly which copy of a retransmitted segment arrived and detect false retransmits before the
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Figure 4-4: Packet acknowledgment example
receiver has seen duplication. SST can thus implement improvements to TCP congestion control [6]
such as forward acknowledgment [156], reordering tolerance [32], and delay-sensitive schemes like
TFRC [108]. As SST implements congestion control at channel granularity, applications may use
many concurrent streams without behaving “antisocially” as with redundant TCP connections [78].
SST can negotiate at channel setup any protocol extensions necessary to implement congestion
control schemes requiring cooperation with the receiver.
4.4.3 Stream Protocol
The stream layer multiplexes streams onto channels by dividing application data into segments ac-
cording to the current maximum transfer unit (MTU) of the network path, and transmitting each
segment as a separate packet on the current channel. The receiving stream layer accepts these po-
tentially out-of-order segments and delivers them in order to the application. The sender uses the
channel layer’s packet-oriented acknowledgments to determine when a segment has been success-
fully received, so the stream layer requires no byte-oriented acknowledgments as in TCP.
SST’s stream layer can migrate an active stream from one channel to another transparently to
the application, giving streams potentially unlimited lifetimes independent of the limited lifetimes
of the underlying channels. The stream layer can attach a stream to a new channel before detaching
it from the old one, allowing the application to continue using the stream without interruption while
transparently migrating the stream to the new channel. SST does not treat channel failure due to
loss of connectivity as a “hard failure” like a TCP timeout. At the application’s option, SST can
retain stream state indefinitely until connectivity resumes and the negotiation protocol creates a new
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channel. At this point SST migrates the application’s streams to the new channel and the application
resumes where it left off. Stream migration also supports end-to-end host mobility [224, 225]: if a
host’s IP address changes, SST channels bound to that address fail, but if either endpoint can find
the other’s new address (e.g., one host is non-mobile or has a dynamic DNS name), SST can create
a fresh channel between the new address pair and transparently migrate the application’s streams to
the new channel. Of course, if one endpoint host reboots, then its stream state is normally lost and
the application must create new streams.
Because the stream protocol relies on the channel protocol for loss detection and congestion
control, and these mechanisms operate within a particular channel or network path, the latency dif-
ferences and resulting packet reordering across multiple paths should not confuse these mechanisms
as they do for TCP.
Stream Identification and Attachment
When the stream layer creates a new stream on behalf of an application, it assigns the stream a
Unique Stream Identifier or USID. A stream’s USID is at least 128 bits, remains fixed through the
stream’s lifetime, and identifies the stream as it migrates from one channel to another. The stream
layer must then attach the stream to a particular channel before it can transmit application data. In
the process of attaching the stream to a channel, the stream layer assigns a shorter, temporary 16-bit
Local Stream Identifier (LSID) to identify the stream efficiently within the scope of that particular
channel. The stream layer uses this LSID in place of the stream’s full USID in data segments it
transmits on this channel. The stream keeps its USID but gets a new LSID each time SST attaches
it to a different channel. The application is not normally aware of either USIDs or LSIDs.
While each stream has only one USID, LSIDs are specific not only to a channel but to each
direction of flow within that channel. Each endpoint has its own LSID space for each channel, in
which it assigns LSIDs to streams independently of its peer. Each host tracks both its own and its
peer’s LSID space, using its own LSID space to identify the stream for a data segment it transmits
to its peer, and using its peer’s LSID space to identify the stream for a data segment it receives. For
bidirectional use, a stream must have two LSIDs, one assigned by each host for each direction of
flow. A stream may in fact have more than one LSID at once for each flow direction, in order to
permit seamless two in each direction and all potentially on different channels, allowing seamless
stream migration from one channel to another.
Root and Top-Level Application Streams
When the stream protocol initiates negotiation of a new channel, it creates and implicitly attaches a
root stream to the channel. SST uses this root stream only for internal signaling: the application is
unaware of its existence. When an application opens a “top-level” application stream via connect,
SST first opens a channel to the desired host if none already exists, then creates a child of the
channel’s invisible root stream for the application’s use. SST can reuse the same channel and root
stream to create many top-level streams to the same target host, avoiding 3-way handshakes for
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successive top-level streams in the same way that it does for substreams the application creates via
create_substream.
TCP uses its port numbers for two purposes: to distinguish among transport instances between
the same pair of hosts, and to name application rendezvous points via well-known port numbers.
SST splits these two functions, using LSIDs exclusively for stream multiplexing, and using explicit
service negotiation for rendezvous. When the stream layer creates a new top-level stream, before
handing this stream to the application, it first sends a message on the new stream to the responding
host’s stream layer, indicating the rendezvous point the initiating application wishes to connect to.
The responding stream layer intercepts this message and replies indicating whether an application
is listening at the given rendezvous point. On success, both stream layers then hand this top-level
stream to the respective applications. An SST rendezvous point is currently a pair of strings: a
service name (e.g., “www”) and a protocol name (e.g., “http”).
Creating Streams
To create a new child of a stream already attached to a channel, the stream layer sends an Init packet,
shown in Figure 4-5. The initiator specifies the LSID it assigned the new stream and the LSID of
the existing parent, both in the initiator’s LSID space. The packet may also carry application data
for the new stream, as described below.
Although Init packets carry no USIDs, the hosts must agree on a USID for the new stream so
they can attach the stream to other channels. Each host uses a convention for assigning LSIDs that
allows an Init packet’s receiver to extrapolate a USID from the new stream’s 16-bit LSID. Each
host assigns LSIDs in its LSID space for a channel using the low 16 bits of a 64-bit counter, and
its peer tracks this counter and extrapolates the full 64-bit value from a received LSID the same
way the channel layer extrapolates packet sequence numbers. The hosts use these 64-bit counters,
plus a pseudorandom nonce unique to the channel and flow direction, to agree on the new stream’s
USID implicitly. The initiator may skip counter values corresponding to LSIDs still in use by other
streams, provided it doesn’t get too far ahead of its peer and lose counter synchronization.
Upon receiving an Init packet with an unknown LSID, the responder records the new LSID,
then sends a Reply packet to assign its own “return-path” LSID to the new stream for data transfer
in the opposite direction. The Reply packet has the same format as an Init packet, except it contains
the initiator’s just-assigned LSID for the new stream in place of the parent stream’s LSID (see
Figure 4-5). The responder assigns LSIDs using its 64-bit counter as above to maintain counter
synchronization, but does not use the counter to derive a USID since each stream requires only one
USID.
Data Transfer and Acknowledgment
Both Init and Reply packets may contain application data and stream control flags. The initiator
uses Init packets to start sending data on the new stream immediately without waiting for the re-
ceiver’s acknowledgment, eliminating TCP’s 3-way handshake delay on new streams once a channel
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Figure 4-5: Stream data transfer packets
has been opened to the desired host. The responder may similarly start sending response data im-
mediately via Reply packets. The Init and Reply packets contain a 16-bit Byte Sequence Number
(BSN) field indicating the data segment’s logical offset in the new stream, so a host can send up to
216−1+MTU bytes of data this way before it must start using using ordinary Data packets, which
it can do only after receiving an acknowledgment indicating that the peer is aware of the newly
assigned LSID.
Data packets have the same structure as Init and Reply packets, except that they have a 32-bit
BSN and no PSID or RSID (see Figure 4-5). The stream layer uses this BSN to reassemble data
segments in the correct order at the receiver, using wraparound arithmetic as in TCP, making the
longevity of a stream effectively unlimited.
A host buffers each data segment it sends until it receives an acknowledgment for that segment,
periodically retransmitting unacknowledged segments. Since the channel layer’s acknowledgments
refer to packet sequence numbers and not byte sequence numbers, the sender records the packet
sequence numbers the channel protocol assigns each data segment during recent transmission at-
tempts, in order to lookup and free the segment when a corresponding acknowledgment arrives.
Since the channel layer’s packet sequence numbers are independent of the stream layer’s LSIDs, a
packet in one stream may effectively acknowledge segments in other streams. The stream layer uses
a separate Ack packet type to send acknowledgments that cannot be piggybacked onto data flowing
in the opposite direction.
Since the channel layer’s acknowledgments are definitive, the receiver must only acknowledge
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a data segment once it has fully processed and locally buffered the segment. If the receiver cannot
process a segment due to a temporary resource shortage, it may drop the segment without acknowl-
edgment, but using flow control to avoid the need to drop segments is preferred since dropped
segments trigger the sender’s congestion control and affect the entire channel.
If a data segment already transmitted must be retransmitted with a smaller MTU, the sender
“re-fragments” the segment into smaller segments for retransmission, adjusting the BSN fields in
the new segments accordingly. A host may also repackage an Init or Reply packet’s data into an
ordinary Data packet for retransmission, if an acknowledgment for some other Init or Reply packet
arrives in the meantime.
Init, Reply, and Data packets contain several flags indicating special stream events. The Push
(P) and Close (C) flags work like TCP’s PSH and FIN flags, whereas the Mark (M) flag is new:
• Push (P) indicates that the stream’s data up through this segment should be pushed to the
receiving application without waiting for more segments to arrive, exactly as in TCP.
• Mark (M) indicates the end of a message or record, directing the stream layer to deliver
the segment as soon as possible, and never to combine it with subsequent data segments
for delivery to the application, even if subsequent data is already available due to out-of-
order delivery for example. The stream layer indicates this record boundary to the receiving
application, so that the application does not have to embed its own markers in the stream.
• Close (C) indicates the last segment in the stream in one direction. After sending its final
Close segment, the sender may continue receiving data as in TCP; the stream terminates after
each participant closes its end or one issues a Reset. Section 4.4.3 below describes how SST
garbage collects stream state after close.
Datagram Delivery
When the application submits a datagram to be sent as an “ephemeral substream” with best-effort
semantics as described in Section 4.2.4, the stream layer checks that the datagram is small enough
to ensure a reasonable chance of successful delivery, and if so transmits it using a sequence of
Datagram packets shown in Figure 4-5. The first packet in the sequence has the First (F) flag set, the
last packet has the Last (L) flag set, and the packets have consecutive sequence numbers, allowing
the receiver to determine when a received datagram is complete. Each packet’s LSID refers to the
parent stream; the sender never assigns an LSID or maintains any state for the ephemeral child
substream.
If the sending stream layer judges the ephemeral substream to be too large for delivery as a
datagram, it sends the substream instead in standard reliable fashion using Init and Data packets,
retransmitting individual segments as necessary, and closes the substream when finished. The re-
ceiving application obtains no indication of the actual delivery method by which the ephemeral
substream arrived.
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Figure 4-6: Stream control packets
Flow Control
While congestion control operates at channel granularity, SST provides flow control for each stream
individually, allowing the receiving application to accept data at different rates on each stream.
Every packet the stream layer sends contains a receive window update, indicated in the header’s 5-
bit Window field. This field uses an exponential encoding: a value n indicates a window of at least
2n− 1 bytes. When the window is large, the sender does not need to know its size precisely since it
will take a while to fill anyway, but the receiver’s updates become more precise as its buffers fill and
the window shrinks. To avoid a variant of silly window syndrome [53], the sender never fragments
data segments just to make a partial segment fit into the receive window: instead it waits until the
window can accommodate a full-size segment, or a short segment containing a Push marker.
TCP uses its cumulative acknowledgment position as a “base” from which to calculate the win-
dow horizon, but SST has no cumulative acknowledgments from which to calculate such a horizon.
SST’s window credit instead represents the total number of unacknowledged bytes the sender may
have in flight. The receiver deducts from its advertised window the size of each segment it receives
and acknowledges, and cancels this deduction once it delivers the segment to the application. The
sender similarly deducts each segment it sends from its window credit and cancels this deduction
when the segment is acknowledged, even if the segment was received and acknowledged out of
order. The sender tracks the packet sequence numbers of window updates and always uses only the
most recently-sent update.
For flow control, SST treats an Init packet’s data as belonging to the parent stream—the stream
specified in the packet’s PSID field—although the data is semantically part of the new child stream.
In effect, when a host sends data on a new stream without waiting for an initial window size from
the responder, the sender “borrows” from the parent’s receive window to send this initial data. This
borrowing maintains proper flow control and avoids receive buffer overrun while allowing stream
creation with no round-trip delay.
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Detaching and Migrating Streams
The stream layer sends an Attach packet, shown in Figure 4-6, to attach an existing stream to a new
channel. The Attach packet contains the LSID assigned by the sender and the permanent USID of
the stream to be attached. The sender can attach a stream to a limited number of channels at once
(currently two), and indicates via an attachment slot number which of these potential attachments it
is using. The receiver looks up the stream by the specified USID, associates the specified attachment
slot in that stream with the specified LSID in the channel on which the Attach packet arrived, and
acknowledges the packet via the channel layer.
A host may detach a stream from a channel, freeing the stream’s LSID in that channel for
use by other streams, by sending a Detach packet (Figure 4-6). By detaching idle streams the
application has not used for some time and treating its LSID space as a cache, SST can manage an
arbitrary number of streams. Host API issues may impose limits on the number of open streams,
such as Unix’s file descriptor limit—but in the current user space SST prototype, which does not
use file descriptors for streams, the number of open streams is limited only by available memory.
Section 4.4.3 later describes how SST avoids confusing packets referring to different uses of the
same LSID.
Forceful Reset
As in TCP, either host may unilaterally terminate an SST stream in both directions and discard any
buffered data. A host resets a stream by sending a Reset packet (Figure 4-6) containing an LSID in
either the sender’s or receiver’s LSID space, and an O (Orientation) flag indicating in which space
the LSID is to be interpreted. When a host uses a Reset packet to terminate a stream it believes to
be active, it uses its own LSID referring to the stream, and resends the Reset packet as necessary
until it obtains an acknowledgment.
A host also sends a Reset in response to a packet it receives referring to an unknown LSID or
USID. This situation may occur if the host has closed and garbage collected its state for a stream
but one of its acknowledgments to its peer’s data segments is lost in transit, causing its peer to
retransmit those segments. The stateless Reset response indicates to the peer that it can garbage
collect its stream state as well. Stateless Reset responses always refer to the peer’s LSID space,
since by definition the host itself does not have an LSID assigned to the unknown stream.
Garbage Collecting and Reusing LSIDs
An SST application that uses one stream per transaction may create and destroy streams rapidly: in
the worst case, a host can create a stream, assign it an LSID, transmit up to an MTU of data, and
close its end of the stream, all with one Init packet. The responder may similarly acknowledge the
Init packet, send up to one MTU of response data, and close the stream, with one Reply packet. SST
may therefore reuse 16-bit LSIDs for many successive streams within a channel’s lifetime, leading to
the risk of confusing packets referring to different uses of the same LSID. This is the same problem
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that at a lower level motivates TCP’s ISN selection [241, 248] and the channel protocol’s keyed
authenticators (Section 4.4.2). SST’s stream protocol, however, benefits from the channel protocol’s
monotonic packet sequence numbering and its mis-ordering limit described in Section 4.4.2.
To avoid confusing old and new uses of an LSID, after detaching an LSID the stream layer
imposes a “quiet period” before creating or attaching another stream with the same LSID. This
quiet period corresponds to TCP’s TIME-WAIT, but SST counts the duration of this quiet period
in packet sequence numbers instead of wall-clock time, relying on the channel layer’s mis-ordering
limit (MOL). With a 32 packet MOL, for example, after detachment a host waits for both its and
its peer’s sequence numbers to advance 32 packets beyond a point when both hosts know about the
detachment. The channel’s replay logic drops packets that arrive so late that they might confuse
new stream attachments using this LSID. Because the MOL is a (typically small) constant, and one
packet can attach and/or detach only one stream, the number of LSIDs that may be stuck in this
quiet period is similarly small, regardless of packet rate. The mis-ordering limit thus avoids the
need for time-bounded TIME-WAITs and eliminate the risk of state overload under heavy use [75].
The channel protocol’s barrier mechanism, described earlier in Section 4.4.2, provides an al-
ternative method of handling LSID reuse that can eliminate the “quiet period” completely. If the
stream layer on a host sets a barrier once it has closed a stream or detached its LSID and received
acknowledgment of that close or detach from the other host, the channel layer guarantees to the
stream layer that no old packets sent before this point that might refer to the obsolete LSID will
subsequently be delivered even, if they arrive out of order. Thus, setting an explicit barrier has the
effect of temporarily setting the MOL to zero and allowing it to “grow” gradually back to its normal
value as further (in-order) packets arrive. While barriers enable stream state to be garbage collected
even more quickly than with a quiet time defined by the MOL, they have the potential disadvan-
tage of unnecessarily preventing the delivery of other packets that might happen to arrive out of
order, including packets associated with completely unrelated streams. For this reason, imposing a
MOL-based quiet period should probably be considered the preferred approach.
4.4.4 The Negotiation Protocol
The negotiation protocol is responsible for setting up new channels with either weak or strong
security. Negotiation with weak security sets up the unpredictable checksum key described in Sec-
tion 4.4.2. The initiator may piggyback application data onto the first negotiation protocol packet,
allowing channel setup with no effective round-trip overhead, but the responder may ignore this
initial data and return a cookie challenge if it is loaded or under DoS attack.
The strong security mode uses Just Fast Keying [4] to establish shared cryptographic secrets
and verify host identities using a simple, fixed four-message (two round-trip) exchange. The last
two messages may carry piggybacked application data, for an effective minimum channel setup
overhead of one round trip, identical to TCP’s.
SST is designed to work with UIA ad hoc naming [85] and UIP routing [80] to support seam-
less communication among both fixed and mobile personal devices. UIA, UIP, and SST use cryp-
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tographic host identifiers analogous to those of HIP [165] to identify endpoints securely, so when
a host’s IP address changes, SST merely reruns the negotiation protocol to establish a channel be-
tween the new addresses, and migrates existing streams to the new channel.
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Chapter 5
NAT Traversal
One of the primary goals of UIA is to support convenient peer-to-peer communication among per-
sonal mobile devices. Unfortunately, now-ubiquitous middleboxes on the Internet such as firewalls
and Network Address Translators (NAT) [70, 252] cause well-known difficulties for peer-to-peer
(P2P) communication, since the peers involved may not have a publicly reachable or even globally
unique IP address [113, 228, 230]. While the UIA routing layer’s ability to forward traffic through
publicly reachable intermediate nodes provides a general-purpose method of traversing middle-
boxes, this explicit forwarding can increase end-to-end latency and unnecessarily burden these in-
termediate nodes. In some cases indirect overlay forwarding paths may be “optimized” into direct
IP-level paths between peers located behind middleboxes, via NAT traversal techniques.
Several NAT traversal techniques are known, but their documentation is slim, and data about
their robustness or relative merits is slimmer. This chapter presents the first thorough development
and analysis of a simple but robust and practical NAT traversal technique, known as hole punching.
While Dan Kegel publicly documented the basics of UDP hole punching in 1999 [130], the present
work examines previously unaddressed scenarios such as the increasingly common situation of
hosts behind multiple levels of NAT: e.g., behind both a home NAT router and a large ISP-deployed
NAT. We also explore a clean, symmetric approach to TCP hole punching, which works over a
substantial percentage of deployed NATs without relying on delicate, timing-sensitive techniques
such as NAT port number prediction or address spoofing, as other NAT traversal proposals for TCP
do [30, 72, 101]. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed hole punching techniques, Chapter 7
will later present the first published empirical study on the compatibility of a wide variety of NATs
deployed “in the wild” with TCP and UDP hole punching techniques.
Section 5.1 first introduces NAT traversal background, terminology, and basic concepts, and
Section 5.2 summarizes hole punching techniques for UDP, which are already moderately well-
understood. Section 5.3 then explores how hole punching can be reliably used to set up peer-to-
peer TCP streams as well. Finally, Section 5.4 summarizes middlebox properties these techniques
depend on. Later in Chapter 7 we will evaluate the reliability of this technique on a wide variety
of deployed NATs, finding that about 82% of the NATs tested support hole punching for UDP, and
about 64% support hole punching for TCP streams. As NAT vendors become increasingly conscious
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Figure 5-1: Public and private IP address domains
of the needs of important P2P applications such as Voice over IP and online gaming protocols,
support for hole punching is likely to increase in the future, making this optimization ever more
important for UIA and other networking architectures supporting peer-to-peer communication.
5.1 Background and NAT Traversal Concepts
The combined pressures of tremendous growth and massive security challenges have forced the
Internet to evolve in ways that make life difficult for many applications. The Internet’s original
uniform address architecture, in which every node has a globally unique IP address and can com-
municate directly with every other node, has been replaced with a new de facto Internet address
architecture, consisting of a global address realm and many private address realms interconnected
by Network Address Translators (NAT). In this new address architecture, illustrated in Figure 5-1,
only nodes in the “main,” global address realm can be easily contacted from anywhere in the net-
work, because only they have unique, globally routable IP addresses. Nodes on private networks
can connect to other nodes on the same private network, and they can usually open TCP or UDP
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connections to “well-known” nodes in the global address realm. NATs on the path allocate tem-
porary public endpoints for outgoing connections, and translate the addresses and port numbers in
packets comprising those sessions, while generally blocking all incoming traffic unless otherwise
specifically configured.
The Internet’s new de facto address architecture is suitable for client/server communication in
the typical case when the client is on a private network and the server is in the global address realm.
The architecture makes it difficult for two nodes on different private networks to contact each other
directly, however, which is often important to the “peer-to-peer” communication protocols used
in applications such as teleconferencing, online gaming, and sharing information among personal
devices as UIA is intended to support. We clearly need a way to make such protocols function
smoothly in the presence of NAT.
One of the most effective methods of establishing peer-to-peer communication between hosts
on different private networks is known as “hole punching.” This technique is widely used already in
UDP-based applications, but essentially the same technique also works for TCP. Contrary to what its
name may suggest, hole punching does not compromise the security of a private network. Instead,
hole punching enables applications to function within the the default security policy of most NATs,
effectively signaling to NATs on the path that peer-to-peer communication sessions are “solicited”
and thus should be accepted. This chapter documents hole punching for both UDP and TCP, and
details the crucial aspects of both application and NAT behavior that make hole punching work.
Unfortunately, no traversal technique works with all existing NATs, because NAT behavior is
not standardized. Chapter 7 presents some experimental results evaluating hole punching support
in current NATs. Our data is derived from results submitted by users throughout the Internet by
running our “NAT Check” tool over a wide variety of NATs by different vendors. While the data
points were gathered from a “self-selecting” user community and may not be representative of
the true distribution of NAT implementations deployed on the Internet, the results are nevertheless
generally encouraging.
While evaluating basic hole punching, we also point out variations that can make hole punching
work on a wider variety of existing NATs at the cost of greater complexity. Our primary focus,
however, is on developing the simplest hole punching technique that works cleanly and robustly in
the presence of “well-behaved” NATs in any reasonable network topology. We deliberately avoid
excessively clever tricks that may increase compatibility with some existing “broken” NATs in the
short term, but which only work some of the time and may cause additional unpredictability and
network brittleness in the long term.
Although the larger address space of IPv6 [62] may eventually reduce the need for NAT, in the
short term IPv6 is increasing the demand for NAT, because NAT itself provides the easiest way
to achieve interoperability between IPv4 and IPv6 address domains [251]. Further, the anonymity
and inaccessibility of hosts on private networks has widely perceived security and privacy benefits.
Firewalls are unlikely to go away even when there are enough IP addresses: IPv6 firewalls will still
commonly block unsolicited incoming traffic by default, making hole punching useful even to IPv6
123
applications.
5.1.1 Terminology
We adopt the NAT terminology and taxonomy defined in RFC 2663 [230], as well as additional
terms defined more recently in RFC 3489 [209] and RFC 4787 [16]. We urge readers to refer to the
above RFCs for detailed information about terminology, but the most basic terms and concepts are
summarized below.
• Session: Of particular importance is the notion of session. A session endpoint for TCP
or UDP is an (IP address, port number) pair, and a particular session is uniquely identified
by its two session endpoints. From the perspective of one of the hosts involved, a session is
effectively identified by the 4-tuple (local IP, local port, remote IP, remote port). The direction
of a session is normally the flow direction of the packet that initiates the session: the initial
SYN packet for TCP, or the first user datagram for UDP.
• Traditional NAT: Of the various flavors of NAT [230], the most common type is traditional
or outbound NAT [228], which provides an asymmetric bridge between a private network
and a public network. Outbound NAT by default allows only outbound sessions to traverse
the NAT: incoming packets are dropped unless the NAT identifies them as being part of an
existing session initiated from within the private network. Outbound NAT conflicts with
peer-to-peer protocols because when both peers desiring to communicate are “behind” (on
the private network side of) two different NATs, whichever peer tries to initiate a session, the
other peer’s NAT rejects it. NAT traversal entails making P2P sessions look like “outbound”
sessions to both NATs.
• Basic NAT versus NAPT: Outbound NAT has two sub-varieties: Basic NAT, which only
translates IP addresses, and Network Address/Port Translation (NAPT), which translates en-
tire session endpoints. NAPT, the more general variety, has also become the most common
because it enables the hosts on a private network to share the use of a single public IP address.
Throughout this chapter we assume NAPT, though the principles and techniques we discuss
apply equally well (if sometimes trivially) to Basic NAT.
• Loopback/Hairpin Translation: When a host in the private domain of a NAT device at-
tempts to connect with another host behind the same NAT device using the public address of
the host, the NAT device performs the equivalent of a ”Twice-nat” translation on the packet as
follows. The originating host’s private endpoint is translated into its assigned public endpoint,
and the target host’s public endpoint is translated into its private endpoint, before the packet
is forwarded to the target host. We refer the above translation performed by a NAT device as
”Loopback translation”. This is also referred sometimes as ”Hairpin translation”.
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Figure 5-2: NAT Traversal by Relaying
5.1.2 Relaying
The most reliable but least efficient method of P2P communication across NAT is simply to make
the communication look to the network like standard client/server communication, through relaying.
Suppose two client hosts A and B have each initiated TCP or UDP connections to a well-known
server S, at S’s global IP address 18.181.0.31 and port number 1234. As shown in Figure 5-2,
the clients reside on separate private networks, and their respective NATs prevent either client from
directly initiating a connection to the other. Instead of attempting a direct connection, the two clients
simply use the server S to relay messages between them. For example, to send a message to client
B, client A sends the message to server S along its already-established client/server connection,
and server S forwards the message on to client B using its existing client/server connection with B.
Relaying always works as long as both clients can connect to the server. Its disadvantages
are that it consumes the server’s processing power and network bandwidth for every data packet
forwarded this way, and communication latency between the peering clients is likely increased
even if the server is well-connected. Nevertheless, since there is no more efficient technique that
works reliably on all existing NATs, relaying is a useful fall-back strategy if maximum robustness is
desired. The TURN protocol [210] defines a method of implementing relaying in a relatively secure
fashion.
UIA’s overlay routing layer effectively provides a generalized relaying service, which can cre-
ate indirect paths between UIA nodes even when such a path must traverse several intermediate
125
Figure 5-3: NAT Traversal by Connection Reversal
nodes or must be relayed for purposes other than NAT traversal (e.g., to cross between completely
different network technologies, such as IP and Bluetooth). In the UIA worldview, the NAT traver-
sal solutions developed in the following sections represents optimizations that permit the dynamic
creation of “shortcuts” that bypass these intermediate relay hops at the IP level, once the P2P con-
nection is established with the help of the intermediary. Since UIA treats NAT traversal only as an
optimization, it is acceptable that NAT traversal does not work on 100% of existing NATs we will
see in Chapter 7: when hole punching does not work, UIA can always fall back on less efficient,
explicit relaying.
5.1.3 Connection Reversal
Some P2P applications use a straightforward but limited technique, known as connection reversal,
to enable communication when both hosts have connections to a well-known rendezvous server
S and only one of the peers is behind a NAT, as shown in Figure 5-3. If A wants to initiate a
connection to B, then a direct connection attempt works automatically, because B is not behind
a NAT and A’s NAT interprets the connection as an outgoing session. If B wants to initiate a
connection to A, however, any direct connection attempt to A is blocked by A’s NAT. B can instead
relay a connection request to A through a well-known server S, asking A to attempt a “reverse”
connection back to B. Despite the obvious limitations of this technique, the central idea of using a
well-known rendezvous server as an intermediary to help set up direct peer-to-peer connections is
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fundamental to the more general hole punching techniques described next.
5.2 UDP Hole Punching
UDP hole punching enables two clients to set up a direct peer-to-peer UDP session with the help of
a well-known rendezvous server, even if the clients are both behind NATs. This technique was men-
tioned in section 5.1 of RFC 3027 [113], documented more thoroughly elsewhere on the Web [130],
and used in recent experimental Internet protocols [117, 207]. Various proprietary protocols, such
as those for on-line gaming, also use UDP hole punching.
5.2.1 The Rendezvous Server
Hole punching assumes that the two clients, A and B, already have active UDP sessions with a
rendezvous server S. When a client registers with S, the server records two endpoints for that
client: the (IP address, UDP port) pair that the client believes itself to be using to talk with S, and
the (IP address, UDP port) pair that the server observes the client to be using to talk with it. We
refer to the first pair as the client’s private endpoint and the second as the client’s public endpoint.
The server might obtain the client’s private endpoint from the client itself in a field in the body of
the client’s registration message, and obtain the client’s public endpoint from the source IP address
and source UDP port fields in the IP and UDP headers of that registration message. If the client is
not behind a NAT, then its private and public endpoints should be identical.
A few poorly behaved NATs are known to scan the body of UDP datagrams for 4-byte fields
that look like IP addresses, and translate them as they would the IP address fields in the IP header.
To be robust against such behavior, applications may wish to obfuscate IP addresses in messages
bodies slightly, for example by transmitting the one’s complement of the IP address instead of the
IP address itself. Of course, if the application is encrypting its messages, then this behavior is not
likely to be a problem.
5.2.2 Establishing Peer-to-Peer Sessions
Suppose client A wants to establish a UDP session directly with client B. Hole punching proceeds
as follows:
1. A initially does not know how to reach B, so A asks S for help establishing a UDP session
with B.
2. S replies to A with a message containing B’s public and private endpoints. At the same time,
S uses its UDP session with B to send B a connection request message containing A’s public
and private endpoints. Once these messages are received, A and B know each other’s public
and private endpoints.
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Figure 5-4: UDP hole punching, peers behind a common NAT
3. When A receives B’s public and private endpoints from S, A starts sending UDP packets
to both of these endpoints, and subsequently “locks in” whichever endpoint first elicits a
valid response from B. Similarly, when B receives A’s public and private endpoints in the
forwarded connection request, B starts sending UDP packets to A at each of A’s known
endpoints, locking in the first endpoint that works. The order and timing of these messages
are not critical as long as they are asynchronous.
We now consider how UDP hole punching handles each of three specific network scenarios. In
the first situation, representing the “easy” case, the two clients actually reside behind the same NAT,
on one private network. In the second, most common case, the clients reside behind different NATs.
In the third scenario, the clients each reside behind two levels of NAT: a common “first-level” NAT
deployed by an ISP for example, and distinct “second-level” NATs such as consumer NAT routers
for home networks.
It is in general difficult or impossible for the application itself to determine the exact physical
layout of the network, and thus which of these scenarios (or the many other possible ones) actu-
ally applies at a given time. Protocols such as STUN [209] can provide some information about
the NATs present on a communication path, but this information may not always be complete or
reliable, especially when multiple levels of NAT are involved. Nevertheless, hole punching works
automatically in all of these scenarios without the application having to know the specific network
organization, as long as the NATs involved behave in a reasonable fashion. (“Reasonable” behavior
for NATs will be described later in Section 5.4.)
5.2.3 Peers Behind a Common NAT
First consider the simple scenario in which the two clients (probably unknowingly) happen to reside
behind the same NAT, and are therefore located in the same private IP address realm, as shown in
Figure 5-4. Client A has established a UDP session with server S, to which the common NAT has
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Figure 5-5: UDP hole punching, peers behind different NATs
assigned its own public port number 62000. Client B has similarly established a session with S, to
which the NAT has assigned public port number 62005.
Suppose that client A uses the hole punching technique outlined above to establish a UDP
session with B, using server S as an introducer. Client A sends S a message requesting a connection
to B. S responds to A with B’s public and private endpoints, and also forwards A’s public and
private endpoints to B. Both clients then attempt to send UDP datagrams to each other directly at
each of these endpoints. The messages directed to the public endpoints may or may not reach their
destination, depending on whether or not the NAT supports hairpin translation as described below in
Section 5.2.5. The messages directed at the private endpoints do reach their destinations, however,
and since this direct route through the private network is likely to be faster than an indirect route
through the NAT anyway, the clients are most likely to select the private endpoints for subsequent
regular communication.
By assuming that NATs support hairpin translation, the application might dispense with the
complexity of trying private as well as public endpoints, at the cost of making local communication
behind a common NAT unnecessarily pass through the NAT. As our results in Section 7.6 show,
however, hairpin translation is still much less common among existing NATs than are other “P2P-
friendly” NAT behaviors. For now, therefore, applications may benefit substantially by using both
public and private endpoints.
5.2.4 Peers behind different nATs
Suppose clients A and B have private IP addresses behind different NATs, as shown in Figure 5-5.
A and B have each initiated UDP communication sessions from their local port 4321 to port 1234
on server S. In handling these outbound sessions, NAT A has assigned port 62000 at its own public
IP address, 155.99.25.11, for the use of A’s session with S, and NAT B has assigned port 31000 at
its IP address, 138.76.29.7, to B’s session with S.
In A’s registration message to S, A reports its private endpoint to S as 10.0.0.1:4321, where
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10.0.0.1 is A’s IP address on its own private network. S records A’s reported private endpoint, along
with A’s public endpoint as observed by S itself. A’s public endpoint in this case is 155.99.25.11:62000,
the temporary endpoint assigned to the session by the NAT. Similarly, when client B registers, S
records B’s private endpoint as 10.1.1.3:4321 and B’s public endpoint as 138.76.29.7:31000.
Now client A follows the hole punching procedure described above to establish a UDP commu-
nication session directly with B. First, A sends a request message to S asking for help connecting
with B. In response, S sends B’s public and private endpoints to A, and sends A’s public and
private endpoints to B. A and B each start trying to send UDP datagrams directly to each of these
endpoints.
Since A and B are on different private networks and their respective private IP addresses are not
globally routable, the messages sent to these endpoints will reach either the wrong host or no host at
all. Because many NATs also act as DHCP servers, handing out IP addresses in a fairly deterministic
way from a private address pool usually determined by the NAT vendor by default, it is quite likely
in practice that A’s messages directed at B’s private endpoint will reach some (incorrect) host on
A’s private network that happens to have the same private IP address as B does. Applications
must therefore authenticate all messages in some way to filter out such stray traffic robustly. The
messages might include application-specific names or cryptographic tokens, for example, or at least
a random nonce pre-arranged through S.
Now consider A’s first message sent to B’s public endpoint, as shown in Figure 5-5. As this
outbound message passes through A’s NAT, this NAT notices that this is the first UDP packet in
a new outgoing session. The new session’s source endpoint (10.0.0.1:4321) is the same as that
of the existing session between A and S, but its destination endpoint is different. If NAT A is
well-behaved, it preserves the identity of A’s private endpoint, consistently translating all out-
bound sessions from private source endpoint 10.0.0.1:4321 to the corresponding public source
endpoint 155.99.25.11:62000. A’s first outgoing message to B’s public endpoint thus, in effect,
“punches a hole” in A’s NAT for a new UDP session identified by the endpoints (10.0.0.1:4321,
138.76.29.7:31000) on A’s private network, and by the endpoints (155.99.25.11:62000, 138.76.29.7:31000)
on the main Internet.
If A’s message to B’s public endpoint reaches B’s NAT before B’s first message to A has
crossed B’s own NAT, then B’s NAT may interpret A’s inbound message as unsolicited incoming
traffic and drop it. B’s first message to A’s public address, however, similarly opens a hole in B’s
NAT, for a new UDP session identified by the endpoints (10.1.1.3:4321, 155.99.25.11:62000) on
B’s private network, and by the endpoints (138.76.29.7:31000, 155.99.25.11:62000) on the Internet.
Once the first messages from A and B have crossed their respective NATs, holes are open in each
direction and UDP communication can proceed normally. Once the clients have verified that the
public endpoints work, they can stop sending messages to the alternative private endpoints.
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Figure 5-6: UDP hole punching, peers behind multiple levels of NAT
5.2.5 Peers Behind Multiple Levels of NAT
In some topologies involving multiple NAT devices, two clients cannot establish an “optimal” P2P
route between them without specific knowledge of the topology. Consider a final scenario, depicted
in Figure 5-6. Suppose NAT C is a large industrial NAT deployed by an internet service provider
(ISP) to multiplex many customers onto a few public IP addresses, and NATs A and B are small
consumer NAT routers deployed independently by two of the ISP’s customers to multiplex their
private home networks onto their respective ISP-provided IP addresses. Only server S and NAT
C have globally routable IP addresses; the “public” IP addresses used by NAT A and NAT B are
actually private to the ISP’s address realm, while client A’s and B’s addresses in turn are private
to the addressing realms of NAT A and NAT B, respectively. Each client initiates an outgoing
connection to server S as before, causing NATs A and B each to create a single public/private
translation, and causing NAT C to establish a public/private translation for each session.
Now suppose A and B attempt to establish a direct peer-to-peer UDP connection via hole punch-
ing. The optimal routing strategy would be for client A to send messages to client B’s “semi-public”
endpoint at NAT B, 10.0.1.2:55000 in the ISP’s addressing realm, and for client B to send messages
to A’s “semi-public” endpoint at NAT B, namely 10.0.1.1:45000. Unfortunately, A and B have no
way to learn these addresses, because server S only sees the truly global public endpoints of the
clients, 155.99.25.11:62000 and 155.99.25.11:62005 respectively. Even if A and B had some way
to learn these addresses, there is still no guarantee that they would be usable, because the address
assignments in the ISP’s private address realm might conflict with unrelated address assignments in
the clients’ private realms. (NAT A’s IP address in NAT C’s realm might just as easily have been
10.1.1.3, for example, the same as client B’s private address in NAT B’s realm.)
The clients therefore have no choice but to use their global public addresses as seen by S for
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their P2P communication, and rely on NAT C providing hairpin or loopback translation. When
A sends a UDP datagram to B’s global endpoint, 155.99.25.11:62005, NAT A first translates the
datagram’s source endpoint from 10.0.0.1:4321 to 10.0.1.1:45000. The datagram now reaches NAT
C , which recognizes that the datagram’s destination address is one of NAT C’s own translated public
endpoints. If NAT C is well-behaved, it then translates both the source and destination addresses in
the datagram and “loops” the datagram back onto the private network, now with a source endpoint
of 155.99.25.11:62000 and a destination endpoint of 10.0.1.2:55000. NAT B finally translates the
datagram’s destination address as the datagram enters B’s private network, and the datagram reaches
B. The path back to A works similarly. Many NATs do not yet support hairpin translation, but it is
becoming more common as NAT vendors become aware of this issue.
5.2.6 UDP Idle Timeouts
Since the UDP transport protocol provides NATs with no reliable, application-independent way to
determine the lifetime of a session crossing the NAT, most NATs simply associate an idle timer with
UDP translations, closing the hole if no traffic has used it for some time period. There is unfortu-
nately no standard value for this timer: some NATs have timeouts as short as 20 seconds. If the
application needs to keep an idle UDP session active after establishing the session via hole punch-
ing, the application must send periodic keep-alive packets to ensure that the relevant translation state
in the NATs does not disappear.
Unfortunately, many NATs associate UDP idle timers with individual UDP sessions defined by a
particular pair of endpoints, so sending keep-alives on one session will not keep other sessions active
even if all the sessions originate from the same private endpoint. Instead of sending keep-alives on
many different P2P sessions, applications can avoid excessive keep-alive traffic by detecting when
a UDP session no longer works, and re-running the original hole punching procedure again “on
demand.”
5.3 TCP Hole Punching
Establishing peer-to-peer TCP connections between hosts behind NATs is slightly more complex
than for UDP, but TCP hole punching is remarkably similar at the protocol level. Since it is not as
well-understood, it is currently supported by fewer existing NATs. When the NATs involved do sup-
port it, however, TCP hole punching is just as fast and reliable as UDP hole punching. Peer-to-peer
TCP communication across well-behaved NATs may in fact be more robust than UDP communica-
tion, because unlike UDP, the TCP protocol’s state machine gives NATs on the path a standard way
to determine the precise lifetime of a particular TCP session.
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5.3.1 Sockets and TCP Port Reuse
The main practical challenge to applications wishing to implement TCP hole punching is not a
protocol issue but an application programming interface (API) issue. Because the standard Berkeley
sockets API was designed around the client/server paradigm, the API allows a TCP stream socket to
be used to initiate an outgoing connection via connect(), or to listen for incoming connections
via listen() and accept(), but not both. Further, TCP sockets usually have a one-to-one
correspondence to TCP port numbers on the local host: after the application binds one socket to a
particular local TCP port, attempts to bind a second socket to the same TCP port fail.
For TCP hole punching to work, however, we need to use a single local TCP port to listen
for incoming TCP connections and to initiate multiple outgoing TCP connections concurrently.
Fortunately, all major operating systems support a special TCP socket option, commonly named
SO_REUSEADDR, which allows the application to bind multiple sockets to the same local end-
point as long as this option is set on all of the sockets involved. BSD systems have introduced a
SO_REUSEPORT option that controls port reuse separately from address reuse; on such systems
both of these options must be set.
5.3.2 Opening Peer-to-Peer TCP Streams
Suppose that client A wishes to set up a TCP connection with client B. We assume as usual that
both A and B already have active TCP connections with a well-known rendezvous server S. The
server records each registered client’s public and private endpoints, just as for UDP. At the protocol
level, TCP hole punching works almost exactly as for UDP:
1. Client A uses its active TCP session with S to ask S for help connecting to B.
2. S replies to A with B’s public and private TCP endpoints, and at the same time sends A’s
public and private endpoints to B.
3. From the same local TCP ports that A and B used to register with S, A and B each asyn-
chronously make outgoing connection attempts to the other’s public and private endpoints as
reported by S, while simultaneously listening for incoming connections on their respective
local TCP ports.
4. A and B wait for outgoing connection attempts to succeed, and/or for incoming connections
to appear. If one of the outgoing connection attempts fails due to a network error such as
“connection reset” or “host unreachable,” the host simply re-tries that connection attempt
after a short delay (e.g., one second), up to an application-defind maximum timeout period.
5. When a TCP connection is made, the hosts authenticate each other to verify that they con-
nected to the intended host. If authentication fails, the clients close that connection and con-
tinue waiting for others to succeed. The clients use the first successfully authenticated TCP
stream resulting from this process.
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Figure 5-7: Sockets versus ports for TCP hole punching
Unlike with UDP, where each client only needs one socket to communicate with both S and
any number of peers simultaneously, with TCP each client application must manage several sock-
ets bound to a single local TCP port on that client node, as shown in Figure 5-7. Each client
needs a stream socket representing its connection to S, a listen socket on which to accept incoming
connections from peers, and at least two additional stream sockets with which to initiate outgoing
connections to the other peer’s public and private TCP endpoints.
Consider the common-case scenario in which the clients A and B are behind different NATs,
as shown in Figure 5-5, and assume that the port numbers shown in the figure are now for TCP
rather than UDP ports. The outgoing connection attempts A and B make to each other’s private
endpoints either fail or connect to the wrong host. As with UDP, it is important that TCP applications
authenticate their peer-to-peer sessions, due of the likelihood of mistakenly connecting to a random
host on the local network that happens to have the same private IP address as the desired host on a
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remote private network.
The clients’ outgoing connection attempts to each other’s public endpoints, however, cause the
respective NATs to open up new “holes” enabling direct TCP communication between A and B. If
the NATs are well-behaved, then a new peer-to-peer TCP stream automatically forms between them.
If A’s first SYN packet to B reaches B’s NAT before B’s first SYN packet to A reaches B’s NAT,
for example, then B’s NAT may interpret A’s SYN as an unsolicited incoming connection attempt
and drop it. B’s first SYN packet to A should subsequently get through, however, because A’s NAT
sees this SYN as being part of the outbound session to B that A’s first SYN had already initiated.
5.3.3 Behavior Observed by the Application
What the client applications observe to happen with their sockets during TCP hole punching depends
on the timing and the TCP implementations involved. Suppose that A’s first outbound SYN packet
to B’s public endpoint is dropped by NAT B, but B’s first subsequent SYN packet to A’s public
endpoint gets through to A before A’s TCP retransmits its SYN. Depending on the operating system
involved, one of two things may happen:
• A’s TCP implementation notices that the session endpoints for the incoming SYN match those
of an outbound session A was attempting to initiate. A’s TCP stack therefore associates this
new session with the socket that the local application on A was using to connect() to B’s
public endpoint. The application’s asynchronous connect() call succeeds, and nothing
happens with the application’s listen socket.
Since the received SYN packet did not include an ACK for A’s previous outbound SYN, A’s
TCP replies to B’s public endpoint with a SYN-ACK packet, the SYN part being merely
a replay of A’s original outbound SYN, using the same sequence number. Once B’s TCP
receives A’s SYN-ACK, it responds with its own ACK for A’s SYN, and the TCP session
enters the connected state on both ends.
• Alternatively, A’s TCP implementation might instead notice that A has an active listen socket
on that port waiting for incoming connection attempts. Since B’s SYN looks like an incoming
connection attempt, A’s TCP creates a new stream socket with which to associate the new TCP
session, and hands this new socket to the application via the application’s next accept()
call on its listen socket. A’s TCP then responds to B with a SYN-ACK as above, and TCP
connection setup proceeds as usual for client/server-style connections.
Since A’s prior outbound connect() attempt to B used a combination of source and des-
tination endpoints that is now in use by another socket, namely the one just returned to the
application via accept(), A’s asynchronous connect() attempt must fail at some point,
typically with an “address in use” error. The application nevertheless has the working peer-
to-peer stream socket it needs to communicate with B, so it ignores this failure.
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The first behavior above appears to be usual for BSD-based operating systems, whereas the
second behavior appears more common under Linux and Windows.
5.3.4 Simultaneous TCP Open
Suppose that the timing of the various connection attempts during the hole punching process works
out so that the initial outgoing SYN packets from both clients traverse their respective local NATs,
opening new outbound TCP sessions in each NAT, before reaching the remote NAT. In this “lucky”
case, the NATs do not reject either of the initial SYN packets, and the SYNs cross on the wire
between the two NATs. In this case, the clients observe an event known as a simultaneous TCP
open: each peer’s TCP receives a “raw” SYN while waiting for a SYN-ACK. Each peer’s TCP
responds with a SYN-ACK, whose SYN part essentially “replays” the peer’s previous outgoing
SYN, and whose ACK part acknowledges the SYN received from the other peer.
What the respective applications observe in this case again depends on the behavior of the TCP
implementations involved, as described in the previous section. If both clients implement the second
behavior above, it may be that all of the asynchronous connect() calls made by the application
ultimately fail, but the application running on each client nevertheless receives a new, working peer-
to-peer TCP stream socket via accept()—as if this TCP stream had magically “created itself”
on the wire and was merely passively accepted at the endpoints! As long as the application does not
care whether it ultimately receives its peer-to-peer TCP sockets via connect() or accept(),
the process results in a working stream on any TCP implementation that properly implements the
standard TCP state machine specified in RFC 793 [244].
Each of the alternative network organization scenarios discussed in Section 5.2 for UDP works
in exactly the same way for TCP. For example, TCP hole punching works in multi-level NAT sce-
narios such as the one in Figure 5-6 as long as the NATs involved are well-behaved.
5.3.5 Sequential Hole Punching
In a variant of the above TCP hole punching procedure implemented by the NatTrav library [72],
the clients attempt connections to each other sequentially rather than in parallel. For example: (1)
A informs B via S of its desire to communicate, without simultaneously listening on its local port;
(2) B makes a connect() attempt to A, which opens a hole in B’s NAT but then fails due to a
timeout or RST from A’s NAT or a RST from A itself; (3) B closes its connection to S and does
a listen() on its local port; (4) S in turn closes its connection with A, signaling A to attempt a
connect() directly to B.
This sequential procedure may be particularly useful on Windows hosts prior to XP Service
Pack 2, which did not correctly implement simultaneous TCP open, or on sockets APIs that do not
support the SO_REUSEADDR functionality. The sequential procedure is more timing-dependent,
however, and may be slower in the common case and less robust in unusual situations. In step (2),
for example, B must allow its “doomed-to-fail” connect() attempt enough time to ensure that at
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least one SYN packet traverses all NATs on its side of the network. Too little delay risks a lost SYN
derailing the process, whereas too much delay increases the total time required for hole punching.
The sequential hole punching procedure also effectively “consumes” both clients’ connections to
the server S, requiring the clients to open fresh connections to S for each new P2P connection to
be forged. The parallel hole punching procedure, in contrast, typically completes as soon as both
clients make their outgoing connect() attempts, and allows each client to retain and re-use a
single connection to S indefinitely.
5.4 Properties of P2P-Friendly NATs
This section describes the key behavioral properties NATs must have in order for the hole punching
techniques described above to work properly. Not all current NAT implementations satisfy these
properties, but many do, and NATs are gradually becoming more “P2P-friendly” as NAT vendors
recognize the demand for peer-to-peer protocols such as voice over IP and on-line gaming.
This section is not meant to be a complete or definitive specification for how NATs “should”
behave; we provide it merely for information about the most commonly observed behaviors that
enable or break P2P hole punching. The IETF started the BEHAVE working group to define offi-
cial “best current practices” for NAT behavior [119]. As of this writing, the BEHAVE group has
standardized NAT behavior recommendations for UDP [16] and IP multicast [263], and is finalizing
similar recommendations for TCP [102], which include the considerations outlined in this section
and others. NAT vendors should of course follow the IETF working group directly as official be-
havioral standards are formulated.
5.4.1 Consistent Endpoint Translation
The hole punching techniques described here only work automatically if the NAT consistently maps
a given TCP or UDP source endpoint on the private network to a single corresponding public end-
point controlled by the NAT. A NAT that behaves in this way is referred to as a cone NAT in RFC
3489 [209] and elsewhere, because the NAT “focuses” all sessions originating from a single private
endpoint through the same public endpoint on the NAT.
Consider again the scenario in Figure 5-5, for example. When client A initially contacted the
well-known server S, NAT A chose to use port 62000 at its own public IP address, 155.99.25.11,
as a temporary public endpoint to representing A’s private endpoint 10.0.0.1:4321. When A later
attempts to establish a peer-to-peer session with B by sending a message from the same local private
endpoint to B’s public endpoint, A depends on NAT A preserving the identity of this private end-
point, and re-using the existing public endpoint of 155.99.25.11:62000, because that is the public
endpoint for A to which B will be sending its corresponding messages.
A NAT that is only designed to support client/server protocols will not necessarily preserve the
identities of private endpoints in this way. Such a NAT is a symmetric NAT in RFC 3489 terminology.
For example, after the NAT assigns the public endpoint 155.99.25.11:62000 to client A’s session
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with server S, the NAT might assign a different public endpoint, such as 155.99.25.11:62001, to the
P2P session that A tries to initiate with B. In this case, the hole punching process fails to provide
connectivity, because the subsequent incoming messages from B reach NAT A at the wrong port
number.
Many symmetric NATs allocate port numbers for successive sessions in a fairly predictable way.
Exploiting this fact, variants of hole punching algorithms [30, 101] can be made to work “much of
the time” even over symmetric NATs by first probing the NAT’s behavior using a protocol such as
STUN [209], and using the resulting information to “predict” the public port number the NAT will
assign to a new session. Such prediction techniques amount to chasing a moving target, however,
and many things can go wrong along the way. The predicted port number might already be in use
causing the NAT to jump to another port number, for example, or another client behind the same
NAT might initiate an unrelated session at the wrong time so as to allocate the predicted port number.
While port number prediction can be a useful trick for achieving maximum compatibility with
badly-behaved existing NATs, it does not represent a robust long-term solution. Since symmetric
NAT provides no greater security than a cone NAT with per-session traffic filtering, symmetric NAT
is becoming less common as NAT vendors adapt their algorithms to support P2P protocols.
5.4.2 Handling Unsolicited TCP Connections
When a NAT receives a SYN packet on its public side for what appears to be an unsolicited incoming
connection attempt, it is important that the NAT just silently drop the SYN packet. Some NATs
instead actively reject such incoming connections by sending back a TCP RST packet or even an
ICMP error report, which interferes with the TCP hole punching process. Such behavior is not
necessarily fatal, as long as the applications re-try outgoing connection attempts as specified in step
4 of the process described in Section 5.3.2, but the resulting transient errors can make hole punching
take longer.
5.4.3 Leaving Payloads Alone
A few existing NATs are known to scan “blindly” through packet payloads for 4-byte values that
look like IP addresses, and translate them as they would the IP address in the packet header, without
knowing anything about the application protocol in use. This bad behavior fortunately appears to
be uncommon, and applications can easily protect themselves against it by obfuscating IP addresses
they send in messages, for example by sending the bitwise complement of the desired IP address.
5.4.4 Hairpin Translation
Some multi-level NAT situations require hairpin translation support in order for either TCP or UDP
hole punching to work, as described in Section 5.2.5. The scenario shown in Figure 5-6, for ex-
ample, depends on NAT C providing hairpin translation. Support for hairpin translation is unfortu-
nately rare in current NATs, but fortunately so are the network scenarios that require it. Multi-level
138
NAT is becoming more common as IPv4 address space depletion continues, however, so support for
hairpin translation is important in future NAT implementations.
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Chapter 6
UIA Implementation
This chapter describes UIA’s current implementation status. All of the UIA components described
in prior chapters have been prototyped, although these prototypes are not yet feature-complete or
fully integrated into a single easily installable and usable system. UIA represents an ambitious new
networking architecture, and fully implementing and refining it into a robust system ready for pro-
duction use will take substantial additional work. Section 6.1 describes the current implementation
of the personal name system described in Chapter 2, Section 6.2 describes the prototypes of the
three approaches to UIA routing explored in Chapter 3, and Section 6.3 describes the Structured
Stream Transport (SST) prototype.
6.1 Personal Naming Implementation
A UIA prototype implementing the personal naming (Chapter 2) and social routing (Section 3.2)
protocols currently runs on Linux and Mac OS X, and is partially ported to FreeBSD. As illustrated
in Figure 6-1, the prototype consists of two user-level daemons implementing UIA’s naming and
routing layers, respectively, and a graphical application for browsing and controlling devices and
groups. The control application and other UIA-aware applications on the device interface directly
to the naming and routing daemons via Sun RPC. Through these interfaces, UIA-aware applications
can resolve UIA names to EIDs, explore and modify groups on behalf of the user, send packets to
EIDs, receive packets on the device’s EID, and discover peers on the local-area network.
6.1.1 Prototype Status
The UIA prototype’s name daemon is written in Python and implements most of the design de-
scribed in Section 2.3, providing group creation, merging, named links between groups, naming
state gossip, state evaluation, multi-component name resolution, and ownership revocation. The
prototype name daemon does not yet implement certain aspects of the name system design, how-
ever, such as multiple personal EIDs per device (Section 2.3.1), undo of merge operations (Sec-
tion 2.3.3), copying orphaned change records across revocations (Section 2.3.3), and the caching
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Figure 6-1: Structure of UIA prototype implementation
remote name resolution protocol (Section 2.3.6). The prototype routing daemon will be described
later in Section 6.2.
The UIA control application allows the user to browse the UIA namespace and create and mod-
ify groups, as illustrated earlier in Figure 2-3, and supervises the device introduction process as
illustrated in Figure 2-1. The control application is still unpolished and does not yet fully support
shared groups or revocation, however.
The source code for the UIA prototype is available on the Web at:
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/uia/
6.1.2 Support for Smaller Devices
The UIA prototype has been ported to the Nokia 770 Internet Tablet, a Linux-based Internet ap-
pliance with an ARM processor. The naming and routing layers have the full functionality of the
regular Linux/Mac version of UIA, but the port of the GUI control application is not yet complete.
In general, the routing and naming modules should port easily among smaller devices, while the
GUI component requires more modifications because of the more specialized and restrictive user
interface frameworks available on each class of mobile device. UIA does not rely on extensive data
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entry or other forms of user interaction that are fundamentally difficult to achieve on small devices,
however.
6.1.3 Using UIA Names in Legacy Applications
The UIA prototype supports legacy applications through a tun wrapper and DNS proxy. The tun
wrapper disguises EIDs as device-local IP addresses and uses the kernel’s tun device to forward
applications’ TCP and UDP packets for these special IP addresses over UIA’s routing layer. The
DNS proxy similarly intercepts name lookups made by local applications and resolves UIA names
to device-local IP addresses for the corresponding EIDs. We have run Apache, Firefox, OpenSSH,
and Apple’s Personal File Sharing over UIA using this legacy interface without modification or
recompilation.
UIA’s legacy application support layer makes the user’s personal group appear to applications
like a global virtual private network, by intercepting network-local broadcast packets that applica-
tions send to UIA’s special IP addresses and forwarding them securely to each of the user’s personal
devices. Because of this feature, many broadcast-based “local-area” service discovery protocols
such as Bonjour [11] automatically work across all the devices in the user’s personal group, even
when some of the devices are in fact remote. We have used Apple’s Bonjour-based Personal File
Sharing, for example, to locate and share files remotely between devices in a UIA personal group
as if they were present on the same LAN.
6.2 Overlay Routing Implementation
Of the three approaches to UIA overlay routing explored in Chapter 3, only the first (Social Routing)
is fully implemented and deployed in an immediately usable form; the other two currently have only
minimal prototypes suitable for simulation and analysis purposes. We briefly examine each of these
implementations in turn.
6.2.1 Social Routing
The social routing protocol described in Section 3.2 is implemented and in regular use in the UIA
prototype. The social routing overlay protocol is implemented in C++ as a standalone UIA routing
daemon, which interacts with other UIA components via RPC, as illustrated in Figure 6-1.
Local Discovery
The social routing daemon uses Apple’s Bonjour [11] to discover and connect with other devices
that happen to be located on the same local area network. UIA devices use this local-area discov-
ery mechanism for two purposes. First, the UIA naming layer depends on local-area discovery to
implement its secure local introduction process, described in Section 2.2.1. Second, once devices
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are already introduced at the UIA naming layer, the routing layer takes advantage of local-area dis-
covery to find and re-connect with devices that may have moved or changed IP addresses since last
contact, but are now located on the same local-area network. Since the local-area discovery mech-
anism works even if the devices in that LAN are not actually connected to the Internet, through
this local-area discovery mechanism the routing protocol can successfully connect and route to (or
through) devices in small “ad hoc” edge networks not connected to the Internet, such as the ad hoc
network a small group of people might create at a business lunch or on a bus or plane.
Locating and Routing to Remote Devices
To connect with devices that are not directly reachable at their last known IP address or via the
local-area discovery mechanism, the social routing daemon uses the flooding mechanism described
earlier in attempt to find the desired EID within the social network formed by the UIA devices that
are currently reachable. The prototype currently uses SSL [175] over TCP connections to implement
cryptographic EID authentication and provide secure communication between UIA devices.
Rougting Legacy Application Traffic over UIA
As mentioned earlier, the UIA prototype supports legacy applications through a tun wrapper and
DNS proxy. The tun wrapper disguises EIDs as device-local IP addresses and uses the kernel’s
tun device to forward applications’ TCP and UDP packets for these special IP addresses over
UIA’s routing layer. In this way, applications can bind a socket to the local device’s EID or connect
to a remote device by EID.
The current overlay routing layer represents EIDs as “fake” IP version 6 (IPv6) addresses [62],
because the 128-bit size of IPv6 addresses makes it simple to generate these fake addresses uniquely
(with high probability), simply but truncating the cryptographic EID and prepending a prefix denot-
ing these addresses as unique local addresses [111]. No IPv6 infrastructure is required for the UIA
routing daemon to work, however, and all messages forwarded over network links are tunneled
through IPv4 sockets. In any case, the current prototype’s use of IPv6 is purely for convenience; it
could just as well represent EIDs as fake IPv4 addresses, providing full compatibility with applica-
tions that only support IPv4, at a small cost in the complexity of managing the space of fake IPv4
addresses within each host’s address space.
UIA’s legacy application support layer effectively makes the user’s personal group appear to ap-
plications like a global virtual private network, by intercepting network-local broadcast packets that
applications send to UIA’s special IP addresses and forwarding them securely to each of the user’s
personal devices. Because of this feature, many broadcast-based “local-area” service discovery pro-
tocols such as Bonjour automatically work across all the devices in the user’s personal group, even
when some of the devices are in fact remote. We have used Apple’s Bonjour-based Personal File
Sharing, for example, to locate and share files remotely between devices in a UIA personal group
as if they were present on the same LAN.
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6.2.2 Identity Hash Routing
The Identity Hash Routing algorithm described in Section 3.2 is implemented for simulation and
experimental evaluation purposes in about 2300 lines of C++, including a custom simulation testbed.
The prototype implements most of the IHR algorithm as described including the merge procedure,
and supports both source routing and virtual link forwarding. The prototype does not yet simulate a
dynamically evolving network topology in general, but does support simulation of “net split” events
of various magnitudes for purposes of testing the merge procedure.
6.2.3 Compact Routing
The TZk-based compact routing algorithm described in Section 3.4 is implemented for simulation
and experimental evaluation purposes in two versions: a mostly-Python version consisting of about
2000 lines of Python [191] and 630 lines of C to optimize performance-critical calculations, and a
4500-line all-C++ version. The two implementations are mostly equivalent. The prototypes imple-
ment randomized landmark selection and distributed routing tree construction based on simulated
messages, but they do not yet implement address assignment for interval routing or attempt to sim-
ulate dynamically changing networks.
6.3 Structured Stream Transport Implementation
A prototype implementation of the Structured Stream Transport (SST) protocol described in Chap-
ter 4 is implemented and usable in both simulation and real-world network environments, although
not yet complete or integrated with the main UIA prototype. The SST prototype takes the form of
a user-space library written in C++, which runs on Linux, BSD, Mac OS X, and Windows. The
library builds on the Qt portability framework [250], relying on the Core and Network components
of Qt (but not the large graphical user interface component).
The prototype implements the SST protocol atop UDP, so its use requires no special privileges
or OS extensions, and the library can be statically linked into or distributed with applications to
minimize deployment burden on users. Although running transport protocols atop UDP is not the
traditionally accepted and sanctioned approach, this approach has a number of advantages in addi-
tion to application-level deployment, such as compatibility with existing NATs and firewalls [87].
The prototype implements most of the SST protocol design, including classic TCP congestion con-
trol [6], but a few features such as flow control and MTU discovery are still incomplete.
The prototype also allows the application to assign priority levels to streams, for explicit control
of data transmission within the scope of a congestion controlled channel. For controlled testing
and simulation, the library allows client applications to run multiple instances of SST simultane-
ously in one process, and to virtualize SST’s use of the host’s timing and networking facilities.
The prototype currently totals about 13,000 source lines, or 4,400 semicolons, and is available at
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/uia/sst/.
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The source code for the SST prototype is available on the Web at:
http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/uia/sst/
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Chapter 7
Evaluation
This chapter evaluates the various components and algorithms comprising UIA in terms of real-
world experience using the currently-deployed parts of UIA, experimental tests, and simulation
studies.
7.1 Experience Using UIA Personal Names
The primary goal of UIA’s naming system is convenience and usability by non-technical users, a
goal that can only be evaluated effectively once UIA has been deployed longer and more widely
in the field. We currently run the UIA prototype on a number of desktop and laptop machines
in our lab, however, and regularly run existing applications such as SSH over UIA to reach our
mobile devices via their short personal device names, and our personal experience so far confirms
the convenience and simplicity of the basic UIA personal naming model.
Many practical challenges remain before UIA personal naming can be widely deployed, how-
ever. Our decision to implement UIA initially using user-space daemons facilitated UIA’s porta-
bility to multiple operating systems, but its level of integration with any one system is limited: a
production-quality implementation of UIA naming will probably have to be somewhat more OS-
specific in order to integrate cleanly and smoothly. For example, most mature operating systems
provide a clean, OS-sanctioned mechanism to hook into the system’s name resolution mechanism,
whose use would eliminate our prototype’s need to redirect all DNS lookups to a local DNS proxy
and avoid the associated potential confusion if the user manually edits the system’s DNS resolver
configuration. The OS-sanctioned mechanisms to hook into name resolution tend to change com-
pletely from one OS to another, however, so we avoided using them for portability reasons.
7.1.1 Interaction with Global Names and Legacy Applications
One minor pragmatic difficulty we encountered in using UIA personal names in legacy applications
is that certain applications, particularly web browsers like Firefox, assume that any valid DNS host
name must contain at least one period (‘.); otherwise the application interprets the name as some
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other word such as a search term to be submitted to a Web search engine. This “at least one dot”
assumption is valid in the traditional DNS world in which there are only a few top-level domains
(TLDs), none of which represent host names, but becomes invalid in the context of UIA, where
single-component host names are commonplace and represent hosts within the user’s own personal
group. Fortunately, until such applications can be modified to remove this assumption or be made
specifically aware of UIA host names, there is an easy workaround: simply append a period to the
end of the name when typing it: e.g., ‘homepc.’ instead of just ‘homepc’. The recent decision
of ICANN to open up the allocation of new top-level domains [45, 118] may eventually force the
reevaluation of this traditional assumption even in the case of global DNS names.
One danger inherent in UIA’s current behavior of resolving personal names as if they were
global names is the potential confusion that might be caused if the user creates a personal name that
conflicts with a DNS top-level domain. If the user names one of her personal devices ‘com’, for
example, she will no longer be able to refer to any global DNS name ending in ‘.com’. This danger
could be ameliorated by detecting and warning the user if she attempts to create a personal name
that conflicts with a known TLD, and could be avoided entirely at some cost in the conciseness and
convenience of personal names by placing all personal names under some particular “virtual” TLD
such as ‘.pers’. This latter approach would also conveniently avoid the problem mentioned above
of applications that assume every DNS name contains at least one dot.
7.2 Social Routing Evaluation
This section uses real-world experience and simulations to evaluate the Social Routing protocol
implemented in the currently deployed UIA prototype, in order to verify that the proposed design is
capable of providing the desired connectivity on realistic networks.
7.2.1 Experience with Social Routing
We currently run the UIA prototype on a number of desktop and laptop machines in our lab, and
regularly run existing applications such as SSH over UIA to reach our mobile devices via their
short personal device names. The overlay routing protocol automatically accounts for IP address
changes and traverses NATs as necessary; SSH connections open when we take a laptop home need
not be restarted. Although these uses are already possible via alternate protocols such as Mobile
IP, the complexity of configuring these alternatives has generally deterred even those of us with
the necessary technical knowledge from deploying them. We feel that UIA’s zero-configuration
personal naming and connectivity provides a crucial missing element in making mobile devices
usable.
One of the key requirements for the social routing protocol to work reliably is for every user
to have at least one stable, publicly reachable node somewhere in his own or one of his friends’
personal groups. While we found this requirement easy to satisfy since most machines at MIT
and many other universities have their own public IP address, this requirement could prove more
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of a problem for users whose only “stable” desktop machines are located behind home and/or cor-
porate firewalls and NATs. Although we implemented the default peer mechanism described in
Section 3.2.1 to address this difficulty, UIA has not yet seen sufficient deployment among such
users to evaluate this issue thoroughly.
7.2.2 Experimental Setup
We use as our simulated network a crawl of the social networking site Orkut gathered by Li and
Dabek [146]. This graph is merely suggestive; until UIA is more widely deployed, it will not be
clear how accurately the Orkut graph characterizes UIA’s likely usage model. The graph has 2,363
users, which we take to represent devices, as if each user owned one device. Friend relationships
are bidirectional, and the number of friends per user is highly skewed: the median is only 7, but the
most popular user has over 1,000.
Our simulator takes as input a percent stable parameter and randomly chooses that percent of
the devices to be stable and publicly accessible. All other devices the simulator considers to be
mobile and inaccessible except through some stable device, as if behind a NAT. We assume that all
devices agree as to which devices are stable.
Each device chooses 16 peers and allows at most 64 devices to choose it, to limit each device’s
overlay maintenance cost in a real network. Devices choose peers in order of friendship distance.
A device can only choose a given target as a peer if the target does not already have 64 peers, or if
the new device is closer than one of the target’s existing peers, in which case the target discards a
random peer at higher friendship distance. Since we do not yet have traces with which to simulate
the network’s evolution, the simulated devices choose peers in random order, iterating until the
network reaches a fixed point.
The simulator then performs token-limited location requests on the resulting overlay between
10,000 random pairs at friendship distances 1, 2, and 3. Each lookup starts with 16 tokens, and
doubles after each failure, up to a maximum of 256 tokens. The simulator records the percentage of
requests that succeed after a given number of rounds and the total number of messages sent.
7.2.3 Location Success Rate
An important performance metric for the location algorithm is the number of tokens needed to
locate a target device successfully. Using more tokens increases the chance of success (assuming
that the overlay is in fact connected), but also increases the cost of concluding that an unreachable
device is offline. Figure 7-1 shows the success rate measured in the simulation for locating devices
at friendship distance 1. Using 256 tokens, the location algorithm achieves greater than a 99.5%
success rate for 10% or more stable devices. Using 64 tokens the algorithm achieves 97.5% success
for 10% or more stable devices. The vast majority of requests—80% of requests at 10% or more
stable devices—succeed within the first inexpensive round of 16 tokens.
At the far left of the graph where few stable devices are available, the success rate drops off
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Figure 7-1: Location request success rate
because each stable device can only support 64 peers, and there are not enough stable devices for
each mobile device to choose a full 16 peers, or in some cases any. As the percentage of stable
devices increases, a linearly increasing number of location requests are to stable devices that can be
contacted directly without flooding, thus requiring no tokens.
We also measured the success rates for locating devices at friendship distances of 2 and 3,
though we omit these graphs for space reasons. The results for distance 2 are almost as good as for
distance 1, presumably because two devices at friendship distance 2 are likely to peer with some
common stable device at distance 1 from each of them. Success rate drops considerably at distance
3, however, achieving only 50% success with 256 tokens in networks of 40% or more stable devices,
for example.
7.2.4 Messages Sent
The lower line in Figure 7-2 shows the total number of messages sent during successful token-
limited lookup requests for devices at friendship distance 1. A request’s message count is ultimately
bounded by its token count, but is often much less because successful lookups usually do not require
all available tokens.
At the left edge of the graph, there are not enough stable devices for every mobile device to
have a peer, so few requests succeed. Those that do succeed do so cheaply, however, because all
of the connected mobile devices have clustered around the same few stable devices. The message
count peaks near the point where the number of stable devices becomes barely sufficient to serve all
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Figure 7-2: Mean messages sent per location request
of the mobile devices, so the requests usually succeed but only after contacting many devices. As
the number of stable devices increases further, more requests complete without flooding at all, since
stable targets are reachable directly at their last known IP addresses.
To contrast UIA’s token-limited scheme with flooding limited by hop count [42], the upper line
in the figure shows the total number of messages sent for successful hop count-controlled location
requests in which the originating device knows via an oracle the exact hop count required for the
search to succeed in one round. As the graph shows, the token-based scheme requires far fewer
messages than even this “ideal” hop count-limited scheme. The inefficiency of the hop count scheme
results from the skewed popularity distribution and redundancy of the friendship graph, as discussed
in Section 3.2.2.
7.3 Identity Hash Routing Evaluation
Although Identity Hash Routing (IHR) is not yet fully implemented as a usable distributed protocol
or integrated into the UIA prototype, in this section we use simulation results to evaluate the po-
tential utility of IHR’s routing and forwarding algorithms for a future version of UIA. Until a full
implementation has been deployed and a substantial critical mass of users has developed, simula-
tions provide the only realistic option for tuning the protocol and predicting how it will behave on
the large networks it is intended to support.
151
7.3.1 Performance Metrics
In order to asses the basic viability of the IHR routing protocol, we focus here on measuring the
efficiency of the network paths the protocol finds through random network topologies. Many other
important factors that will affect the performance of real-world IHR networks remain for future
study. In particular, while simulations confirm that the protocol recovers from random node failures
and network partitions, we do not yet have a full characterization of the dynamic behavior of a IHR
network under continuous change.
In order to measure the efficiency of routing paths chosen by IHR nodes, we define the IHR
path length between two nodes n1 and n2 to be the total number of physical hops in the path that
n1 constructs to n2 using the build path procedure in Figure 3-4. We define the stretch between
n1 and n2 to be the ratio of the IHR path length to the length of the best possible path through the
underlying topology.
We measure the stretch for a given pair of nodes by using build path to construct a path from
one node to the other, measuring the total number of physical hops in the path, and then eliminating
all the virtual links that build path constructed so that the measurement of one path does not affect
the measurement of subsequent paths. On networks of 100 nodes or less we measure all possible
paths between any two nodes; on larger networks we take a sample of 10,000 randomly chosen node
pairs.
7.3.2 Test Network Topology
Selecting appropriate network topologies for simulations of IHR is difficult, because we have no
way to predict the topologies of the networks on which a protocol like IHR will actually be deployed.
Using topological maps of the existing IPv4 Internet would not make sense: the existing well-
connected Internet is precisely the portion of today’s global network infrastructure across which
IHR will not have to find paths, because IP already does that well enough, and IHR simply treats
these paths as direct physical links. For the function IHR is designed provide, finding paths between
nodes on the Internet and nodes on the many private and ad hoc networks attached to it, no reliable
topological data is available precisely because most of these adjoining networks are private.
Nevertheless, we can construct artificial topologies that approximate the most important char-
acteristics we believe this global network infrastructure to have. First, we expect the topology on
which IHR is deployed to consist of many clusters, in which each node in a given cluster can reliably
address and connect with any other node in the same cluster, but nodes in one cluster have limited
connectivity to nodes in other clusters. Second, because of the diversity of existing networking
technologies and deployment scenarios, we expect the size of these clusters to follow a power law
distribution, with larger clusters having better connectivity to neighboring clusters. Finally, we ex-
pect all of these clusters to be within at most a few hops from a single huge, central cluster, namely
the public IP-based Internet.
To construct an artificial topology having these characteristics, we start with a single distin-
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guished cluster we will call the root cluster, initially containing a single node. We then randomly
“grow” the network one node at a time as follows. For each new node, we choose the number of
attachment points the node will have based on a geometric random variable with a multihoming
probability parameter pm. Approximately pmN of the network’s N nodes will have at least two
attachment points, p2mN have at least three attachment points, and so on.
We choose each attachment point for a new node via a random walk from the root cluster using
a downstream probability parameter pd and a new cluster probability parameter pn. At each step,
with probability pd we move the attachment point downstream, and with probability 1 − pd we
terminate the process. To move the attachment point downstream, we choose a node at random
from the current cluster, then we either create a new cluster “private” to that node with probability
pn, or else we with probability 1− pn we pick at random any cluster that node is attached to (which
could be the cluster we just came from). Once the random walk terminates, we add the new node to
the cluster at which the walk ended.
We call the resulting random network topology a rooted topology, since it consists of many
small clusters centered around the single large root cluster, approximating the well-connected IP-
based Internet surrounded by many smaller private networks.
We choose somewhat arbitrarily the following “baseline” parameters for the experiments. We
use network topologies of varying sizes constructed with a multihoming probability pm = 1/10,
a downstream probability pd = 3/4, and new link probability pn = 1/2. On these topologies we
build IHR networks with a redundancy factor k = 3, by adding nodes to the network one at a time in
random order. We will vary these parameters to explore their impact on the efficiency of the routing
protocol.
7.3.3 Source Routing versus Recursive Tunneling
Figure 7-3 shows the average and maximum path stretch observed (vertical axis) between any two
nodes on networks of a given size (horizontal axis), for both source routing and recursive tunnel-
ing. The error bars indicate standard deviation of the measured stretch. In the random 10,000-node
rooted topology, the root cluster contains 3233 nodes (32% of the network), the average distance be-
tween any two nodes is 2.5 hops, and the maximum distance between any two nodes (total network
diameter) is 8 hops.
With both source routing and recursive tunneling, we see that the IHR routing protocol con-
sistently finds paths that are on average no more than twice as long as the best possible path. The
average-case efficiency of recursive tunneling is slightly worse than for source routing, due to the
more limited amount of information nodes have to optimize paths they find through the network.
The routing protocol occasionally chooses bad paths—up to 6× stretch for source routing and up
to 16× for recursive tunneling—but the low standard deviation indicates that these bad paths occur
rarely.
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7.3.4 Rooted versus Unrooted Networks
We would next like to determine how much the IHR routing protocol benefits from the tree-like
structure of rooted network topologies. Is the IHR routing protocol only viable when some underly-
ing protocol such as IP is doing most of the work of routing within the large central cluster, or could
IHR routing also be used to internetwork a number of small link-layer networks joined in ad-hoc
fashion?
To explore this question, we modify the random network creation procedure of Section 7.3.2 so
that the random walk to find each new attachment point for a given starts at a cluster chosen uni-
formly at random from all existing clusters, rather than at a well-known root cluster. The resulting
unrooted topologies have a much more uniform and unpolarized distribution in their cluster sizes
and in the connections between clusters. In the random 10,000-node unrooted topology, for exam-
ple, the largest cluster contains only 11 nodes, the average distance between any two nodes is 7.7
hops, and the network diameter is 19 hops. We expect efficient routing on such a diffuse network to
be more difficult than on a rooted network.
Figure 7-4 compares the path efficiency of IHR source route-based forwarding on rooted and
unrooted networks of varying sizes. We find that unrooted networks indeed yield greater stretch,
but not by a wide margin. This result suggests that IHR routing is not highly dependent on rooted
topologies and may be useable as well on more diffuse topologies.
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Figure 7-4: Network path stretch for rooted versus unrooted networks
7.3.5 Discussion and Future Work
The above development and evaluation of IHR suggests that the basic approach of adapting DHT
lookup algorithms into overlay routing schemes may indeed be viable. Since IHR has so far only
been analyzed under simulation and is not integrated into the deployed UIA prototype, however, it
is likely that many practical issues will still need to be addressed in order to make it into a robust
distributed protocol.
One potential issue with the scheme as described above is the danger of temporary routing
loops developing between nodes due to dynamic changes in the network topology. For example,
with forwarding based on recursive tunneling, if node A has a virtual link through B to C , then
B’s physical link to C fails, B might see A’s advertised (virtual) link to C and try to use it to build
a virtual link to C through B. These mutually recursive virtual links will eventually time out and
be garbage collected, but the resulting loop could cause considerable network inefficiency and slow
routing table convergence in the meantime. These issues are not different from the looping issues
of classic Bellman-Ford routing, however, and the many solutions to this problem that have been
explored in the context of traditional routing protocols are likely to be applicable to IHR as well.
A second, somewhat more serious challenge with IHR is the security of the distributed routing
structure against the variety of disruption or denial-of-service attacks that malicious nodes might
mount. These threats have already received considerable attention in the context of traditional DHT
lookup schemes [40,67,222,232], and many of the proposed remedies may apply to IHR as well, but
fully understanding the similarities and differences between DHT lookup and DHT-inspired overlay
routing for security purposes will require further analysis. One approach that may be particularly
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useful in the context of UIA is to build on the social trust framework provided by UIA’s naming
layer, as the Sprout DHT does [153].
IHR lacks a formal bound on stretch—i.e., on the inefficiency of the paths it finds. Furthermore,
the typical stretch measured in the above simulations may be reasonable in practice, when multi-hop
UIA routing is only needed as a “backup solution” when IP routing provides no path at all, but is
not what we might hope for. In the next section, therefore, we explore the use of routing schemes
that can guarantee bounded stretch on any topologies—though as we will see there are downsides
to these schemes as well.
7.4 Compact Routing Evaluation
As with IHR, the TZk-based compact routing protocol has not yet been developed into a fully op-
erational protocol ready for use on real-world networks, but this section uses simulations to analyze
a variety of general properties of the protocol that are likely to be important to its practical utility.
We first examine stretch, then congestion of network routes, and finally robustness against failures
in the network. Although these are far from the only properties important for practical deployment,
these first-step results appear promising and help confirm the protocol’s scalability and understand
the remaining challenges to be addressed.
7.4.1 Simulation Framework and Method
The simulated message-based compact routing protocol builds on a custom, lightweight simulation
framework in C++, because we found existing simulation frameworks insufficiently scalable to
handle the large graph sizes we wished to test (over 190,000 nodes in one case). The current
simulation environment and routing protocol represents a second generation to an earlier Python-
based simulator, which yielded comparable results on smaller graphs but did not scale sufficiently
to handle the largest ones.
Due to the unavailability of realistic network topology datasets or generators that included use-
ful edge weights—e.g., measured round-trip delays between network nodes—we did not try to
model time realistically in our protocol. Instead, all simulated nodes perform protocol processing
in lock step: they receive messages from neighbors, process them, and send new messages to their
neighbors in one time step, and once sent, messages arrive at their destinations one time step later.
The simulated protocol selects landmarks randomly so as to reduce the expected number of land-
marks by a factor of two at each level, yielding about log2 n landmark levels for an n-node topology.
Given this landmark selection, the protocol computes compact routing trees in the way described
earlier in Section 3.4.4, where at each time step each node gossips all new routing table informa-
tion with its neighbors. The routing tables of all nodes thus gradually converge toward shortest-path
routes to their landmarks in similar fashion to classic Bellman-Ford routing protocols—with the key
difference of course that each node does not end up with routing table pointers to all other nodes
but merely a selection of nearby landmarks at each level. Our current protocol does not solve the
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Name Description
mesh random 2D mesh on a Euclidean plane
scale-free scale-free graph generated by preferential attachment
regular random regular graph
Table 7.1: Synthetic topologies used for simulation
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Figure 7-5: Maximum stretch relative to shortest-path routes
well-known “counting to infinity” problem of Bellman-Ford protocols, but many existing solutions
to this problem such as destination sequencing [184] (or in this case “landmark sequencing”) are
applicable.
For comparison, we evaluate the compact protocol’s performance on several different types
of synthetic networks of varying size, as well as topologies from Skitter [38] and DIMES [246]
derived from actual Internet measurements. The types of synthetic topologies we used are shown in
Table 7.1. The “mesh” generator places nodes randomly on a 2D plane and connects all nodes closer
than a certain radius. This is an approximate model for wireless ad-hoc networks. The “scale-free”
generator starts with a loosely-connected network, and connects nodes with probability proportional
to their degree. The Internet’s core exhibits some scale-free-like properties. The “regular” generator
creates a random d-regular graph. It exercises the behavior of the protocol on highly disordered
networks.
7.4.2 Stretch
After running the compact routing protocol to produce routing trees, the simulation chooses 10
random routing targets per node, measures the length of the paths chosen by the routing protocol,
and compares it against the shortest path length computed via Dijkstra’s single-source shortest path
algorithm to compute path stretch. (It was not practical to evaluate all pairs on the larger networks
because of the O(n2) time required.) Figure 7-5 shows the maximum measured stretch observed
on all sampled paths, and Figure 7-6 shows average stretch. The figure presents measurements for
two versions of the protocol in each case: the “Pure TZk” version conforms to the original TZk
algorithm, and the “With 25 extra table entries” version permits each node to grow its routing table
by as many as 25 entries beyond the minimum number required for pure TZk—a fairly arbitrary
“slop factor” that we use to get an idea of the sensitivity of the routing algorithm to routing table
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Figure 7-6: Average stretch relative to shortest-path routes
size. These extra entries are distributed evenly over all the levels of the routing table, which gives
the optimal benefit to the maximum stretch bound. The number of levels in these simulations is
always log2 n, which gives small TZk routing tables and O(log n) max stretch.
Krioukov et al. [140] formally analyzed the average-case stretch of another compact routing
algorithm presented by Thorup and Zwick in the same paper as TZk [247], which we call TZ2
because it uses a fixed two-level landmark hierarchy. They later compared the stretch of TZ2 and
several other 2-level, stretch 3 algorithms via simulations [141]. Although TZ2 selects landmarks
and constructs routing tables somewhat differently from TZk, the resulting behavior is conceptually
similar for purposes of computing stretch: namely, a message from a node u to a node v follows a
shortest path directly from u to v if the two nodes are close together, and otherwise takes a shortest
path from u toward v’s closest landmark l followed by a shortest path from l toward v—which is
equivalent to routing on a shortest-path tree rooted at l. Therefore, although no formal average-case
stretch analysis of TZk has been done yet, there is reason to believe that a similar analysis might
yield similar results. Krioukov’s specific stretch results are not directly comparable to ours despite
this conceptual similarity, however, because the TZ2 algorithm they evaluated uses a fixed 2-level
with
√
n size routing tables, whereas the simulations done here use a variable number of landmark
levels (approximately log2 n) with O(log n) size routing tables.
7.4.3 Route Congestion
Because TZk routes all “long-distance” traffic over a few large trees rooted at the top-level land-
marks, a high percentage of this long-distance traffic passes through or near these top-level land-
marks, causing high path congestion in the links around them. To evaluate the congestion bot-
tleneck, the simulation computes the routes chosen by the compact routing protocol between all
random pairs, and counts the number of routes that pass through the most congested edge in the net-
work. Figure 7-7 shows the maximum congestion measured for the routing protocol divided by the
congestion measured for shortest-path distance-vector routing, for both the original TZk algorithm
and the protocol with extra routing table entries.
We observe that extra table entries improve congestion considerably, although congestion around
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Figure 7-7: Network congestion relative to shortest-path routes
# nodes Stretch Rel. Cong.
Skitter (TZ) 7,536 1.67 45.8
. . . (25 entries) 7,536 1.32 3.42
Skitter-RTR (TZ) 192,245 1.53 26.9
. . . (25 entries) 192,245 1.33 4.87
DIMES (TZ) 16,847 2.08 29.2
. . . (25 entries) 16,847 1.19 0.79
Table 7.2: Skitter and DIMES simulations, with and without optimizations.
high-level landmarks still unavoidably occurs. Some level of congestion is probably acceptable in
a deployment of compact routing on real networks, because real networks are typically designed
to aggregate many low-capacity edge links and “bundle” them over a high-capacity core [148]. As
long as the high-level landmarks used by the routing protocol are deliberately chosen to be nodes
within that high-capacity core, this congestion around high-level landmarks may in effect turn out
to be exactly what the network operator is seeking. If congestion does turn out to be a problem, the
protocol provide a means for operators to trade off congestion for routing table size, the same as for
stretch.
Measurements on AS adjacency graphs from skitter [38] and DIMES [246] are shown in Ta-
ble 7.2, along with one skitter router-adjacency graph. These datasets have a small number of highly
connected nodes, which tends to result in high congestion near the hubs. The pure TZk approach
has high congestion relative to shortest-paths; the modified protocol does considerably better with
only 25 extra table entries.
7.4.4 Reliability
Since recomputation of all compact routing trees in response to any topology change may be expen-
sive [141], we would like to avoid this cost when possible and instead take advantage of the natural
redundancy provided by the protocol’s many separate routing trees in order to “route around” tem-
porary failures. In this way, no recomputation of routing trees is necessary as a result of such
temporary failures; instead any end hosts trying to communicate through a broken link simply try a
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Figure 7-8: Resiliency to network failures
different routing tree instead.
To determine the effectiveness of the protocol at providing robustness in this way, we examine
the failure rate of routing attempts when some percentage of network edges are randomly disabled,
breaking any tree routing paths using those edges. For this test the protocol is configured for full
redundancy (r = ∞): i.e., each node’s global address contains all the nodes in its routing table.
Figure 7-8 shows the routing failure rate over the random edge failure rate on the Skitter topology,
with several settings for the number of extra landmarks each node collects at each level. From
this graph we observe that the protocol provide substantial resilience at least against small numbers
of randomly-distributed failures, especially when a considerable set of landmarks are available in
which to seek a usable routing tree.
Of course, failures on real networks are often not randomly distributed; evaluating our protocol
under more sophisticated failure models remains for future work.
7.5 Structured Stream Transport Evaluation
This section reports on preliminary experience implementing and using SST in real and simulated
environments. We examine how SST scales across transaction sizes in comparison with TCP and
UDP, how Web-style transactions on SST compare with non-persistent, persistent, and pipelined
HTTP over TCP, and how applications can dynamically prioritize SST streams to improve interac-
tive responsiveness.
7.5.1 Experience with Applications
The SST prototype is in regular use by Netsteria, an experimental peer-to-peer application support-
ing text-based chat, voice-over-IP calling and conferencing, and swarming file transfers. As the
application is primarily a vehicle for exploring networking ideas such as SST, it focuses little atten-
tion on backward compatibility or interoperability with existing application protocols on existing
transports.
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Netsteria’s combination of different types of network activities operating concurrently serves
well to exercise SST’s capabilities and drive its development. The file transfer mechanism, for
example, divides files into variable-length blocks and uses a separate SST stream for each block
request/reply transaction, making use of SST’s scalability over transaction sizes. The voice chat
mechanism uses SST’s ephemeral substreams to transmit small media frames efficiently with best-
effort delivery to minimize latency.
7.5.2 Performance Validation
To test SST’s basic performance against the “gold standard” of TCP, we first run microbenchmarks
of raw bandwidth and TCP-friendliness on three transports: the SST prototype, the host operating
system’s native TCP, and a user-space TCP implementation that was developed alongside the SST
library for comparison purposes. Though the native TCPs are more mature, the user-space TCP
can run on either a real or simulated network like the SST library. Since SST always uses selective
acknowledgments, the user-space TCP implements TCP’s SACK extension to ensure a fair com-
parison, as do the native TCP stacks on the hosts used for testing. Since TCP does not provide
cryptographic security, the benchmarks run SST in its comparable checksum-based authentication
mode.
Downloading a 10MB file from a PC running SuSE Linux 10.0 to a MacBook Pro running Mac
OS 10.4.8 over a real 1.5Mbps DSL connection, and taking the best of three runs to factor out out
possible delays caused by unrelated system daemon activity, SST was measured to be 1.0% slower
than native TCP, and user-space TCP was 2.1% slower—a difference barely out of the noise, but
attributable to the overhead of implementing transports outside the kernel atop UDP. Running the
same benchmark over an 802.11g wireless LAN providing about 18Mbps maximum throughput,
SST was 7.1% slower than native TCP, and user-space TCP was 3.6% slower. These results sug-
gest that even the unoptimized SST prototype performs adequately on “consumer-grade” networks,
although a more optimized implementation would be desired on high-speed networks. Comparing
SST against the user-space TCP on simulated networks with similar parameters, the two transports
exhibited identical performance to within 0.2%.
The second benchmark runs two downloads at once—one using the native TCP, the other using
either SST or the user-space TCP—to verify “TCP-friendly” congestion control behavior. The
user-space transports were found to be fair, and just barely less aggressive than native TCP: SST
takes a 48.8% bandwidth share against native TCP’s 51.2% share, and the user-space TCP takes
48.1% against native TCP’s 51.9%. This result is unsurprising given that both user-space transports
implement the classic TCP congestion control schemes.
7.5.3 Scalability over Transaction Size
We now compare SST against TCP and UDP when used for Web-style transactions in which the
request is small but the response varies in size. Since we wish to examine how SST’s performance
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Figure 7-9: Transactional use of UDP, TCP, and SST over a 216× range of transaction sizes.
scales when the application uses transport instances to match its transaction structure, this test uses
one SST or TCP stream per transaction as in HTTP/1.0, leaving HTTP/1.1 persistent streams to the
next section. The UDP test operates as in DNS or RPC, with each request datagram soliciting a
single response datagram.
Figure 7-9 shows client-observed transaction latency on a log/log plot for responses ranging
from 32 bytes to two megabytes, measured on the real 1.5Mbps DSL connection described above,
which has about 50ms minimum latency. For small transactions where network latency dominates,
TCP takes twice as long as UDP due to its 3-way handshake. UDP ceases functioning beyond
around 8KB due to middleboxes on the test connection, and IP version 4 limits datagrams to 64KB
in any case. In this test the network connection was quiescent and no UDP datagrams were lost,
but in a second test whose results are not shown, on a connection loaded with two concurrent long-
running TCP downloads, the effective UDP datagram loss rate often exceeded 50% even at the
widely-used 8KB datagram size.
As the graph shows, SST can create new streams for small transactions with the same low
latency as UDP, while scaling to support long-running transfers. The SST test runs its transactions
over a “warm” communication channel already set up by the negotiation protocol, representing
the common case in which a client makes multiple requests to the same server. Even without a
warm channel, SST can piggyback the first application request and response data segments onto
the negotiation protocol packets if cryptographic security is not required and the responder is not
heavily loaded, retaining a total latency of one round trip. Otherwise, SST adds one round trip delay
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Figure 7-10: Web workload comparing single-transaction SST streams against four HTTP flavors
over TCP.
for channel setup.
7.5.4 Web Traffic Workload
HTTP/1.1 addressed the inefficiency of short-lived TCP streams through persistent connections,
which are now in common use, and pipelining, which is not. Since SST attempts to offer the
benefits of persistent streams with the simplicity of the one-transaction-per-stream model, we now
compare SST against the behavior of several flavors of HTTP over TCP, under a simulated web
workload. While HTTP is a useful protocol for comparison purposes because it is well-understood
and supports several connection schemes, the issues we explore here are not specific to HTTP but
apply to any application protocol based on a request/response model.
For this test we simulate a series of web page loads, each page consisting of a “primary” HTTP
request for the HTML, followed by a batch of “secondary” requests for embedded objects such as
images. As the simulation’s workload we use a fragment of the UC Berkeley Home IP web client
traces available from the Internet Traffic Archive [120]. We sort the trace by client IP address so
that each user’s activities are contiguous, then we use only the order and sizes of requests to drive
the simulation, ignoring time stamps. Since the traces do not indicate which requests belong to
one web page, the simulation approximates this information by classifying requests by extension
into “primary” (e.g., ‘.html’ or no extension) and “secondary” (e.g., ‘gif’, ‘.jpg’, ‘.class’),
and then associating each contiguous run of secondary requests with the immediately preceding
primary request. The simulation pessimistically assumes that the browser cannot begin requesting
secondary objects until it has downloaded the primary object completely, but at this point it can in
theory request all of the secondary objects in parallel. This assumption may slightly decrease the
amount of potential parallelism available to any of the downloading schemes tested: since SST is
designed to take maximum advantage of available parallelism, any experimental error caused by
this assumption is merely likely to make SST’s benefit appear less in the simulations than it would
be in reality.
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Figure 7-10 shows a scatter plot of the total duration of each web page load against the total
size of all downloads for that page, on the simulated 1.5Mbps network used in Section 7.5.2. The
plot is divided into five groups by the total number of HTTP requests per web page. The leftmost
group, for pages with no secondary requests, has a best-case load time half that of other groups,
because in the latter groups secondary requests do not start until the primary request completes.
The points labeled “HTTP/1.0 serial” reflect the behavior of early web browsers that load pages by
opening TCP connections for each request sequentially, “HTTP/1.0 parallel” represents browsers
that open up to eight single-transaction TCP streams in parallel, “HTTP/1.1 persistent” represents
modern browsers that use up to two concurrent persistent TCP streams as per RFC 2616 [78], and
“HTTP/1.1 pipelined” uses two concurrent streams with up to four pipelined requests each. The
SST case uses one transaction per stream, as in HTTP/1.0, but imposes no limit on the number of
parallel streams. As the graph indicates, HTTP/1.0 over SST achieves performance comparable to
pipelined HTTP/1.1 streams over TCP, both of which are much faster than other methods, including
the current common case of persistent but non-pipelined TCP streams.
7.5.5 Dynamic Prioritization
In a final experiment, we consider a hypothetical SST-enabled web browser in which a user views a
“photo album” page containing several large images. Traditional browsers load the images on a page
from top to bottom, so if the user immediately scrolls within the page after opening it, or clicks on a
link to a text anchor somewhere in the middle of the page, she must wait until the browser loads the
(probably invisible) images above the visible area before the desired images begin to appear. Our
SST-enabled browser instead expedites the loading of the image(s) within the currently visible scroll
area—perhaps in particular the image immediately under the user’s mouse pointer. In this scenario,
the image to be expedited might change at any time as the user scrolls the window or moves the
mouse.
With persistent or pipelined TCP connections, the browser cannot change the order of requests
already in the pipeline, but with SST the browser and web server can cooperate to achieve the desired
result. The client specifies an initial priority for each request it submits, and changes the priority of
a request already in progress by spawning a temporary substream from the request’s original stream
and sending a short “change priority” message on this substream. On receipt, the server attaches this
new priority level to the appropriate SST stream on its end, causing its stream layer to transmit data
for high-priority streams before others. This prioritization feature required no changes to the SST
protocol as described in Section 4.4, and only a minor API extension to the SST implementation for
the server’s use. The server could theoretically also use the client’s priority information to control
other processing resources on behalf of the client, such as the relative priorities of disk reads or
threads performing CGI computations.
Figure 7-11 shows the behavior observed by the client in a simple scenario on the usual sim-
ulated 1.5Mbps network. At time zero the client requests two 1.5MB files at normal priority, and
the server divides return bandwidth evenly between them. At five seconds the client submits a
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Stream Delivery Datagram Delivery
SST TCP SCTP SST UDP DCCP
Data Packet 20 20 28 16 8 12
Ack Packet 20 20 28 16 — 16
Sack Packet 20 32+ 28+ 16 — 20+
Data + Ack 20 20 44 16 — 16
Data + Sack 20 32+ 44+ 16 — 20+
Table 7.3: Transport layer header overhead
third request labeled high-priority, causing the server to commit all bandwidth to the new request,
temporarily blocking the old ones. At ten seconds the client submits two priority change requests,
changing Request 1 to high-priority and Request 3 to normal, and the client observes the prior-
ity changes take effect one round-trip later. When Request 1 finally completes, the remaining two
requests again divide available bandwidth evenly until they complete as well.
7.5.6 Wire Efficiency
Minimizing the per-packet overhead of transport layer headers is important to many applications,
especially voice applications that frequently send frames only a few bytes in size. Table 7.3 com-
pares SST’s header overhead in bytes against the minimal overhead imposed by several other trans-
ports. The numbers for SST include the 32-bit lightweight checksum that SST uses in its non-
cryptographic security mode, but do not include a UDP encapsulation header since SST could be
run directly atop IP like the other transports. The DCCP numbers are for DCCP’s short header
format, which uses 24-bit sequence numbers instead of 48-bit at the cost of weakening the protocol
against packet forgery attacks. SST also transmits 24-bit sequence numbers in packets, but does not
rely on them to protect against forgery, instead relying on 32-bit keyed checksums that depend on
full 64-bit internal sequence numbers. SST effectively provides most of the functionality of SCTP
and DCCP, along with structured stream support not available in any existing transport, with no
more wire overhead than basic TCP.
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SST TCP SCTP DCCP RDP UDP
Prototype 4400 540
Linux 2.6.20 5400 8000 2900 630
FreeBSD 5.4 4400 510
4.3BSD 990 900 170
Table 7.4: Transport code size (semicolon count)
7.5.7 Implementation Size
For a rough comparison of implementation complexity, Table 7.4 shows the code size of several
transports measured in number of semicolons. The top line shows the user-space C++ implemen-
tations of SST and TCP used in the above experiments; the other lines show existing transports
written in C. The user-space TCP is “bare-bones” and implements only the TCP features needed for
the above experiments. The SST prototype will no doubt grow as it matures, but it already includes
cryptographic security functionality that none of the other transports do. In comparison, libssl
from OpenSSL 0.9.8e is about 13,000 semicolons (41,000 lines).
7.6 NAT Traversal Evaluation
To evaluate the robustness of the TCP and UDP hole punching techniques described in Chapter 5 on
a variety of existing NATs, we implemented and distributed a test program called NAT Check [171],
and solicited data from Internet users about their NATs.
NAT Check’s primary purpose is to test NATs for the two behavioral properties most crucial to
reliable UDP and TCP hole punching: namely, consistent identity-preserving endpoint translation
(Section 5.4.1), and silently dropping unsolicited incoming TCP SYNs instead of rejecting them
with RSTs or ICMP errors (Section 5.4.2). In addition, NAT Check separately tests whether the
NAT supports hairpin translation (Section 5.4.4), and whether the NAT filters unsolicited incoming
traffic at all. This last property does not affect hole punching, but provides a useful indication the
NAT’s firewall policy.
NAT Check makes no attempt to test every relevant facet of NAT behavior individually: a wide
variety of subtle behavioral differences are known, some of which are difficult to test reliably [124].
Instead, NAT Check merely attempts to answer the question, “how commonly can the proposed hole
punching techniques be expected to work on deployed NATs, under typical network conditions?”
7.6.1 Test Method
NAT Check consists of a client program to be run on a machine behind the NAT to be tested,
and three well-known servers at different global IP addresses. The client cooperates with the three
servers to check the NAT behavior relevant to both TCP and UDP hole punching. The client program
is small and relatively portable, currently running on Windows, Linux, BSD, and Mac OS X. The
machines hosting the well-known servers all run FreeBSD.
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Figure 7-12: NAT check test method for UDP
UDP Test: To test the NAT’s behavior for UDP, the client opens a socket and binds it to a local
UDP port, then successively sends “ping”-like requests to servers 1 and 2, as shown in Figure 7-12.
These servers each respond to the client’s pings with a reply that includes the client’s public UDP
endpoint: the client’s own IP address and UDP port number as observed by the server. If the two
servers report the same public endpoint for the client, NAT Check assumes that the NAT properly
preserves the identity of the client’s private endpoint, satisfying the primary precondition for reliable
UDP hole punching.
When server 2 receives a UDP request from the client, besides replying directly to the client it
also forwards the request to server 3, which in turn replies to the client from its own IP address.
If the NAT’s firewall properly filters “unsolicited” incoming traffic on a per-session basis, then the
client never sees these replies from server 3, even though they are directed at the same public port
as the replies from servers 1 and 2.
To test the NAT for hairpin translation support, the client simply opens a second UDP socket at
a different local port and uses it to send messages to the public endpoint representing the client’s
first UDP socket, as reported by server 2. If these messages reach the client’s first private endpoint,
then the NAT supports hairpin translation.
TCP Test: The TCP test follows a similar pattern as for UDP. The client uses a single local
TCP port to initiate outbound sessions to servers 1 and 2, and checks whether the public endpoints
reported by servers 1 and 2 are the same, the first precondition for reliable TCP hole punching.
The NAT’s response to unsolicited incoming connection attempts also impacts the speed and
reliability of TCP hole punching, however, so NAT Check also tests this behavior. When server 2
receives the client’s request, instead of immediately replying to the client, it forwards a request to
server 3 and waits for server 3 to respond with a “go-ahead” signal. When server 3 receives this
forwarded request, it attempts to initiate an inbound connection to the client’s public TCP endpoint.
167
UDP TCP
Hole Hole
Punching Hairpin Punching Hairpin
NAT Hardware
Linksys 45/46 (98%) 5/42 (12%) 33/38 (87%) 3/38 (8%)
Netgear 31/37 (84%) 3/35 (9%) 19/30 (63%) 0/30 (0%)
D-Link 16/21 (76%) 11/21 (52%) 9/19 (47%) 2/19 (11%)
Draytek 2/17 (12%) 3/12 (25%) 2/7 (29%) 0/7 (0%)
Belkin 14/14 (100%) 1/14 (7%) 11/11 (100%) 0/11 (0%)
Cisco 12/12 (100%) 3/9 (33%) 6/7 (86%) 2/7 (29%)
SMC 12/12 (100%) 3/10 (30%) 8/9 (89%) 2/9 (22%)
ZyXEL 7/9 (78%) 1/8 (13%) 0/7 (0%) 0/7 (0%)
3Com 7/7 (100%) 1/7 (14%) 5/6 (83%) 0/6 (0%)
OS-based NAT
Windows 31/33 (94%) 11/32 (34%) 16/31 (52%) 28/31 (90%)
Linux 26/32 (81%) 3/25 (12%) 16/24 (67%) 2/24 (8%)
FreeBSD 7/9 (78%) 3/6 (50%) 2/3 (67%) 1/1 (100%)
All Vendors 310/380 (82%) 80/335 (24%) 184/286 (64%) 37/286 (13%)
Table 7.5: User reports of NAT support for UDP and TCP hole punching
Server 3 waits up to five seconds for this connection to succeed or fail, and if the connection attempt
is still “in progress” after five seconds, server 3 responds to server 2 with the “go-ahead” signal and
continues waiting for up to 20 seconds. Once the client finally receives server 2’s reply (which server
2 delayed waiting for server 3’s “go-ahead” signal), the client attempts an outbound connection to
server 3, effectively causing a simultaneous TCP open with server 3.
What happens during this test depends on the NAT’s behavior as follows. If the NAT properly
just drops server 3’s “unsolicited” incoming SYN packets, then nothing happens on the client’s
listen socket during the five second period before server 2 replies to the client. When the client
finally initiates its own connection to server 3, opening a hole through the NAT, the attempt succeeds
immediately. If on the other hand the NAT does not drop server 3’s unsolicited incoming SYNs but
allows them through (which is fine for hole punching but not ideal for security), then the client
receives an incoming TCP connection on its listen socket before receiving server 2’s reply. Finally,
if the NAT actively rejects server 3’s unsolicited incoming SYNs by sending back TCP RST packets,
then server 3 gives up and the client’s subsequent attempt to connect to server 3 fails.
To test hairpin translation for TCP, the client simply uses a secondary local TCP port to attempt
a connection to the public endpoint corresponding to its primary TCP port, in the same way as for
UDP.
7.6.2 Test Results
The NAT Check data we gathered consists of 380 reported data points covering a variety of NAT
router hardware from 68 vendors, as well as the NAT functionality built into different versions
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of eight popular operating systems. Only 335 of the total data points include results for UDP
hairpin translation, and only 286 data points include results for TCP, because we implemented these
features in later versions of NAT Check after we had already started gathering results. The data is
summarized by NAT vendor in Table 7.5; the table only individually lists vendors for which at least
five data points were available. The variations in the test results for a given vendor can be accounted
for by a variety of factors, such as different NAT devices or product lines sold by the same vendor,
different software or firmware versions of the same NAT implementation, different configurations,
and probably occasional NAT Check testing or reporting errors.
Out of the 380 reported data points for UDP, in 310 cases (82%) the NAT consistently translated
the client’s private endpoint, indicating basic compatibility with UDP hole punching. Support for
hairpin translation is much less common, however: of the 335 data points that include UDP hairpin
translation results, only 80 (24%) show hairpin translation support.
Out of the 286 data points for TCP, 184 (64%) show compatibility with TCP hole punching: the
NAT consistently translates the client’s private TCP endpoint, and does not send back RST packets
in response to unsolicited incoming connection attempts. Hairpin translation support is again much
less common: only 37 (13%) of the reports showed hairpin support for TCP.
Since these reports were generated by a “self-selecting” community of volunteers, they do not
constitute a random sample and thus do not necessarily represent the true distribution of the NATs in
common use. The results are nevertheless encouraging: it appears that the majority of commonly-
deployed NATs already support UDP and TCP hole punching at least in single-level NAT scenarios.
7.6.3 Testing Limitations
There are a few limitations in NAT Check’s current testing protocol that may cause misleading
results in some cases. First, we only learned recently that a few NAT implementations blindly
translate IP addresses they find in unknown application payloads, and the NAT Check protocol
currently does not protect itself from this behavior by obfuscating the IP addresses it transmits.
Second, NAT Check’s current hairpin translation checking may yield unnecessarily pessimistic
results because it does not use the full, two-way hole punching procedure for this test. NAT Check
currently assumes that a NAT supporting hairpin translation does not filter “incoming” hairpin con-
nections arriving from the private network in the way it would filter incoming connections arriving
at the public side of the NAT, because such filtering is unnecessary for security. We later realized,
however, that a NAT might simplistically treat any traffic directed at the NAT’s public ports as
“untrusted” regardless of its origin. We do not yet know which behavior is more common.
Finally, NAT implementations exist that consistently translate the client’s private endpoint as
long as only one client behind the NAT is using a particular private port number, but switch to
symmetric NAT or even worse behaviors if two or more clients with different IP addresses on the
private network try to communicate through the NAT from the same private port number. NAT
Check could only detect this behavior by requiring the user to run it on two or more client hosts
behind the NAT at the same time. Doing so would make NAT Check much more difficult to use,
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however, and impossible for users who only have one usable machine behind the NAT. Nevertheless,
we plan to implement this testing functionality as an option in a future version of NAT Check.
7.6.4 Corroboration of Results
Despite testing difficulties such as those above, our results are generally corroborated by those of a
large ISP, who recently found that of the top three consumer NAT router vendors, representing 86%
of the NATs observed on their network, all three vendors currently produce NATs compatible with
UDP hole punching [254]. Additional independent results recently obtained using the UDP-oriented
STUN protocol [124], and STUNT, a TCP-enabled extension [99, 101], also appear consistent with
our results. These latter studies provide more information on each NAT by testing a wider variety of
behaviors individually, instead of just testing for basic hole punching compatibility as NAT Check
does. Since these more extensive tests require multiple cooperating clients behind the NAT and thus
are more difficult to run, however, these results are so far available on a more limited variety of
NATs.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we first informally evaluated the currently implemented and deployed naming and
routing prototype from a high-level usability perspective, then delved into each of the alternative
approaches to routing in Sections 7.2–7.4, focusing on performance metrics such as success rate,
routing table size, and route stretch. Section 7.5 then evaluated UIA’s structured stream trans-
port from the perspective of responsiveness—a particularly important usability metric for personal
devices running highly interactive communication applications. Finally, Section 7.6 presented an
experimental study on the effectiveness of hole punching as a tool for optimize the UIA routing
layer or other peer-to-peer communication mechanisms.
A common conclusion that may be safely drawn from all of these sections is that the possible
design space in each functional area is vast and much more work will be needed to achieve the full
promise of “ubiquitous computing” using mobile personal devices, but the evaluation in this chapter
suggests that the ideas proposed in this thesis represent a promising stepping stone for the promise
of “ubiquitous computing.”
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Chapter 8
Related Work
UIA builds on a large body of related work in the areas of naming systems, location-independent
identifiers, gossip and optimistic replication protocols, and social networks. This chapter explores
the relationship of UIA and its components to prior work. The most important contributions of UIA
with respect to all of this prior work are the new abstractions that UIA introduces for personal device
connectivity, although Section 1.7 also lists other contributions in all the functional areas that don’t
necessarily involve new network abstractions:
• Personal groups built from pairwise introductions and managed without reference to central
authorities or services.
• Personal names supporting global connectivity between users and their personal devices,
without requiring global uniqueness.
• Structured streams for efficient, responsive communication between personal devices, de-
signed for delay-sensitive interactive applications that manage many communication activities
in parallel.
We first examine related work at the network architecture level, then work related to individual
UIA components.
8.1 Network Architectures
UIA’s basic usability goal of making personal device connectivity “just work,” without users having
to configure protocols or register with central services, is consistent with the classic ubiquitous com-
puting idea of trying to make computers “disappear” from the user’s consciousness [262]. UIA’s
technical design builds on and is heavily inspired by the Internet’s existing architecture [54], in-
cluding its foundation on best-effort packet-switched delivery and a separation of naming, routing,
transport, and application concerns. In addition, UIA adopts several existing architectural exten-
sions to the classic Internet that have been proposed before but not yet widely adopted.
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IP addresses are traditionally overloaded to serve the roles of both node identification and rout-
ing, causing both confusion and technical difficulties when nodes need to move while retaining
their logical identities [50, 160, 212, 221]. UIA incorporates the idea of splitting the “locator” and
“identifier” roles of Internet addresses, as developed in other architectures such as Nimrod [39,193],
HIP [165], FARA [52], JXTA [97], and i3 [237]. As in HIP, UIA borrows from SFS [158] the idea
of making node identifiers self-certifying by generating them from the hash of a public key. In
contrast with prior architectures, however, UIA supports not just identification of hosts but also the
convenient identification and management of personal groups of administratively related hosts, so
that users can identify and name each other via persistent, location-independent logical group iden-
tities whose specific device membership may change over time. UIA’s design also refines previous
notions of host identity by introducing cryptographic EIDs that securely identify not just a host but
a particular user on that host. Different users of a shared UIA host can run independent personal
network services without conflicting or requiring host-wide configuration, and network services can
leverage UIA names and EIDs to authenticate clients at user granularity.
UIA is also influenced by the architectural principle of application level framing [51]. One of
the primary goals of UIA’s structured stream transport is to provide transport objects that directly
mirror the structure of the “application data units” with which the application is concerned.
The Mobile People Architecture (MPA) [151] proposes adding a new “Person Layer” above the
Application Layer in the current Internet architecture, which provides each individual user with a
unique identifier and a Personal Proxy that acts as a central point of contact for the user regardless
of which personal device(s) he is using at the moment. The user’s Personal Proxy can for example
forward incoming calls to the mobile personal device the user is currently carrying, to a fixed device
at the user’s current location, or to the user’s voicemail if the user cannot be located. The Universal
Inbox [192] provides similar services, but implements them in the Internet core rather than at the
edges. MPA and Universal Inbox are complementary to UIA in that they address user location
tracking, call redirection, and media conversion, which UIA leaves to higher layers: it should be
natural to build services analogous to MPA’s “Person Layer” or the Universal Inbox atop UIA’s
naming and routing facilities. UIA on the other hand addresses the problem of making it easy for
technically unsophisticated users to build and manage groups of personal devices, a problem neither
MPA nor Universal Inbox addresses. UIA also supports communication within disconnected edge
networks, which fails in MPA and Universal Inbox because the user becomes unreachable by anyone
whenever the user’s Personal Proxy or other central intermediary services are unreachable.
UIA is a continuation of work begun with Unmanaged Internet Protocol [80, 81]. UIA extends
the earlier work with its personal naming system, new overlay routing algorithms, and the structured
stream transport.
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8.2 Naming
UIA’s personal naming model is inspired in part by SDSI/SPKI [71, 205]. Like SDSI, UIA allows
users to define locally-scoped personal names bound to cryptographic targets and groups to form
decentralized, composable namespaces. While SDSI associates public keys with users (principals)
and expects users to know about and manage their own public keys, however, UIA simplifies key
management by making each device responsible for creating and managing its own device-specific
key invisibly to the user. UIA devices form user identities out of cooperating groups of personal
devices, which the user builds through simple device introduction and merge. SDSI’s model for
designated certificate servers does not adapt well to disconnected mobile devices, however. UIA
handles lost or stolen devices without re-keying and thus losing the user’s identity.
UIA’s introduction process builds on previously explored ideas for secure associations, such
as the Resurrecting Duckling security model [233] and SPKI/SDSI introduction [65], but UIA is
unique in providing the ability to build symmetric, self-managing, distributed personal groups solely
out of pairwise introductions.
Existing Internet protocols can provide some of UIA’s naming features, but they require con-
figuration effort and technical expertise that deters even sophisticated users. Dynamic DNS [258]
can name devices with dynamic IP addresses, but requires configuration on both the name server
and the named device, and devices still become inaccessible when behind NAT. DNS Security [14]
cryptographically authenticates DNS names, but its administration cost has hindered deployment
even by the Internet’s root naming authorities, let alone by ordinary users.
Uniform Communication Identifiers [74] provide a common identifier for phone, E-mail, and
other forms of communication, along with a central address book shareable among communication
devices. HINTS [150] uses name-history trails to map obsolete user names to current ones. These
systems still rely on globally unique names with centralized registration and management, however.
Bonjour [11] allows devices to choose their own names on local-area networks, but these names
are insecure and ephemeral: any device can claim any name, and its name becomes invalid as soon
as it moves to a different network. UIA uses Bonjour libraries to discover new devices on the
local network, but UIA names persist and remain bound to the original target device despite later
migration.
DHT-based naming systems such as DDNS [57], i3 [237], and CoDoNS [194] provide new
mechanisms for resolving global names. TRIAD [47] provides content delivery and NAT traversal
by routing on global DNS names. In place of global names, UIA focuses on global connectivity via
personal names, which users can choose without the restriction of global uniqueness. In addition,
UIA’s optimistic replication of naming state keeps the user’s namespace available on his devices
even while disconnected from the Internet and its global name services or DHTs.
Ficus [104, 106], Coda [134], and Ivy [169] develop optimistic replication algorithms for file
systems, and Bayou [245] does so for databases. Rumor [105] and P-Grid [61] explore optimistic
data replication on mobile devices, Roma [242] uses one mobile device to offer central management
of data on other devices, and Footloose [178] uses mobile devices the user carries to propagate
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updates among other devices. UIA builds on all of this work to address distributed naming and ad
hoc group management, confronting the additional challenge of maintaining consistency when not
only the data content but the set of participants may change independently on different devices.
The design of UIA’s personal name system may have applicability beyond the domain of per-
sonal devices to other peer-to-peer systems. For example, systems such as SFR [24, 260] and
i3 [237] also identify network endpoints using cryptographically secure, but otherwise meaningless,
bit strings. UIA’s name system can be used to provide human-readable names to such endpoints in
a secure and user-friendly manner.
UIA’s support for naming and connecting to other users via personal group names effectively
creates an explicit social network, comparable to those maintained by popular web sites such as
friendster [91], orkut [176], and facebook [76], except in a completely decentralized fashion with
no central database. UIA’s social network could be useful to higher-level services and applications
for various purposes, such as sybil-resistant DHT key/value lookup [60] and other sybil-resistant
services [270, 271], and social data sharing, search, and storage systems such as Turtle [186],
SPROUT [154], F2F [146], and Tribler [190].
8.3 Routing
Existing Internet protocols can provide some of UIA’s connectivity features, but they require con-
figuration effort and technical expertise that deters even sophisticated users. Mobile IP [185] gives
a mobile device the illusion of a fixed IP address, but requires setting up a dedicated forwarding
server at a static, public IP address. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) [96] provide secure remote
access to corporate networks, but their infrastructure and administration requirements make them
unsuitable for deployment by average consumers for their personal networks.
A resilient overlay networks (RON) [9] serves a function similar in spirit to the UIA routing
layer, increasing the reliability of an IP network by detecting connectivity failures in the underlying
network and forwarding traffic around them. RON makes no attempt at scalability beyond a few
dozen nodes, however, and assumes that all participating nodes have unique IP addresses.
Several protocols have been developed to provide connectivity through firewalls and NATs, such
as SOCKS [144], STUN [209], and UPnP [255]. These special-purpose protocols are tied to the
characteristics and network topologies of commonly deployed NATs and firewalls, however, and
do not solve the more general problem of routing between different address domains connected in
arbitrary fashion.
The following sections examine related work specific to the specific routing methods explored
in UIA.
8.3.1 Social Routing
In classic distance-vector routing algorithms [127] such as RIP [110], as well as variants such as
MS [159], ExBF [44], WRP [168], and DSDV [184], each router continuously maintains routing in-
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formation about every other addressable node or subnet. In link-state algorithms such as OSPF [166]
and FSR [182], routers maintain complete network connectivity maps, achieving faster routing ta-
ble convergence and avoiding the looping problems of basic distance-vector algorithms. With all of
these protocols, however, each router requires at least O(N) storage for a network of size N , and
must regularly exchange connectivity information of size O(N) with each of its neighbors. Since
UIA is intended to run on personal mobile devices with limited storage and network bandwidth, but
which may be interconnected over the Internet in large numbers, it is not practical for each UIA
device to maintain individual records for every other UIA device in the network: thus, UIA requires
a more scalable approach. UIA’s social routing protocol achieves this scalability by limiting scope
to routing among social neighbors, whereas the other two schemes use distributed routing struc-
tures to provide scalable routing among arbitrary nodes while requiring limited state at each node.
In effect, UIA’s social routing protocol does not attempt to provide connectivity between arbitrary
graph nodes efficiently: instead it focuses on providing simple and efficient connectivity between
socially or administratively related nodes: i.e., a user’s own personal devices, and those of friends
and acquaintances.
Reactive or “on demand” routing algorithms designed for ad hoc networks, such as DSR [125]
and AODV [183], require routers to store information only about currently active routes, limit-
ing maintenance traffic and storage overheads on networks with localized traffic patterns. Routing
queries for distant nodes may have to be broadcast through most of the network before the desired
route is found, however, limiting the scalability of these protocols on networks with global traffic
patterns. The social routing protocol uses scoped flooding to locate and create a forwarding path to
an arbitrary node on demand, similar to ad hoc protocols like DSR and AODV, and to unstructured
peer-to-peer search mechanisms as in Gnutella [42]. UIA’s social routing algorithm performs this
flooding on a graph based on the user’s social network, however, rather than on a graph based on
the underlying physical topology. In this sense UIA is analogous to systems that leverage social
networks for other purposes, such as Turtle [186] and Tribler [190] for peer-to-peer file sharing,
SPROUT [154] and other DHTs [60] that leverage social networks for secure key lookup, and
F2F [146] for friend-to-friend data storage.
8.3.2 Identity Hash Routing
Distributed hash tables (DHTs) [19, 211, 236] provide scalable lookup of arbitrary flat identifiers
in large distributed address spaces, but tolerate only limited asymmetry or non-transitivity in the
underlying network [90]. UIA’s Identity Hash Routing scheme is inspired by DHTs, but it addresses
the more difficult problem of providing both resolution of flat identifiers and creating any necessary
forwarding paths over potentially arbitrary topologies with asymmetric connectivity.
Like IHR, ROFL [37] borrows DHT techniques to build a scalable routing mechanism. While
ROFL’s goal is to build a new routing infrastructure for the Internet core to replace BGP [200] and
other routing protocols based on structured CIDR [92] addresses, whereas IHR’s goal is to provide
a scalable routing overlay atop the Internet’s existing routing infrastructure, implemented primarily
175
by personal edge devices instead of core routers. Since it is relatively easy to deploy operating
system extensions incrementally on edge devices but difficult to modify Internet core routers and
routing protocols, the overlay approach is likely to be much easier to deploy in practice. ROFL
and IHR share the common limitation of offering no formal bound on stretch, and no obvious way
to modify the algorithms to guarantee such a bound; this limitation may be more of a problem for
ROFL, since it aspires to be the “primary” routing mechanism to forward IP traffic across many link
layer hops, whereas UIA’s overlay routing layer merely provides a “backup” routing mechanism
that forwards traffic over a few IP-level hops only when direct IP-level connectivity is unavailable.
8.3.3 Compact Routing
UIA’s compact routing protocol builds on recent theoretical work, which has produced a new class
of routing algorithms ensuring both small (sub-linear) routing table size on every node and bounded
worst-case stretch on arbitrary graphs [2, 15, 56, 247], Unfortunately it is not self-evident how to
convert any of these centralized, static algorithms into practical distributed protocols, let alone
deploy them on existing networks. UIA’s TZk-based protocol is intended to be one step toward
making formal compact routing algorithms practical.
Prior analysis of one compact routing algorithm indicates that the algorithm should provide
average-case stretch close to 1 on Internet-like graphs [140], even though its worst-case stretch is 3.
This analysis was done on a different algorithm by Thorup and Zwick from the one we use in this
paper, although both algorithms were presented in the same paper [247]. The two algorithms are
closely related, however, and may have similar average-case stretch properties.
Some formal analysis has also been done on the communication cost of responding to dynamic
topology changes. The worst-case cost is known to be proportional to network diameter, and thus
Ω(n) for arbitrary graphs [3]. Korman and Peleg presented a routing scheme that efficiently adapts
to changes in edge weights (but not additions or removals) in graphs with low local density [139].
Krioukov et al. noted that random scale-free graphs have high local density [141], shedding doubt on
the practicality of large-scale compact routing due to the control overhead of maintaining routing
tables. This cost analysis assumes however that routing tables are always recomputed on every
minor topology change such as a temporary link or router failure. UIA’s model assumes in contrast
that routing tables only need to be recomputed occasionally as the network’s nominal topology
evolves under administrative control, leaving temporary outages to be handled by redundancy built
into the routing algorithm and into lower-level networking layers.
UIA builds on prior work analyzing compact routing algorithms by examining other practical
aspects of routing protocol behavior not previously considered, such as route congestion and ro-
bustness to failures. UIA’s protocol has also been validated via simulation on a wider variety of real
and synthetic network topologies, and at much larger scales than has been done previously: e.g.,
one graph used is a Skitter [38] AS-adjacency graph containing about 190,000 nodes and 600,000
edges.
UIA’s TZk-based protocol implements name-dependent compact routing, meaning that the pro-
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tocol assigns each node a topology-sensitive locator that other nodes use to contact it. There
are name-independent schemes that accept arbitrary location-independent node labels [2, 15] and
have similar worst-case stretch, but their average-case stretch is generally higher than for name-
dependent routing, because any message must be sent to some node that knows the location of the
target before being forwarded to the target itself [141]. Since nodes on real networks usually ex-
change multiple messages in a conversation, it may be preferable for purposes of minimizing stretch
to perform a single address lookup in a directory of some kind, such as the DNS or a DHT, paying
this cost only once and then using more efficient routing for subsequent messages.
TZk’s hierarchy of landmarks is reminiscent of Landmark [253], and related hierarchical ad
hoc routing protocols such as LANMAR [94], L+ [43], and PeerNet [73], all of which dynamically
arrange mobile nodes into a tree. These protocols assign each node a hierarchical address corre-
sponding to its current location in this tree, and implement a location-independent identity-based
lookup service by which the current address of any node can be found. Each non-leaf node serves
as a landmark for all of its children, and is responsible for routing traffic to them from nodes outside
its local subtree. An important technical difference between TZk and landmark routing is that TZk
nodes do not fit into a strict hierarchy but instead choose their reference landmarks based on abso-
lute proximity. In TZk, for example, a level 2 reference landmark may be different from the level
2 reference landmark of the node’s level 1 reference landmark: that is, a node in TZk can choose
a “grandparent” different from its “parent’s parent.” This choice of landmarks based on absolute
proximity without imposing a strict hierarchy is a crucial property upon which TZk’s formal stretch
bound depends. Similar to landmark routing, however, TZk routes local traffic purely within the
lowest levels of the tree, providing scalability when traffic patterns are predominantly local. Since
global traffic must pass through the landmark nodes at the upper levels of the hierarchy, however,
these upper-level nodes may be overloaded in a network with global traffic patterns.
8.4 Transport
The popularity of SSL [64] and SSH tunneling [266] attest to the demand for multiplexing logical
streams onto a secure channel. MUX [95] and BEEP [206] similarly multiplex logical streams onto
one TCP stream, layering their own flow control atop TCP’s. These protocols exacerbate TCP’s
drawbacks, however, by totally ordering many unrelated activities so that one lost packet blocks
everything behind it.
SST builds on many ideas borrowed from other transports. RDP [179, 180] provides reliable
datagram delivery, in-sequence or as-available according to the application’s choice at connection
setup. SCTP [234] multiplexes multiple “streams of datagrams” onto one session, provides both
reliable and best-effort delivery, and supports “multihomed” endpoints for rapid failover. Its streams
do not have individual flow control, however, and cannot be dynamically created or destroyed, but
must be negotiated en masse at session startup. DCCP [137] is a best-effort datagram service with
congestion control, comparable to SST’s channel layer, but without SST’s packet security features.
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RDP, SCTP, and DCCP all suffer from the “large datagram” problem: datagrams with too many
fragments are almost certain to be lost or require many retransmissions.
SST does not provide multihoming as SCTP does, but its ability to attach streams to more than
one channel at once could be extended to support multihoming, or even to load-balance a stream
across multiple channels following different network paths. Since SST’s stream protocol relies on
the channel protocol for loss detection and congestion control, these mechanisms automatically op-
erate at channel—i.e., path—granularity. Performing “end-to-end” load balancing this way could
thus avoid both the harmful performance side-effects caused by load balancing in lower layers [27],
and the complexity of managing multi-path congestion and retransmission control in a stream trans-
port [122].
The need for efficient transport support for transaction-oriented application protocols has long
been recognized [31,35]. VMTP [46] supports lightweight RPC-style communication in a clustered
environment, but provides no congestion control and limits messages to 16KB. T/TCP [36] enhances
TCP to re-open recently-closed streams quickly, but this serial reuse has the same disadvantages as
HTTP/1.1 persistent connections without the benefits of pipelining [173].
TCP has also been extended to share congestion control state across streams [18, 249]. The
Congestion Manager [22] enables congestion control sharing across multiple transports; SST should
fit well into such an architecture if available.
Another TCP extension provides end-to-end support for host mobility [224]. SST’s separation
into channel and stream layers, and its ability to migrate streams across channels, provides a cleaner
solution reminiscent of a session layer [225].
The rich literature on prioritization in the network layer to ensure quality of service [272] is rele-
vant to SST’s use of prioritization in the transport layer to schedule an application’s streams relative
to each other. Hierarchical schemes [28] may be particularly well-matched to the structured stream
abstraction. SST’s channel layer could be enhanced with techniques developed in OverQoS [240]
to provide better QoS for aggregates of logical streams on ordinary Internet paths.
8.5 NAT Traversal
UDP hole punching was first explored and publicly documented by Dan Kegel [130], and is by
now well-known in peer-to-peer application communities. Important aspects of UDP hole punching
have also been indirectly documented in the specifications of several experimental protocols, such as
STUN [209], ICE [207], and Teredo [117]. We know of no existing published work that thoroughly
analyzes hole punching, however, or that points out the hairpin translation issue for multi-level NAT
(Section 5.2.5).
We also know of no prior work that develops TCP hole punching in the symmetric fashion
described here. Even the existence of the crucial SO_REUSEADDR/SO_REUSEPORToptions in the
Berkeley sockets API appears to be little-known among P2P application developers. NatTrav [72]
implements a similar but asymmetric TCP hole punching procedure outlined earlier in Section 5.3.5.
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NUTSS [101] and NATBLASTER [30] implement more complex TCP hole punching tricks that
can work around some of the bad NAT behaviors mentioned in Section 5.4, but they require the
rendezvous server to spoof source IP addresses, and they also require the client applications to have
access to “raw” sockets, usually available only at root or administrator privilege levels.
Protocols such as SOCKS [144], UPnP [255], and MIDCOM [231] allow applications to tra-
verse a NAT through explicit cooperation with the NAT. These protocols are not widely or con-
sistently supported by NAT vendors or applications, however, and do not appear to address the
increasingly important multi-level NAT scenarios. Explicit control of a NAT further requires the
application to locate the NAT and perhaps authenticate itself, which typically involves explicit user
configuration. When hole punching works, in contrast, it works with no user intervention.
Recent proposals such as Nimrod [39, 193], HIP [164], and FARA [52] extend the Internet’s
basic architecture by decoupling a host’s identity from its location [50, 160, 212, 221]. IPNL [88],
UIP [80, 81], and DOA [261] propose schemes for routing across NATs in such an architecture.
While such extensions are probably needed in the long term, hole punching enables applications
to work over the existing network infrastructure immediately with no protocol stack upgrades, and
leaves the notion of “host identity” for applications to define.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis has presented the Unmanaged Internet Architecture, a connectivity architecture for in-
teractive personal devices owned and managed by nontechnical users. The most important contribu-
tions of this architecture are three novel networking abstractions: personal groups built by pairwise
introduction and managed in a fully distributed fashion; personal names that provide global con-
nectivity despite being locally scoped to a user’s personal group for convenience; and structured
streams enabling interactive, delay-sensitive applications to manage concurrent transactions effec-
tively and obtain maximum responsiveness from given network conditions. The architecture builds
on the central theme of full decentralization, and is comprised of three components: a naming layer
implementing personal groups and personal names, a routing layer to provide connectivity among
those names, and a transport layer to support high-level application communication via the struc-
tured stream abstraction.
9.1 Decentralization
Avoiding unnecessary reliance on central services or authorities is a basic principle applied through-
out UIA’s design. This principle is motivated by three goals: preserving the user’s autonomy to
manage his own devices without having to register with some organization or get help from a tech-
nical expert; preserving connectivity among those devices even when they are connected only via
an isolated local-area network or a temporarilly disconnected Internet fragment; and preserving the
user’s privacy by avoiding an architectural requirement that some central service know the user’s
device names and where on the Internet they are located at all times.
While the decentralization principle applies most obviously to UIA’s naming and routing com-
ponents, it also factors into the motivation for UIA’s structured transport component, although less
directly. In a centralized client/server communication model, it may usually be assumed that the
server is “well-connected”—i.e., via a high-bandwidth, low-latency connection—and thus if there
is a high-latency component of the path it is probably on only one end (the client’s). As peer-to-
peer communication between personal devices becomes more common and universally supported,
however, it will be increasingly common for a peer-to-peer transport session to traverse two high-
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latency links, one for each peer, effectively doubling the total round-trip time and increasing the
user-observable responsiveness benefits of avoiding unnecessary serialization onto one TCP stream.
9.2 Naming
The UIA naming system provides a new approach for introducing, naming, and globally connecting
mobile devices, which is complementary to the traditional global name system embodied by the In-
ternet’s Domain Name System. UIA gives users persistent personal names for conveniently finding
and expressing who they want to talk to, what devices they wish to access, and who can access their
own devices.
Each device starts with a generic name for itself, such as laptop, and a cryptographic end-
system identifier to provide authentic and private communication. A user can merge devices to
form personal groups, which cooperate to maintain a distributed namespace by gossiping logs of
the user’s changes. A user’s group can name both the user’s devices and other users’ groups; users
can form links securely either by physical device introduction or via other trusted channels. Since
UIA names are local and personal, users need not register with central authorities to obtain scarce
globally unique names.
9.3 Routing
UIA’s overlay routing layer provides robust connectivity between personal devices, even as they
migrate among different attachment points having different IP addresses, must communicate from
behind firewalls and NATs, or have connectivity only to a limited set of nodes in an ad hoc edge
network and not to the main Internet. This thesis has explored three approaches to overlay routing,
each of which holds promise but also has limitations: social routing, identity hash routing, and
compact routing.
• Social Routing is UIA’s currently deployed overlay routing scheme, which uses ad hoc for-
warding through social neighbors’ devices to cope with a spectrum of connectivity environ-
ments while focusing on providing connectivity between nearby social neighbors. Scoped
flooding ensures robustness when groups of devices form isolated islands of connectivity, and
a social overlay enables devices to find a target’s current IP address efficiently when they have
Internet connectivity.
• Identity Hash Routing (IHR) builds on scalable structuring ideas borrowed from distributed
hash table (DHT) technology. Whereas conventional DHTs only provide a lookup service and
assume the underlying network is already fully connected, IHR builds a combined lookup
and routing service that can both locate a node by its flat, location-independent Endpoint
Identifier, and at the same time create a forwarding path to the node. IHR supports two
specific forwarding mechanisms: source routing and virtual links. Simulation experiments
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suggest that IHR should scale well and provide reasonably efficient paths in the common case,
although an important weakness of the algorithm is the absence of any formally guaranteed
bound on stretch, or path length inefficiency compared to shortest-path routing.
• Compact Routing builds on recent theoretical advances to build an overlay routing proto-
col that should provide both scalability and a formal stretch bound. The protocol selects a
hierarchy of landmarks and builds routing trees centered at each landmark; each node in the
network joins a limited number of routing trees and thus requires limited-size (e.g., logarith-
mic) routing tables. Simulation experiments suggest that this protocol should indeed scale
well, although it has two downsides: the routing scheme tends to create congestion around
high-level landmarks, which we can address either by selecting high-capacity, well-connected
nodes as high-level landmarks or by increasing the routing table sizes of individual nodes; and
the routing scheme depends on structured addresses, so a lookup mechanism such as a DHT
must be layered above it to make it fully usable as an overlay routing protocol for UIA.
One take-away message from this exploration is that there are clearly multiple ways to imple-
ment a routing service to fit into the UIA architecture, and none of them may be clearly dominant,
so in the long term it is probably important for UIA to remain agnostic as to which specific routing
scheme is used to connect clouds of personal devices.
9.4 Transport
UIA’s structured stream transport (SST) is designed to support application communication between
personal devices once the naming and routing layers have successfully located and connected to
a desired target device. The modern interactive applications that users wish to run on personal de-
vices typically involve many independent or concurrent transactions, as well as multimedia streams,
none of which TCP can support efficiently and responsively. Although UDP is always an option,
it is inconvenient when transactions are usually small but sometimes may be large because IP frag-
mentation only works well in practice up to a limited datagram size. SST subsumes both the TCP
stream and UDP datagram abstractions by enabling the application to create and manage many
fine-grained streams easily and efficiently, creating a new stream for each transaction and using
“ephemeral streams” in liu of datagrams. The central characteristic of the structured stream abstrac-
tion is a “fork” operation to create new child streams from an existing stream.
SST is in its infancy and will require refinement, more optimized implementation, further anal-
ysis, and integration into the UIA prototype. Structured streams nevertheless appear to be a promis-
ing enhancement to the classic reliable stream abstraction, in order to better support the needs of
modern, highly interactive applications for personal devices. SST’s multiplexing of independent
lightweight streams onto persistent channels gives applications the flexibility to match their use
of streams to their natural structure and transaction granularity, avoiding the start-up delays and
serialization imposed by TCP and the datagram size limitations of UDP.
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9.5 NAT Traversal
One of the UIA routing layer’s functions is to provide communication between personal devices that
are behind (the same or different) NATs. Although the UIA routing layer can address this require-
ment generically by forwarding all application traffic through a well-connected intermediary, more
efficient solutions are often available to this special case in the form of NAT traversal techniques.
Hole punching is a general-purpose NAT traversal technique that does not require any explicit
communication with the NATs involved. As long as the NATs involved meet certain behavioral
requirements, hole punching works consistently and robustly for both TCP and UDP communica-
tion, and can be implemented by ordinary applications with no special privileges or specific network
topology information. Hole punching fully preserves the transparency that is one of the most impor-
tant hallmarks and attractions of NAT, and works even with multiple levels of NAT—though certain
corner case situations require hairpin translation, a NAT feature not yet widely implemented. Now
that many of the “P2P-friendly NAT behaviors” described in this thesis including hairpin translation
are being standardized as part of the IETF’s BEHAVE working group [119], we might hope that the
percentage of NATs that support hole punching effectively will grow in the future.
9.6 Possible Barriers to Adoption
An important pragmatic consideration for any significantly new networking architecture such as
UIA is what barriers to adoption the new architecture is likely encounter in any attempt at large-scale
deployment. While we make no attempt in this thesis to explore this complex issue exhaustively, it
is worth briefly enumerating some of the most likely deployment challenges. These challenges may
be organized into three categories: technical, economic, and political.
9.6.1 Technical Barriers
There are of course many technical challenges to migrating existing operating systems and Internet
protocols to support a new networking architecture like UIA, some of which have been discussed
already throughout this thesis. In particular, the fact that UIA affects multiple architectural layers
means that various parts of the network protocol stack ideally need to be changed to effect a clean
and complete migration, and such changes in practice need to be incrementally deployable one de-
vice (or even one application) at a time without breaking interoperability with existing, “legacy”
systems in order to see widespread use in the real world. The current UIA prototype takes consid-
erable effort to address these incremental deployment challenges, but additional issues remain.
Operating System Modifications: The current UIA naming and routing prototype is designed
to be installed at system level and operate transparently to applications, but deploying operating
system extensions at least require the user to have administrative privilege. Many users in practice
do not have administrative privileges on at least some of the machines they use regularly, however,
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such as their work PCs. An implementation of the UIA naming and routing layers that can be linked
into and distributed with particular applications, operating entirely in user space like the prototype
SST transport library already does, could help address this barrier to adoption, but would bring with
it additional technical challenges such as making multiple UIA-enabled applications in one system
cooperate coherently with each other.
Heterogeneity of Devices and Operating Systems: In pursuing the goal of portability across
various operating systems, the current UIA naming and routing prototype is not as well-integrated
into any particular operating system as it needs to be for ease of installation and use by nontechnical
users, but cleanly integrating UIA into each of the many popular operating systems used in modern
personal devices—especially small mobile devices such as smart phones and Internet tablets, which
run a wide variety of embedded operating systems—is likely to be a major engineering challenge
requiring the support of the vendors of those devices.
Prevalence of Firewalls and NATs: While UIA’s overlay routing layer is designed to support
peer-to-peer communication between personal devices located behind firewalls or NATs, using traf-
fic forwarding or NAT traversal techniques as appropriate, the routing layer still depends on the
existence of some UIA-enabled devices that are not behind NATs or highly restrictive firewalls, in
order to provide those forwarding or NAT traversal rendezvous services. If the prevalence of NATs
and firewalls continues to increase, however, there may not be enough non-NATted UIA devices
within a user’s nearby social neighborhood to provide these forwarding or NAT traversal services
to the other devices, forcing UIA (and all other networking architectures and applications oriented
around peer-to-peer communication) into increasing reliance on centralized servers to provide these
forwarding and NAT traversal functions. Such a development would not prevent the deployment
of UIA—the routing layer’s “default peer” mechanism (Section 3.2.1) could make use of central
forwarding/rendezvous services provided by a device manufacturer or software vendor, for exam-
ple, or a user’s accounts in UIA-aware online services could act as “virtual UIA devices” providing
forwarding and rendezvous for the user’s “real” devices—a high effective reliance on central servers
due to the scarcity of “first-class” UIA devices may undermine the fault tolerance and disconnected
operation benefits of UIA’s fully decentralized design.
9.6.2 Economic Barriers
While surmounting the above technical barriers is probably possible, the amount of work it will re-
quire implies that such a project would eventually have to receive support and funding from a variety
of market players, such as the manufacturers of personal devices, and the vendors of the operating
systems and applications that run on them. On the positive side, there is clearly a lot of hardware
and software vendor interest in improving the power and capabilities of the networking features
in the personal devices they sell, including peer-to-peer naming and communication features, as
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evidenced by commercial initiatives such as Apple’s MobileMe service [13] and Microsoft’s Live
Mesh [161].
On the negative side, however (and equally evidenced by the above examples), market incentives
often tend to favor “vendor-specific walled garden” approaches, in which devices manufactured by
or running software written by one vendor work well together but do not easily interoperate with
those from other vendors. To be maximally useful, a personal device connectivity architecture
like UIA will ultimately require support across a wide variety of devices and operating systems.
Achieving such interoperability will in turn require standards development activity supported by
many device and software vendors in the industry, and the willingness of vendors to engage in such
standards activity may in turn hinge on the existence of a strong and vocal demand from users for
standards-based, cross-device, vendor-neutral personal device networking.
Another possible economic roadblock to the widespread deployment of a decentralized archi-
tecture like UIA is the common preference of device and software vendors for relying on centrally
managed services located in data centers and under full control of the vendor. From the vendor’s
perspective, such services have two important advantages over decentralized services running partly
on customers’ devices. First, the vendor always has full control of the data center servers running
the centralized service, and can for example roll out software upgrades all at once without having
to worry about maintaining backward compatibility with an arbitrary number of prior software ver-
sions that may still be running somewhere on some customer’s device. Second, a centralized design
gives vendors greater access to their customers’ information and activities, which they often like to
leverage for targeted advertising and other purposes. This latter advantage from vendors’ perspec-
tive of course may create secrecy and privacy issues from the customers’ perspective, so customers
that are particularly concerned with privacy may prefer more a decentralized connectivity architec-
ture like UIA.
9.6.3 Political Barriers
Finally, associated with the above “centralized versus decentralized” tension is the ongoing political
debate on the privacy rights of individuals versus the desire of governments to monitor personal
communications for law enforcement purposes. UIA’s architecture is based on the idea that an
individual should be able to use his personal devices to communicate freely with each other, and
with the devices of his friends and associates, via secure peer-to-peer communication channels that
are cryptographically authenticated and privacy protected to prevent eavesdropping or interference
from third parties or intermediaries within the network.
Although Western democratic systems have in theory generally upheld individuals’ rights to
engage in private communication of this form, until a few years ago strong encryption technolo-
gies were export-controlled in the US [126] and even banned entirely in France [197]. While the
laws pertaining to use of strong encryption were liberalized substantially due to their usefulness
for e-commerce, and this liberalization did not specifically distinguish between “peer-to-peer” and
“customer-vendor” communication, there is no fundamental reason legal regimes could not distin-
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guish between these different uses. It is not clear that there is the same level of economic power
backing the preservation of the right to private peer-to-peer communication as there is backing the
right to private customer-vendor communication: in fact the long series of severe anti-piracy laws
passed in the last decade in the US and elsewhere under the backing of large media companies, as
part of their war against online file sharing, suggests that the opposite is likely to be true. Thus, al-
though the private peer-to-peer communication capabilities provided by a connectivity architecture
like UIA are theoretically neutral to any particular (legal or illegal) use, the desires of both govern-
ments and large economic powers to monitor peer-to-peer communications for their own respective
purposes could ultimately represent a major political barrier to the widespread use and deployment
of an architecture like UIA in the long term.
9.7 Future Work
Although the results of this thesis suggest that the Unmanaged Internet Architecture provides a
promising approach to managing and globally connecting personal devices, many avenues for future
work remain, some of which this section highlights.
9.7.1 Naming
The UIA naming system currently operates only at the granularity of personal groups and devices,
but for many applications what the user cares about directly is not devices but logical distributed
applications or services [20]. If Alice makes a voice call to Bob, for example, she might prefer
her voice application to figure out automatically which of Bob’s devices he is currently reachable
at, as in the Mobile People Architecture [151] or Universal Inbox [192], instead of her having to
name a specific device as the target of the call. In other words, Alice wants to invoke Bob’s logical
voice communication service rather than a particular device, leaving the service itself to manage its
own distributed operation across Bob’s personal group. While it should already be possible to build
such distributed services atop the current UIA mechanisms as a separate layer, exploring the details
of how such services would operate and how they might be most cleanly integrated with the UIA
naming paradigm represents a compelling direction for future research.
UIA’s personal naming system is designed to coexist with DNS and support the concurrent use
of UIA’s personal names and DNS’s global names, but UIA and DNS currently use completely
different name resolution mechanisms: while DNS uses a client/server resolution protocol with
limited caching, UIA relies on optimistic replication of name records. It may be, however, that a
single name management and resolution protocol supporting a continuum of state replication poli-
cies, between completely uncached and completely replicated, could best serve the requirements of
both global and personal naming. Developing a clean, next-generation “unified naming protocol” of
this kind that supports both personal and global names effectively, while permitting a smooth tran-
sition from the legacy DNS protocols, may require considerable additional effort. Such a naming
protocol might be able to support both UIA-style personal names and DNS-style global names at
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once, however, which would would both reduce barriers to UIA’s adoption, since the change isn’t
“just for personal names” anymore, and provide the responsiveness benefits of UIA’s gossip-based
namespace synchronization model to the resolution of global names as well.
UIA currently provides no read access control for its namespaces, only write access control
via group ownership. Users may wish to hide certain names, such as links to business partners,
from view of the general public, or limit visibility of devices at work to business colleagues while
allowing family members to see devices at home. One difficulty in providing read access control
in UIA’s highly decentralized environment is that devices appear to require read access to a group
merely in order to determine who owns it for access control purposes, which may effectively limit
the usefulness of read access control. In order for Alice’s PC to authenticate a change record Bob
writes on his laptop to their shared PhotoClub group, for example, Alice’s PC (and any other
device that wishes to read this group) must be able to read Bob’s personal group to verify that Bob’s
laptop is indeed an indirect owner allowed to write to PhotoClub.
The UIA naming daemon currently assumes that groups are small and change infrequently, so
that it is reasonable for devices always to gossip entire groups and store change records forever (or
until the device is replaced or the user’s account wiped). The caching-based remote name resolution
protocol described in Section 2.3.6, which the current prototype does not yet implement, should
complement the current prototype’s gossip mechanism by allowing devices to resolve names in
large or rarely accessed groups held on other devices without replicating the entire group. Using
caching instead of replication for some groups comes at some cost in availability, of course, since it
is no longer guaranteed that the required name records will be available if all the owners of a remote
group are unreachable.
The current design also may not yet adequately address the gradual state buildup of name records
over long periods of time. A potentially useful modification to the current design would be for a
UIA device to keep a separate log for each group or series, and garbage collect logs of groups the
device does not own and has not accessed recently. A state checkpoint mechanism might similarly
enable devices to garbage collect old change records for groups they own.
UIA currently assumes that groups are owned by one person or a few people managing the
group by consensus: any group owner can modify the group without restriction. Users may wish to
configure groups so that changes require approval from multiple distinct owners, or to make some
owners more “trusted” than others. Treating a PC locked up in a data center as more trustworthy
than a laptop or cell phone could eliminate the risk of ownership disputes if the mobile device is
stolen, for example. The user would have to think ahead and perform more manual configuration,
however, and the consequences might be worse if the trusted PC is compromised.
As pointed out in Section 2.3.3, UIA’s current naming and revocation model can handle the
immediate re-keying of a device due to key compromise or algorithm obsolescence, but to support
smooth, gradual key or algorithm retirement it may be useful to allow a device to have multiple
EIDs at once during some “key transition period” after introducing a new EID but before revoking
the old one. There may be other reasons as well to allow a device to have multiple EIDs at once:
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so that the device can maintain a collection of keys with a diversity of cryptographic algorithms or
key strengths, for example, allowing the user to pick an algorithm or key strength appropriate to
the security requirements of a particular application or communication session. The current naming
system would interpret the presence of two device name records referring to different EIDs as a
name conflict, and thus would need to be modified to support multiple EIDs per device. One way to
support this feature would be to allow the “target” field of a device name record to contain an EID set
instead of just one EID. Another approach would be to re-apply UIA’s personal group management
algorithm at the “intra-device” level, so that a “personal device” is no longer an atomic entity but
is itself treated as a “group of keys,” and keys can be added or revoked according to mechanisms
analogous to those UIA currently uses to add or revoke devices in the user’s personal group.
As an alternative to the digital signature algorithm with which UIA normally signs namespace
change records, we are experimenting with incorporating Alpaca [145], a security framework based
on proof-carrying authentication [10], into the UIA personal naming model. In Alpaca, instead of
a signature, a change record contains a structured proof that the record’s meaning (e.g., “resolve
name x to EID y”) has been endorsed by the group owner. Proof-carrying authentication enables
new types of proofs to be created and deployed without changing the verifier’s code. We have used
this mechanism for example to create a UIA group whose records are certified by MIT’s central
X.509 certification authority (CA), so that alice.mit securely maps to the person the MIT CA
has endorsed as alice@mit.edu even though UIA contains no explicit code to check X.509 cer-
tificates. Since UIA’s goal is to provide a fully decentralized network architecture, proof-carrying
authentication furthers that goal by enabling decentralized development of new infrastructure fea-
tures.
9.7.2 Routing
The routing schemes explored in this thesis indicate several alternative approaches to implementing
the routing layer of the architecture, none of them can be considered the last word in routing for UIA,
and determining the best routing protocol design and developing it into a solid, widely deployable
implementation remains for future work. It is possible that the best routing layer design may result
from a combination of ideas from the routing schemes explored here: for example, leveraging the
naming layer’s social network for security and efficiently as in the current social routing scheme,
but doing so in the context of a larger scalable distributed structured such as those explored in the
Identity Hash Routing and Compact Routing schemes.
Social Routing Improvements
Apart from major new algorithmic work on UIA’s routing algorithms, The routing layer’s search al-
gorithm could be improved incrementally in many ways, such as by using additional hints from the
naming layer to improve its performance. To locate laptop.Charlie.Bob.Alice, for exam-
ple, it might first locate some device belonging to Bob and ask that device to locate laptop.Charlie.
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Since the goal of this approach to routing was to provide a simple but workable initial solution to
the routing problem, however, we defer the exploration of significant algorithmic improvements
to the subsequent sections on alternative approaches to UIA routing, namely identity hash routing
(Section 3.3) and compact routing (Section 3.4). Also, the social routing protocol does not yet but
should implement the NAT traversal optimizations described in Chapter 5.
Forwarding Protocol Limitations
The routing layer currently uses SSL over TCP for all UIA connectivity, including for tunneling the
UDP datagrams of legacy applications. Although the prototype router implementation benefitted in
the short term from the maturity and portability of SSL, the downside of using SSL over TCP is
that it unnecessarily serializes all upper-level protocol traffic into one stream, creating head-of-line
blocking problems in which one dropped packet delays all traffic (logically related or not) behind it
in the SSL stream. This serialization does not cause significant problems for many applications such
as HTTP [78] and SSH [174], but currently prevents the UIA prototype from being usable for delay-
or jitter-sensitive applications such as audio/video conferencing. The best solution would be to use
the new structured stream transport described in Chapter 4 as UIA’s secure forwarding substrate
for the overlay routing layer, and not just as a transport protocol to support applications. Another
alternative would be to use DTLS [202], an adaptation of SSL for UDP; or to use IPsec [131–133]
above the overlay routing layer.
When forwarding traffic across multiple UIA devices, the routing layer currently encrypts and
authenticates traffic both hop-by-hop and end-to-end, which is inefficient but provides strong secu-
rity. We intend to make hop-by-hop protection optional in the future.
Legacy Application Support
UIA’s legacy application interface currently cannot provide each user of a multi-user machine with
a fully separate TCP/UDP port space for its own EID, because the kernel’s protocol stack offers
no way to ensure that only a particular user’s applications can bind a socket to the device-local IP
address representing that user’s EID. Thus, without enhancing the kernel’s transport protocols, only
UIA-aware applications can make full use of personal EIDs. Fixing this issue requires changes to
kernel-level code and is thus less portable.
9.7.3 Transport
Some optional extensions to the SST wire protocol presented in this thesis may be desirable for
certain purposes, which could be negotiated at channel setup time. A payload chunking similar
to SCTP’s could allow transmitters to bundle several small stream-level segments into one packet
for more efficient use of the network, in media stream trunking scenarios for example. A payload
padding option as in IPsec’s ESP could help protect against traffic analysis. Some congestion con-
trol algorithms requiring cooperation between sender and receiver may similarly be negotiated at
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channel setup time.
The field sizes in the SST header format defined allow a host to send up to about 222 packets in
one round trip time, to create about 214 new streams per round trip to send about 216 bytes of data
immediately on a new stream before receiving the responder’s acknowledgment, and to send about
230 bytes of data per round trip on an established stream (the same as TCP’s maximum window
size). While these limits should be ample enough for common purposes, extremely high-bandwidth,
high-latency networks might benefit from a negotiable extended header format with wider fields to
support larger windows.
SST’s stream hierarchy provides an obvious potential affinity with hierarchical scheduling al-
gorithms such as Hierarchical Fair Queuing (HFQ) [112], Hierarchical Packet Fair Queuing (H-
PFQ) [28], and Lottery Scheduling [259], suggesting a simple, powerful, and flexible method of
ensuring fairness among an application’s concurrent communication activities. The naive approach
of matching the scheduling hierarchy exactly to the hereditary stream structure may be inadequate,
however, because of the an activity that was started for one reason might be continued for other
reasons. In a tabbed web browser that concurrently downloads several web pages, for example, a
low-priority web page might commence downloading a certain image that, as the web browser only
later discovers, a high-priority web page also needs. If the image download stream’s scheduling
priority is based only on its original context as a child of the low-priority web page, but the high-
priority web page needs to the image in order to complete, then a classic priority inversion scenario
results. Thus, a mechanism may be needed to allow scheduling contexts to be dynamically “trans-
ferred” within the hierarchy, or better yet, to allow a stream to be “multihomed” and given several
parent streams for scheduling purposes.
Finally, it is easy to envision SST’s stream attachment, detachment, and migration functionality
being extended to support features such as streams that can persist across long-term disconnec-
tion [225] or reboots of either endpoint, or streams whose endpoints can migrate from one endpoint
to another, reminiscent of distributed capabilities [8, 66, 195, 243].
9.7.4 Other Features
While UIA focused on naming, routing, and transport, there are many other functional areas that
bear reconsideration in terms of the requirements of modern personal devices, especially under the
additional challenging demands of UIA’s philosophy of full decentralization. Some important topics
that the current UIA design currently leaves untouched include:
• How to replicate and synchronize not just namespace state but also application-level data
across personal devices in a fully decentralized model like UIA’s.
• How to support the naming not only of devices and groups or “users” but also services effec-
tively, where a logical service might be distributed across several devices in an application-
specific fashion.
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• How best to allow new applications to interact with UIA for purposes of making security
decisions, such as supporting access control policies using UIA names, and the potential
security risks of doing so.
Inevitably, UIA can be said to have barely scratched the surface.
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